DeCoursey v. Murad, LLC
| Decision Date | 16 May 2023 |
| Docket Number | 3:22-cv-353 (AMN/ML) |
| Parties | JESSICA DECOURSEY and GRACE SIT, on behalf of themselves and a class of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. MURAD, LLC, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York |
LEVI & KORSINSKY, LLP Mark S. Reich Courtney E. Maccarone (admitted pro hac vice) Gary I. Ishimoto (admitted pro hac vice) Attorneys for Plaintiffs
DENTONS U.S. LLP Michael Duvall Grant J. Ankrom (admitted pro hac vice) Michael E. Harriss (admitted pro hac vice) Attorneys for Defendant
Plaintiffs Jessica DeCoursey and Grace Sit (“Plaintiffs”) bring this proposed class action under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) against Defendant Murad, LLC (“Defendant”), seeking compensatory and other monetary relief, injunctive, declaratory, and other equitable relief, and costs and attorneys' fees. Dkt. No. 1 at 34. In the Complaint, Plaintiffs assert six causes of action on behalf of consumers who purchased at least one of Defendant's cosmetic products (the “Affected Murad Products”)[1] containing color additives which are alleged to be unsafe for use in the eye area (the “Unsafe Color Additives”),[2] as follows: (1) breach of implied warranty on behalf of a Nationwide Class[3] (Count I); (2) violation of New York General Business Law (“GBL”) § 349 on behalf of a New York Subclass[4] (Count II); (3) violation of GBL § 350 on behalf of the New York Subclass (Count III); (4) violation of the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act (“MMPA”) on behalf of a Missouri Subclass[5] (Count IV); (5) negligence - failure to warn, on behalf of the Nationwide Class (Count V)[6]; and (6) unjust enrichment on behalf of the Nationwide Class (Count VI). Id. at ¶¶ 78, 73-148.
Defendant has moved to dismiss certain of the claims in the Complaint under (1) Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction; (2) Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim; and (3) Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) for lack of standing to seek injunctive relief.[7] Dkt. No. 18. Plaintiffs opposed Defendant's motion to dismiss and submitted Declarations in support of their Opposition.[8] Dkt. No. 23. Defendant replied. Dkt. No. 24. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part.
The following facts are drawn from the Complaint and assumed to be true for purposes of this motion. See Div. 1181 Amalgamated Transit Union-N.Y. Emps. Pension Fund v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 9 F.4th 91, 94 (2d Cir. 2021) (per curiam).
Defendant is a Delaware company with its principal place of business in El Segundo, California. Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 17. The proposed classes are comprised of consumers who purchased at least one of the Affected Murad Products, each of which contain at least one color additive that the FDA has prohibited in cosmetics intended for use in the eye area. Id. at ¶¶ 3-4, 24-31; see also 21 CFR §§ 74.2304 (FD&C Red No. 4), 74.2333 (D&C Red No. 33), 74.2254 (D&C Orange No. 4); 21 U.S.C. § 379e(a)(1)(A).
Plaintiffs allege that Defendant “designs, formulates, manufactures, markets, advertises, distributes, and sells the Affected Murad Products both directly, and through authorized sellers, to consumers throughout the United States.” Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 2. Plaintiffs further allege that Defendant knew or should have known of the dangers of using the Affected Murad Products in the eye area, and despite this, directed consumers through its advertising, marketing, and instructional videos, to use each of the Affected Murad Products in the eye area. Id. at ¶¶ 5-7, 10-11. For example, Defendant's website[9] instructs consumers to “gently pat Retinol Youth Renewal Eye Serum around under-eyes and lids.” Id. at ¶ 46.
(Image Omitted)
See, e.g., id.[10]
Plaintiffs allege that Defendant could have either “produced the Affected Murad products without the unsafe color additives” or included a “prominent and conspicuous” safety warning alerting consumers that the products should not be used in the eye area. Id. at ¶¶ 8, 59-60. Plaintiffs further allege that had they and the putative class members known these products were unsafe for use in the eye area, they would have either not purchased the products or paid substantially less for them. Id. at ¶¶ 9-11.[11] As to the individual Plaintiffs, Plaintiff DeCoursey alleges she is a resident and citizen of New York and that in November 2021, she purchased Retinol Youth Renewal Eye Serum at an Ulta retail store located in Ithaca, New York. Id. at ¶ 15. DeCoursey further alleges that in June 2021, she purchased Retinol Youth Renewal Serum from an Ulta retail store located in Dickson City, Pennsylvania, and in November 2021, she purchased Retinol Youth Renewal Serum and Retinol Youth Renewal Night Cream from a CosmoProf retail store located in Scranton, Pennsylvania. Id. DeCoursey alleges that she relied on Defendant's representations and warranties in the accompanying labels and disclosures when deciding to purchase these products and would not have purchased the products had she known they contained unsafe color additives. Id.
Plaintiff Sit alleges she is a resident and citizen of Missouri, and that in or around 2020, she purchased Retinol Youth Renewal Night Cream from a Macy's retail store located in St. Peters, Missouri, and in the summer of 2021, she purchased Clarifying Oil-Free Water Gel from a Walmart retail store located in either St. Peters or O'Fallon, Missouri. Id. at ¶ 16. Sit also alleges that she relied on Defendant's representations and warranties in the labels and disclosures, and had she known the products contained unsafe color additives, she would not have purchased them. Id.
Defendant challenges the Court's personal jurisdiction over (1) Plaintiff DeCoursey's claims regarding her purchases of the Affected Murad Products in Pennsylvania; (2) Plaintiff Sit's claims regarding her purchases of the Affected Murad Products in Missouri; and (3) absent class members' claims regarding purchases of the Affected Murad Products outside of New York. Dkt. No. 18 at 6.
“When a defendant moves to dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(2) for want of personal jurisdiction, courts must perform a two-part analysis.” Harris v. Ware, No. 04-CV-1120, 2005 WL 503935, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2005). “First, personal jurisdiction over a defendant must be established under the law of the state where the federal court sits.” Id. (citation omitted). “Second, if jurisdiction is established under the governing statute, courts must determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction under the relevant state law would violate the defendant's due process rights.” Id. (citation omitted).
When “evaluating the parties' submissions, the Court will read the Complaint and submissions in the light most favorable to Plaintiff.” Daou v. Early Advantage, LLC, 410 F.Supp.2d 82, 88-89 (N.D.N.Y. 2006) (citations omitted). Unless a court conducts “a full-blown evidentiary hearing,” the plaintiff only needs to make “a prima facie showing of jurisdiction through its own affidavits and supporting materials to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2).” Harris, 2005 WL 503935, at *1 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “In other words, prior to discovery, a plaintiff may defeat a jurisdiction-testing motion by pleading in good faith ... legally sufficient allegations of jurisdiction.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). However, “[i]f the plaintiff fails to make the requisite showing, [the Court] may dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2).” Id.
Defendant has also moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims for failure to state a claim. A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a party's claim for relief. SeePatane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 111-12 (2d Cir. 2007). In considering legal sufficiency, a court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in the pleader's favor. SeeATSICommc'ns, Inc. v. ShaarFund,Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). This presumption, however, does not extend to legal conclusions. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted). Although a court's review of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is generally limited to the facts presented in the pleadings, the court may consider documents that are “integral” to the pleadings even if they are neither physically attached to, nor incorporated by reference into, the pleadings. See Mangiafico v. Blumenthal, 471 F.3d 391, 398 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152-53 (2d Cir. 2002)).
To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a party need only plead “a short and plain statement of the claim,” with sufficient factual “heft to ‘sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief,'” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)). Under this standard, the pleading's “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right of relief above the speculative level,” id. at 555 (citation omitted), and present claims that are “plausible on [their] face,” id. at 570. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability, it ‘stops short of the...
To continue reading
Request your trial