Decker v. Nhiager Thao
| Citation | 2023 IL App (1st) 220961 U |
| Decision Date | 07 April 2023 |
| Docket Number | 1-22-0961 |
| Parties | KRYSTAL DECKER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NHIAGER THAO; EDWARD ROMAN; and MARIA GUADALUPE ASCENCIO-BARAJAS, Defendants (Nhiager Thao, Defendant-Appellee). |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County No. 18 L 6190 Honorable Bridget J. Hughes, Judge presiding.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: In this negligence action, although we affirm the circuit's court ruling that granted defendant-appellee leave to file a motion for summary judgment, we reverse the court's ruling that granted him summary judgment where there was a genuine issue of material fact on the issue of proximate causation.
¶ 2 During a windy, rainy and foggy morning, Nhiager Thao's vehicle spun out on southbound Interstate 90 and came to rest predominantly in the far left lane of the highway. Krystal Decker was driving in the far left lane of the highway, but could not change lanes because of a truck, so she stopped her vehicle in front of Thao's vehicle. Upon seeing Thao visibly injured, Decker remained on the scene and called 911. While there, vehicles driven by Edward Roman and Maria Guadalupe Ascencio-Barajas rear-ended Decker. Decker suffered various injuries as a result of those collisions, including to her left knee. Decker sued Thao, Roman and Ascencio-Barajas for negligence. After the latter two defendants settled with Decker, Thao sought leave to file a motion for summary judgment. The circuit court granted Thao leave, and he filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Decker could not establish that he was a proximate cause of her injuries. The court agreed with Thao and granted his motion.
¶ 3 On appeal, Decker contends that the circuit court erred in granting Thao leave to file a motion for summary judgment and erred in granting Thao's motion for summary judgment. As to the latter contention, Decker posits that Thao's conduct that resulted in his vehicle becoming disabled on the highway was a proximate cause of her injuries and the court erred in determining the issue of proximate cause as a matter of law. For the reasons that follow, although the circuit court properly granted Thao leave to file a motion for summary judgment, we reverse the court's grant of summary judgment in his favor and remand the matter for further proceedings.
¶ 5 The following recitation of events is taken from the depositions of Thao, Decker and Roman. At somewhere between 4 and 5 a.m. on April 27, 2017, Thao was driving a cargo van southbound on Interstate 90 to pick up groceries for his sons' business. At the time, traffic was fairly light but it was raining heavily, very windy, dark and there was a light fog. A little less than a mile away from Division Street in Chicago, Thao moved from the right lane of the highway into the middle lane. At around Division Street Thao's vehicle "hydroplaned," and he suddenly lost control of it. His vehicle veered into the far right concrete barrier, and the force of the impact caused his vehicle to drift back and hit the left concrete median. Ultimately, Thao's vehicle came to rest predominantly in the far left lane, but straddled over a little into the middle lane. He was angled toward the median and facing oncoming traffic. Thao did not see the water that had pooled on the highway that he believed caused his vehicle to hydroplane and spin out. Thao was worried that his vehicle would explode, so he exited and walked toward the back of his vehicle.
¶ 6 Krystal Decker, an emergency medical technician, was on her way to work that morning in the far left lane of Interstate 90 when she observed Thao's vehicle disabled on the highway. Decker did not observe any headlights on Thao's vehicle due to the damage to its front. Upon approaching Thao's vehicle, Decker reduced her speed and stopped in the far left lane about five feet in front of Thao's vehicle. Decker believed there was a narrow shoulder, about the size of half a car or smaller, to the left of the far left lane. Although Decker contemplated changing lanes to the right, "[i]t wasn't safe to do so" because there was a truck in the adjacent lane. She put her hazard lights on, parked the vehicle and then looked to see if anyone was in the disabled vehicle. After not seeing anyone in the vehicle, she observed Thao emerge from the side of his vehicle hunched over appearing to be injured. Decker unbuckled her seat belt because, according to her, "by law," she had "a duty" to help Thao and rolled down her window. She asked Thao if he was hurt and if he had called 911. Thao told her that he was having some pain on the left side of his body. While speaking to Thao, Decker noticed that the vehicles behind them were not slowing down, and then she called 911. Around this time, Thao also decided he should call 911, so he went back to his vehicle to retrieve his cell phone. After Decker called 911, she was able to speak with a trooper from the Illinois State Police.
¶ 7 Edward Roman was driving on Interstate 90 that morning about 40-45 miles per hour in the far left lane when he observed both Thao and Decker's vehicles in front of him. From his vantage point, he thought that they had been involved in an accident and observed Decker's hazard lights on. As Roman approached their vehicles, he tried to change lanes, but there was another vehicle in the adjacent lane so Roman applied his brakes and tried to pull close to the narrow shoulder on the left side of the highway to avoid hitting Decker. As Roman neared Decker's vehicle, he observed Thao outside of his vehicle, which caused Roman to honk his horn.
¶ 8 While Decker was on the phone with the Illinois State Police trooper, she heard tires screeching and felt Roman's vehicle rear-end her, which caused her knee to slam into the dashboard. Decker believed it was only "[s]econds" from the time she stopped on the highway until Roman hit her. Roman exited his vehicle to make sure Decker was unharmed, and she responded that she was not seriously hurt. Roman also observed Thao outside of his vehicle and told him it was dangerous to be standing on the highway, so they needed to jump on top of the concrete median. Thao and Roman did so, and according to Roman, they jumped onto the median approximately two minutes after he rear-ended Decker. Not more than five minutes later, according to Roman, Ascencio-Barajas rear-ended Decker's vehicle. Decker, however, believed that Ascencio-Barajas hit her mere "[s]econds" after Roman did, though she was unsure whether it was 3 seconds or 60 seconds. The second collision caused Decker's knee to again slam into the dashboard. Despite being rear-ended twice, Decker's vehicle never made contact with Thao's vehicle. Decker stayed in her vehicle the entire time because she believed it was the safest place to be. Following the collisions, the police and paramedics arrived. An ambulance took Thao and Decker together to the hospital. Thao received a citation for driving "too fast," but during his deposition, he asserted that a traffic court dismissed the citation. As a result of the collisions, Decker received multiple injuries, including an injury to her left knee, which required surgery.
¶ 9 A little more than a year after the accidents, Decker sued Thao, Roman and Ascencio-Barajas, bringing one count of negligence against each of them. Only the count directed at Thao is relevant for this appeal. In that count, Decker alleged that Thao had a duty to maintain, operate and control his vehicle in a manner to not cause injuries to others lawfully traveling along the highway. Decker claimed that Thao breached this duty by driving too fast based on the conditions, driving without brakes adequate to control his vehicle's movement, unnecessary hindering and obstructing her by blocking traffic, and improperly failing to change lanes in a reasonable and safe manner, all in violation of various provisions of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Code). See 625 ILCS 5/11-601; 11-709; 11-1416; 12-301 (West 2016). Decker asserted that, as a direct and proximate result of these violations, Thao's "vehicle struck the front of [her] vehicle" and caused her injuries.[1]
¶ 10 Thao filed an answer to Decker's complaint, denying all material allegations and that his conduct proximately caused her injuries. Additionally, Thao raised multiple affirmative defenses, including that Decker was comparatively negligent. Decker, in turn, denied each and every allegation contained in Thao's affirmative defenses. Roman and Ascencio-Barajas filed their own answers and affirmative defenses. Additionally, all three defendants filed counterclaims for contribution against each other. Discovery ensued.
¶ 11 In September 2019, the circuit court set the case for trial to begin the following year, but due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the trial date was abandoned. On December 16, 2020, the circuit court ordered all fact discovery closed, and on July 21, 2021, the court certified the case for trial. In the court's trial certification order, it stated that "[n]o dispositive motions are pending and none will be filed by any party prior to trial." Two months later, the court set the case for trial on December 13, 2021.
¶ 12 Four days before the scheduled trial, Roman and Ascencio-Barajas, individually, filed motions for findings of good-faith settlements with Decker, and they requested their dismissal from the litigation. The next day, Decker filed an emergency motion for...
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