Decker v. Sargeant
Decision Date | 15 October 1890 |
Docket Number | 15,784 |
Citation | 25 N.E. 458,125 Ind. 404 |
Parties | Decker v. Sargeant |
Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
From the Porter Circuit Court.
Judgment affirmed, with costs.
N. L Agnew and D. E. Kelly, for appellant.
A. D Bartholomew, for appellee.
The facts, as disclosed by the record, may be briefly stated, and are as follows: On the 16th and 17th days of June, 1890, the appellant was the keeper of a saloon in the city of Valparaiso, wherein he retailed intoxicating liquors to be used upon the premises. He held a license from the State, and likewise from the city.
At the dates named there was an ordinance in force in said city (if the common council had the power to enact such an ordinance) as follows:
On the 25th day of June a prosecution was instituted before the mayor of said city against the appellant, to recover a penalty for a violation of said ordinance between the dates first named, and he was, as the result of said prosecution, found guilty of a violation of said ordinance and adjudged to pay a penalty of five dollars and costs, and that he stand committed until said fine and costs were paid or replevied. The appellant having failed to pay or replevy the said judgment, the said mayor issued his mittimus committing the appellant to the jail of Porter county and in charge of the appellee, the sheriff of the county and ex officio its jailer. To obtain his release from said commitment and his discharge from any liability on account of said judgment, this proceeding was instituted.
There are two errors assigned, but in argument appellant's counsel present for our consideration but one question, had the common council the power to enact the ordinance in question?
Counsel for the appellee contends that there is a further question which he insists meets us at the threshold and blocks the way to a consideration of the question which the appellant asks us to consider. The appellee contends that the judgment of the mayor of Valparaiso can not be attacked collaterally, except for want of jurisdiction, and that this proceeding is but a collateral attack upon the judgment and does not proceed upon the theory that the court was without jurisdiction.
In view of the conclusion which we have reached upon the question which the appellant brings before us, we have not found it necessary to consider the other question.
The appellant, but for his license, would not have had the right...
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