DeCook v. Olmsted Med. Ctr., Inc.
| Citation | 875 N.W.2d 263 |
| Decision Date | 17 February 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. A14–1180.,A14–1180. |
| Parties | Jennifer L. DeCOOK, et al., Respondents/Cross–Appellants, v. OLMSTED MEDICAL CENTER, INC., Brenda J. Hanson, R.N., and Darlene M. Pratt, R.N., Appellants/Cross–Respondents, Kenneth M. Palmer, M.D., Jack F. Perrone, M.D., Kimberly McKeon, M.D., and Ashley Morrow, R.N., Cross–Respondents. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Minnesota (US) |
Kay Nord Hunt, Lommen Abdo, PA, Minneapolis, Minnesota, and Patrick A. Thronson, Janet, Jenner & Suggs, LLC, Baltimore, Maryland, for respondents/cross-appellants.
Mark A. Solheim, Paula Duggan Vraa, Margaret Jennings Meier, Larson King LLP, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for appellants/cross-respondents and cross-respondent Morrow.
Douglas S. Knott, Samuel J. Leib, Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker LLP, Milwaukee, Wisconsin for cross-respondent Palmer.
Robert G. Benner, Dunlap & Seeger, P.A., Rochester, Minnesota, and Peter G. Syregelas, Pretzel & Stouffer, Chartered, Chicago, Illinois, for cross-respondents Perrone and McKeon.
Mark R. Bradford, Frank Aba–Onu, Bassford Remele, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota, for amicus curiae Minnesota Defense Lawyers Association.
In this appeal from the denial of a motion to dismiss for insufficiency of process, we consider the question of whether a summons and complaint signed by an attorney licensed outside the state of Minnesota are legal nullities, or whether the defective signature may be cured. In the related conditional cross-appeal, we consider whether the district court erred in granting a motion to dismiss as to several defendants for insufficiency of service. Because we conclude that the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure afford a district court the discretion to allow an amendment to cure a defective signature on a summons and complaint, we affirm the court of appeals' judgment in part. However, because we conclude that the plaintiffs produced sufficient evidence of effective service to shift the burden to the defendants to prove that service was not effective and that burden was not carried, we reverse in part.
On January 22, 2010, Mya DeCook—the daughter of Jennifer and Ryan DeCook—was born at Olmsted Medical Center (the Medical Center) in Rochester. In January 2014, Stephen Offutt and Patrick Thronson, attorneys for the DeCooks, contacted the Medical Center's risk management department to discuss how to serve process upon the Medical Center and the doctors and nurses involved in Mya's birth in order to commence a medical malpractice suit.1 Though the record does not reflect that the attorneys contacted the doctors and nurses themselves, the Medical Center's compliance officer, Barbara Graham, told the attorneys that, "if by email, I am authorized to accept service for the 3 physicians [Palmer, Perrone, and McKeon] ... and for the 2 named nurses [Hanson and Pratt]."
At that time, the identity of Nurse Morrow was unknown, and she was listed on the case caption as "Jane Doe, R.N." After Graham determined that Jane Doe was in fact Nurse Morrow, Graham contacted Offutt and inquired about revising the caption to add Morrow's name. In that email, Graham also confirmed that she had obtained Morrow's authorization for Graham to accept service of process, stating that Morrow "has given me her ok to accept service for her."
Relying on Graham's representations, the DeCooks' attorneys attempted to serve the Medical Center and the six individual defendants by emailing a copy of the summons and complaint to Graham on January 14, 2014. Although the signature blocks in the summons and complaint bore the printed names of both Offutt (licensed to practice in Minnesota) and Thronson (licensed only in Maryland), the documents were signed only by Thronson. Graham signed and returned an acceptance of service form on January 15, stating: "I, Barbara Graham, R.N., Compliance Office of Olmsted Medical Center, hereby admit and accept service.... on behalf of" the Medical Center and each of the six individual defendants.
On January 31, 2014, all defendants filed a Joint and Separate Motion to Dismiss based on Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(b) (), (c) (insufficient process), and (d) (insufficient service of process). Thronson contacted the attorney who filed the motion in an attempt to learn more, but was unsuccessful. Thronson and Offutt, concerned by the motion, sent copies of the summons and complaint (still signed only by Thronson) to the appropriate sheriff's offices for personal service upon the defendants. Sheriff's deputies personally served Nurse Pratt on February 24 and Nurse Hanson on February 27. Also on February 27, a sheriff's deputy attempted to serve the remaining defendants by leaving copies of the process at the Medical Center with an employee.
The defendants filed a memorandum in support of their motion to dismiss on March 4, 2014, arguing that the summons and complaint were void because they contained only Thronson's signature, that the defendants were never served personally, and that the purported service via email was ineffective. The defendants filed affidavits from Graham in support of the motion. Neither of Graham's two affidavits denied that the six individual defendants had authorized her to accept service of process by email on their behalf, and no defendant filed an affidavit denying that he or she had given Graham such authorization. In response, Offutt promptly appended his signature to a copy of the summons and complaint, and the amended summons and complaint were again mailed to the appropriate sheriffs for service. Again, Pratt and Hanson were personally served, and the process for the remaining defendants was left with an employee at the Medical Center.
The district court denied the motions to dismiss for insufficient process, reasoning that, although the summons and complaint were defective due to the lack of a Minnesota attorney's signature, the Rules of Civil Procedure granted the court discretion to allow the summons and complaint to be cured by amendment, which the court allowed. The court also denied the motions to dismiss for insufficient service of process as to the Medical Center, Pratt, and Hanson, but granted the motions with respect to the remaining defendants.2 The court found that Pratt and Hanson had been personally served in accordance with Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.03, and that the Medical Center had been validly served through the email to Graham.3
The Medical Center, Pratt, and Hanson appealed, arguing that the summons and complaint were legal nullities and that the court erred in allowing the DeCooks to amend them. The DeCooks filed a cross-appeal, arguing that the district court erred in concluding that the January 14 email to Graham did not constitute effective service upon the six individual defendants. The court of appeals affirmed, DeCook v. Olmsted Med. Ctr., No. A14–1180, 2015 WL 1880319 (Minn.App. Apr. 27, 2015), and we granted review of both appeals.4
We turn first to the issue of whether a summons and a complaint signed by an attorney not licensed in Minnesota are legal nullities. Answering this question requires us to interpret Minnesota's Rules of Civil Procedure and applicable statutes. Such interpretation presents questions of law which we review de novo. Walsh v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 851 N.W.2d 598, 601 (Minn.2014).
The Minnesota rules of court are clear on the need for pleadings such as a complaint to be signed by an attorney licensed in Minnesota. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 11.01 ; Minn. Gen. R. Prac. 5. A complaint lacking the signature of a Minnesota attorney is defective. The rules also require a summons to be "subscribed by the plaintiff or by the plaintiff's attorney."
Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.01. In keeping with statutory requirements that attorneys not licensed in Minnesota may not practice in the state, see Minn.Stat. § 481.02, we conclude that the Rule 4.01 imperative that a summons be subscribed by the plaintiff "or by the plaintiff's attorney" requires that a summons not subscribed by the plaintiff be subscribed by an attorney licensed to practice in Minnesota. Accordingly, a summons is defective if it is not subscribed by either the plaintiff or an attorney licensed to practice law in Minnesota. Here, both the summons and the complaint were defective.
Citing our decision in Herrick v. Morrill, 37 Minn. 250, 252, 33 N.W. 849, 850 (1887), the DeCooks argue that the summons was not defective at all because Offutt's printed name on the summons' signature block constituted a valid "subscription" of the summons. This argument was not made at the court of appeals and thus is arguably forfeited here. In the interests of clarifying the law for Minnesota practitioners, however, we choose to address it. Herrick's analysis is not applicable here, as Herrick was decided many decades before the effective date (1952) of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure, which apply here.
Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 4.01 requires a summons to be "subscribed by the plaintiff or by the plaintiff's attorney." "Subscribed" means "signed." See The American Heritage Dictionary 1737 (5th ed.2011) ("to sign (one's name) at the end of a document...."); Black's Law Dictionary 1655 (10th ed.2014) (containing four relevant definitions, all of which contemplate a written signature). Further, Rule 11.01 requires "[e]very pleading, written motion, and other similar document" to be "signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's individual name" if the party is represented. Minn. R. Civ. P. 11.01. Even if a summons is not a "similar document" to a pleading or motion such that it is covered by Rule 11, no good reason exists for different rules to govern a summons as opposed to all other important court documents. We conclude that Rule 4.01's subscription requirement means the summons must be signed.
The DeCooks also argue that the complaint was not defective, as Offutt ratified Thronson's signature on the complaint by instructing Thronson to sign Offutt's name...
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