DeCurtis v. Visconti, Boren & Campbell Ltd.
| Decision Date | 16 June 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 2019-245-Appeal.,PC 12-4078,2019-245-Appeal. |
| Citation | 252 A.3d 765 |
| Parties | Sergio A. DECURTIS v. VISCONTI, BOREN & CAMPBELL LTD. et al. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Stephen J. Brouillard, Esq., Theresa L. Sousa, Esq., for Plaintiff.
Michael B. Forte, Jr., Esq., Joseph F. Penza, Jr., Esq., for Defendants.
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, and Long, JJ.
Justice Long, for the Court.
The plaintiff, Sergio DeCurtis (plaintiff or Mr. DeCurtis), appeals from a partial final judgment of the Superior Court in favor of the defendants, Visconti, Boren & Campbell Ltd. (VBC) and Richard Boren (collectively defendants), in this action alleging that the defendants committed legal malpractice in the drafting of Mr. DeCurtis's antenuptial agreement and in rendering advice related to that agreement and a postnuptial agreement. This case came before the Supreme Court pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. After considering the parties’ written and oral submissions, and after reviewing the record, we conclude that cause has not been shown and that this case may be decided without further briefing or argument. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we vacate the judgment of the Superior Court.
The reader may find the facts of this case somewhat familiar, as this case has previously been before this Court. Our prior decision may be found at DeCurtis v. Visconti, Boren & Campbell, Ltd. , 152 A.3d 413 (R.I. 2017). The facts discussed herein are only those relevant to the instant appeal.
On March 2, 2000, Mr. DeCurtis engaged VBC, the law firm that employed Attorney Boren at the time, to draft an antenuptial agreement for him and his then-fiancée, Michelle Tondreault. On March 22, 2000, Mr. DeCurtis and Ms. Tondreault executed the agreement, without making any changes to VBC's draft, and they were married a few days later.
In 2005, Ms. Tondreault filed the first of what would be two divorce petitions in the Family Court. The couple ultimately negotiated a settlement, and the 2005 petition was dismissed after the couple executed a postnuptial agreement, which was drafted by Attorney Boren. In June 2010, Ms. Tondreault again filed for divorce. In advance of trial, she filed a memorandum wherein she asserted that neither the antenuptial agreement nor the postnuptial agreement excluded from equitable distribution the parties’ earnings, income, or assets earned or acquired during the marriage. Moreover, she argued that separate property, as defined in a valid antenuptial agreement, is not "forever frozen" as separate property in light of this Court's opinion in Marsocci v. Marsocci , 911 A.2d 690 (R.I. 2006). Mr. DeCurtis, in his pretrial memorandum, countered that income and earnings received during the marriage retain their status as separate property. He also argued that Marsocci is distinguishable because the antenuptial agreement at issue in that case lacked a transmutation clause, unlike the antenuptial agreement executed by Ms. Tondreault and Mr. DeCurtis.1
The case was reached for trial on June 21, 2011. Prior to opening arguments, the Family Court justice admitted the antenuptial and postnuptial agreements as joint exhibits and confirmed that neither party intended to offer "any supplemental evidence * * * indicating what the language [of the agreements] means or the interpretation[.]" The justice then informed the parties that, under his reading of the law and the two agreements, "income that was derived during the period of the marriage" was not excluded from the marital estate.2 Following this pronouncement from the Family Court justice, Mr. DeCurtis indicated that he believed that his income would not become part of the marital estate to be divided between him and Ms. Tondreault upon divorce. The justice explained to Mr. DeCurtis that that was the "opposite" of his reading of the law, and the trial commenced. The couple agreed to settle the matter a few days later.
Thereafter, on August 8, 2012, Mr. DeCurtis filed a three-count complaint in the present case against defendants in Superior Court. Mr. DeCurtis alleged professional negligence and breach of fiduciary duty against Attorney Boren and vicarious liability against VBC for the acts of Attorney Boren. More specifically, Mr. DeCurtis alleged that Attorney Boren had failed to draft the antenuptial agreement to protect his assets and failed to advise him "of any risk associated with commingling his premarital assets" with marital property.3 The defendants filed an answer and asserted various affirmative defenses, including the defenses of voluntary payment and failure to mitigate damages.
The parties engaged in discovery, during which a dispute arose regarding the discoverability of antenuptial and postnuptial agreements drafted by Attorney Boren for other clients. That issue came before this Court by way of defendants’ petition for certiorari, which we granted, and in January 2017, we issued our decision in DeCurtis , cited supra . As we have noted, the facts and details of that decision are not relevant to the instant appeal and thus are not repeated here.
Upon remand to the Superior Court for further proceedings, Mr. DeCurtis moved for partial summary judgment. He asked the Superior Court to decide three issues as a matter of law. First, he asked the court to determine that Attorney Boren was not "exonerate[d]" from his alleged malpractice in drafting the antenuptial agreement because of a potential change in the law based on our decision in Marsocci , cited supra , or, alternatively, to certify a question to this Court to clarify the meaning of Marsocci . Second, plaintiff asked the court to determine, as a matter of law, that the antenuptial agreement drafted by Attorney Boren did not contain language to protect plaintiff's earnings. Third, and finally, plaintiff asked the court to determine that the voluntary-payment defense asserted by defendants had not been recognized in Rhode Island, was the minority view, was inapplicable to this case because the settlement payment was not voluntary, and contravened plaintiff's duty to mitigate his damages.
The defendants filed an objection and a cross-motion for summary judgment on June 18, 2018. The defendants raised five arguments in support of their motion. They argued that Attorney Boren was entitled to two forms of immunity: (1) immunity due to a change in the law that occurred subsequent to the drafting of the agreements and (2) judgmental immunity relative to his choice of language in the antenuptial agreement. Additionally, defendants argued that, if provisions protecting a spouse's substantial assets are enforceable, a "pure construction" of the antenuptial agreement at issue in this case would have protected plaintiff's assets. The defendants also argued that one allegation in the complaint could not constitute malpractice as a matter of law.4 Finally, defendants claimed that plaintiff was a "voluntary payer" of a settlement and therefore had waived his right to seek "indemnity" from defendants.
The trial justice rendered a written decision on January 28, 2019. In analyzing the questions presented, the trial justice consolidated the various issues raised. With respect to whether Marsocci changed the law to bar the exclusion of marital income from equitable distribution, regardless of the existence of antenuptial or postnuptial agreements, the trial justice declined to certify the question to this Court without an agreed statement of facts. He also declined to interpret Marsocci without further development of the factual record. The trial justice determined that questions involving the voluntary-payer doctrine, proof of damages, and mitigation of damages were not appropriate for summary judgment because further discovery was required. Turning to the professional negligence claim and alleged immunity defenses, the trial justice determined that the questions raised required analysis of what duty Attorney Boren owed to Mr. DeCurtis in drafting the agreements.
The trial justice analyzed Attorney Boren's duty by applying the ad hoc approach discussed in our opinion in Woodruff v. Gitlow , 91 A.3d 805 (R.I. 2014).5 As part of the analysis, the trial justice determined that the antenuptial and postnuptial agreements would have been adequate to protect Mr. DeCurtis at the time of drafting in 2000, but stated that our opinion in Marsocci in 2006 "may" have changed the law. The trial justice reasoned that, if he were to impose a duty on Attorney Boren to include additional language at a time when no Rhode Island law imposed such a duty, attorneys would be required to predict "infallibly" how courts would interpret the documents they draft. He concluded his analysis by finding that Attorney Boren's duty was to draft antenuptial and postnuptial agreements that "were in compliance with the law at the time in Rhode Island." The trial justice therefore declined to impose a duty on Attorney Boren to include any additional language in those agreements and granted summary judgment in favor of defendants "on the narrow issue of [Attorney] Boren's duty" in drafting the antenuptial and postnuptial agreements.
Thereafter, the parties filed a statement of agreed-upon facts with accompanying exhibits, as well as renewed motions for partial summary judgment.6 Specifically, the parties asked the trial justice to enter partial summary judgment on the court's interpretation of Marsocci and the effect of that opinion on this case.7 The plaintiff also asked the trial justice to deny defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the issue of Attorney Boren's entitlement to judgmental immunity.
The trial justice rendered a bench decision on the renewed cross-motions for summary judgment on April 8, 2019. The trial justice denied plaintiff's motion and granted defendants’ motion based on judgmental immunity. He further clarified that his...
To continue reading
Request your trial
- Andrade v. Andrade
-
Champlin's Realty Assocs. v. Coastal Res. Mgmt. Council
...of the Court's opinion to the effect that settlement of this long-brewing and complex dispute would be in the best interest of all concerned." Id. Skaling, 799 A.2d at 1012) ("It is the policy of this state to encourage the settlement of controversies in lieu of litigation.")).[3] Indeed, t......