Deegan v. State
| Decision Date | 30 August 2021 |
| Docket Number | 2:19-CV-2310-WBS-DMC-P |
| Parties | SIDNEY ROSS DEEGAN, III, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et al., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
Plaintiff a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Before the court is Plaintiff's first amended complaint. See ECF No 17. The Court dismisses the complaint with leave to amend.
The Court must screen complaints from prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity, officer, or employee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any portion of the complaint that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2).
A complaint must contain a short and plain statement of the claim that a plaintiff is entitled to relief. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must provide “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). To survive screening, a plaintiff's claims must be facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). Plaintiffs must demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). If the allegations “do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, ” the complaint does not state a claim. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. The complaint need not identify “a precise legal theory.” Kobold v. Good Samaritan Reg'l Med. Ctr., 832 F.3d 1024, 1038 (9th Cir. 2016).
The Court must construe a pro se litigant's complaint liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam); Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012). However, “‘a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.'” Bruns v. Nat'l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)). The Court may dismiss a pro se litigant's complaint “if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Hayes v. Idaho Corr. Ctr., 849 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2017).
When Plaintiff filed his amended complaint, he was a state prisoner incarcerated at High Desert State Prison (HDSP). ECF No. 17 at 3. Plaintiff brings suit against twenty-one defendants, most of whom are prison personnel at HDSP: (1) Diaz, as Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR); (2) M.E. Spearman, a warden of HDSP; (3) Jim Pickett, a warden of HDSP; (4) D. Espinoza, a correctional counselor supervisor; (5) R. Peery, associate warden; (6) Knedler, a correctional captain; (7) J. Quam, a correctional counselor; (8) D. Renner, a correctional counselor; (9) Roderick, a correctional counselor; (10) Cervantes, a correctional lieutenant; (11) G. Watkins, a correctional lieutenant; (12) Alkire, a correctional lieutenant; (13) Guzman, a correctional sergeant; (14) Kotlar, a correctional officer; (15) Mortell, a correctional officer; (16) Paoli, a correctional sergeant; (17) Houston; (18) Dardis; (19) Gavilanes; (20) Gray; (21) Richardson, a correctional lieutenant. Id. at 2-4. Plaintiff also sues the State of California. Id. at 1, 32. He sues Defendants in their official and personal capacities. See id. at 3-4.
Around March 2019, following a prison riot, HDSP officials initiated a prison-wide disciplinary search of cells. Id. at 5. Plaintiff placed all his property on his bunk, including his hearing aids, so that officers could search it. Id. at 5-6. Plaintiff also undressed so that he could be strip searched per standard procedure. Id. at 6. He tried to put his hearing aids in after guards searched him. Id. Defendant Kotlar instructed Plaintiff to leave the hearings aids on the bed. See id. Guards restrained Plaintiff outside the cell. Id. When Plaintiff returned, it had been torn apart and Plaintiff's property thrown about the cell. Id. at 6-7. Kotlar confiscated Plaintiff's audio and cable splitters, toothpicks, shoelaces, and letters. Id. at 7. Kotlar also wrote Plaintiff up on a rules violation for having pruno (prisoner-made alcohol) that Plaintiff contends was merely juice. Id. Sometime later, Plaintiff realized that Kotlar had also thrown out Plaintiff's hearing aids. Id. at 8. Plaintiff appealed Kotlar's actions Id.
Later still, Houston conducted an alcohol sweep of prisoners' cells. Id. at 9. Houston found what he alleged to be a bag of pruno in Plaintiff's cell. Id. Mortell then arrived and tore apart Plaintiff's cell, threw wet towels on Plaintiff's grievance paperwork, and littered Plaintiff's other property around the cell. Id. at 9-10. Plaintiff complained that alcohol sweeps are not an excuse to rummage through inmates' property, and that Mortell could not search the cell without cause. Id. Houston and Mortell disregarded Plaintiff's protests, so Plaintiff went to see Defendant Sergeant Guzman. Id. at 10. Guzman was “deliberately indifferent” to Plaintiff's complaints. Id. Houston was nearby and threateningly approached Plaintiff until another guard restrained him. Id. Plaintiff inventoried his cell and noted Houston and Mortell took hot sauces and sweetener. Id. The guard who restrained Houston returned Plaintiff's property. Id.
Defendant Dardis wrote Plaintiff up on another alcohol violation despite Plaintiff's complaints. Id. at 10-11. Although other inmates had pruno, only Plaintiff received a violation. Id. at 11. Plaintiff contends that the violation is false because Dardis claimed that he searched the cell and found pruno. Id. Dardis allegedly did so to cover for Houston and Mortell's “misconduct.” Id.
A few days later, Defendant Gavilanes allegedly contributed to the “campaign of harassment” against Plaintiff by conducting another cell search. Id. Gavilanes claimed he found pruno in Plaintiff's cell. Id. Plaintiff contends that there was no alcohol and that his cell was again left in disarray. Id. His legal paperwork had again been dirtied and his property thrown about. Id.
Defendant Richardson, another handful of days later, called Plaintiff in for a hearing on the alcohol violation Kotlar issued. Id. at 12. HDSP officials granted Plaintiff a staff assistant to help gather witnesses and other relevant information and submit a written report to the senior hearing officer. Id. Richardson was the senior hearing officer. Id. Richardson permitted witnesses at the hearing but allegedly improperly denied Plaintiff the ability to ask them any questions at all, including pertinent questions. Id. at 12-13. Richardson himself asked Plaintiff how Plaintiff lost his hearing aids, and Plaintiff explained that Kotlar threw them away and that Plaintiff had filed a grievance against Kotlar. Id. at 13. Plaintiff alleges that Richardson then purposely gave Plaintiff an arbitrary hearing by refusing all questions, effectively denying him the ability to have witnesses. Id. Richardson stated that all he needed was a statement from one officer saying Plaintiff had pruno. Id. Richardson found Plaintiff guilty of the violation and suspended Plaintiff's privileges (e.g., to a television, canteen, and packages) for a month. Id. Plaintiff also lost 120 days of good-time credit. Id. Plaintiff believes the total punishment was excessive and improper. Id. at 14.
Following the hearing, Mortell allegedly searched Plaintiff's cell yet again, even though another officer had already searched it and found no contraband. Id. Mortell threw Plaintiff's property about the cell. Id. Paoli arrived with a sealed juice box as part of Plaintiff's kosher meal service. Id. Mortell threw kosher meal items out of the cell in addition to another bag of juice Plaintiff says he had on the floor. Id. Without examining the juice, Mortell wrote Plaintiff up on another fictitious violation for possessing pruno. Id. Plaintiff's cell was once again left dirty, and his property was strewn around. Id. at 15. Grievance paperwork was again damaged. Id. Paoli did nothing to stop the abuse. Id.
HDSP officials held hearings on the more recent two alcohol violations. Id. at 16. Fearing further reprisal, Plaintiff contends that he pled guilty under duress. Id. Plaintiff also feared reprisal because he filed an appeal against Richardson for his conduct at the earlier hearing. Id.
Nevertheless Defendants subjected Plaintiff to more searches. Id. at 16-18. At the beginning of June 2019, Mortell searched Plaintiff's cell. Id. Mortell threw Plaintiff's property around but did not touch property belonging to Plaintiff's cellmate. Id. Mortell later searched Plaintiff's body in the dining hall and threatened to place Plaintiff in a restricted unit where all his property and privileges would be taken. Id. at 17. Defendant Gray also later searched Plaintiff's cell. Id. at 17-18. Later in June, Mortell searched Plaintiff's cell again. Id. at 18. Mortell allegedly lied and, at some point, stated he had seen Plaintiff hide alcohol. Id. Mortell may have written Plaintiff up on another...
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