Deel Motors, Inc. v. Department of Commerce, P-31

Decision Date21 September 1971
Docket NumberNo. P-31,P-31
PartiesDEEL MOTORS, INC., et al., Petitioners, v. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE of the State of Florida, and Edward L. Mead, et al., as Trustees of the Automotive Industries of Florida Self Insurers Fund, et al., Respondents.
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

Truett & Watkins, Tallahassee, for petitioners.

F. Perry Odom and N. Sanders Sauls, of Ervin, Pennington, Varn & Jacobs, Tallahassee, for respondents.

WIGGINTON, Judge.

Petitioners seek review by certiorari of a final order rendered by respondent, Department of Commerce of the State of Florida, Division of Labor and Employment Opportunities, which assesses against petitioners and other employer members of the Automotive Industries of Florida Self Insurers Fund certain specified sums of money representing their pro rata liability for earned premiums due for workmen's compensation insurance coverage afforded them by the Fund for the years 1963 to 1966, inclusive. It is contended that the order complained of is void and of no legal effect because (1) the proceedings conducted by respondent Department of Commerce, which form the predicate for the order, were conducted in a manner contrary to the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act, F.S. chapter 120, F.S.A., thereby depriving petitioners of due process and equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the state and federal constitutions; and (2) it is predicated solely and exclusively upon the purported authority granted by Chapter 69--106, Laws of Florida, 1969 (F.S. § 440.58, F.S.A.), which statute petitioners contend is unconstitutional, void, and of no legal support for the order here assaulted.

At all times material to this cause petitioners were engaged in various branches of the automotive industry in Florida. Prior to the year 1963 petitioners, together with other employers similarly engaged, created and became members of the Automotive Industries of Florida Self Insurers Fund. The purpose of this organization was to enable the employer members to pool their liabilities and qualify as self-insurers in accordance with the provisions of the workmen's compensation law of this state. 1 The agreement so entered into by petitioners was duly approved by the then Florida Industrial Commission which was charged with the duty of administering the workmen's compensation act of Florida. 2 The Automotive Industries of Florida Self Insurers Fund was administered by a board of trustees elected by the membership, whose duty it was to supervise the collection from the employer members of periodic payments in such amounts as were required to provide workmen's compensation coverage for their respective employees. The trustees of the Fund entered into an agreement with Robert F. Coleman of Florida, Inc., as its agent to service the claims of the members of the Fund arising under the workmen's compensation law of Florida. Robert F. Coleman of Florida, Inc., after having been approved as servicing agent by the Florida Industrial Commission, became insolvent, as a result of which the Fund was unable to pay the claims against it filed by employees of the Fund members for benefits accruing to them during the years 1963, 1964, 1965, and 1966 under the workmen's compensation law of this state.

In order to provide an effective procedure for servicing and paying the claims of employees against the employer members of the Fund, the Legislature of Florida enacted Chapter 67--606, Laws of Florida 1967. This statute directs the Florida Industrial Commission, upon the receipt of a petition by the trustees of the Fund involved in this proceeding, to enter its order requiring the employer members of the Fund liable therefor to pay all delinquent premiums and all assessments which may be necessary for the payment of workmen's compensation claims and related expenses owing to the employees of the members. 3 The trustees of the Fund, in the discharge of what they conceived to be their proper function and duty, proceeded to compute the amount of assessments which would be required to be paid by each member of the Fund in order to permit the discharge of the Fund's outstanding obligations to the employees of its members for workmen's compensation benefits which accrued during the four-year period hereinabove stated. Each member of the Fund was notified of the amount of assessment levied against it, but when the payment of such assessments was not forthcoming within what the trustees felt to be a reasonable time, the trustees filed with the Department of Commerce their petition setting forth the assessments levied against all delinquent members of the Fund and the method by which the assessments were computed by them. By this petition the trustees prayed for an order requiring the employer members of the Fund to pay to the Department the assessments as set forth in the petition. A copy of the petition so filed by the trustees was served on each of the Fund members against whom an assessment had been levied, and the Department issued its formal written notice that a public hearing would be held by it at the time and place specified in the notice for consideration of the petition so filed by the trustees.

In response to the petition and notice, petitioners filed their formal written answers in which they severally denied that they were indebted to the Fund in any amount on account of claims filed by their respective employees for benefits under the workmen's compensation law during the years in question. In addition, petitioners denied the material allegations of the petition; denied that the board of trustees which was purporting to act in this matter was legally constituted and alleged that the actions taken by it in making the purported assessments against them were illegal, improper, and ineffective as a matter of law; and alleged that the assessments purported to be made by the trustees were inaccurate and incorrect and predicated upon an improper basis. As an additional affirmative defense, petitioners challenged the constitutionality of Chapter 67-606, Laws of Florida, 1967 (F.S. § 440.58, F.S.A.), under which the Department of Commerce now purports to act in ordering petitioners to pay the assessments made against them by the trustees herein. The hearing was held at the time and place set forth in the notice and was presided over by the Director of the Department of Commerce, Division of Labor and Employment Opportunities. After the meeting was called to order, the attorney for the trustees was invited to present the petition which formed the basis of the hearing. The trustees' attorney, without being sworn as a witness, made an oral presentation in which he explained to the hearing officer that the assessments set forth in the petition against the employer members of the Fund had been approved by the trustees and were due and payable. No proof was offered as to the correctness or validity of the underlying records from which the assessments were computed. The attorney spoke of the determination made by the trustees of the deficit which existed in the Fund, the losses experienced during the four years in question, the premiums collected, the amount of reserves available for payment of claims, the amount of service fees incurred, and shortages experienced. At the conclusion of his informal presentation, the trustees' attorney respectfully requested the Department to enter its order directing the members of the Fund to pay the assessments levied against them by the board of trustees as set forth in its petition. Such informal statement by the trustees' attorney concluded their presentation of the petition filed by them. No witnesses were sworn, no testimony taken, no documents offered or received in evidence, and no proof adduced in support of any of the allegations of the petition. Counsel for...

To continue reading

Request your trial
11 cases
  • University Community Hosp. v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, s. 91-3270
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Florida (US)
    • December 29, 1992
    ...as a matter of due process." Conklin Center v. Williams, 519 So.2d 38, 39 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988). See also Deel Motors, Inc. v. Department of Commerce, 252 So.2d 389 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971). The rules of pleading are not applied in administrative proceedings as strictly as they are in court procee......
  • Robinson v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Florida (US)
    • January 22, 2020
    ...for Responsible Gov't, Inc. v. Fla. Keys Aqueduct Auth., 795 So. 2d 940, 948 (Fla. 2001) )); Deel Motors, Inc. v. Dep't of Commerce, 252 So. 2d 389, 394 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971) ("[A]ll proceedings conducted by any state agency, board, commission, or department for the purpose of adjudicating an......
  • Board of Trustees of Billings School Dist. No. 2 of Yellowstone County v. State ex rel. Bd. of Personnel Appeals, 14653
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Montana
    • December 24, 1979
    ...which it had to defend. N.L.R.B. v. Johnson (6th Cir. 1963), 322 F.2d 216, 220. See also, Glenn, supra; Deel Motors, Inc. v. Department of Commerce (Fla.App.1971), 252 So.2d 389. We hold that the District received fair notice that the charge of coercion would be litigated. The complaint cha......
  • H. Miller & Sons, Inc. v. Hawkins
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Florida
    • July 27, 1979
    ...upon which the Commission relied . . . ." Occidental Chemical Co. v. Mayo, 351 So.2d 336, 341 (Fla.1977); Deel Motors, Inc. v. Dept. of Commerce, 252 So.2d 389 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971). The Commission directly addressed this issue in Order 7851. We agree with the following excerpt from that We b......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT