Deering v. Deering
| Citation | 437 A.2d 883,292 Md. 115 |
| Decision Date | 08 December 1981 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 58,60,s. 58 |
| Parties | Rochell K. DEERING v. Donald A. DEERING. Mary J. ANDREWS v. Samuel Justus ANDREWS. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Maryland |
Jeffrey B. Fisher, Marlow Heights (Fisher & Walcek, Marlow Heights, on the brief), for Mary Andrews.
Allen J. Kruger and C. Philip Nichols, Jr., Laurel (Goldman, Nichols, Kovelant, Pedersen, Hurtt & Kruger, Laurel, on the brief), for Samuel Andrews.
Charles W. Ayres, Jr., Glen Burnie, for Rochell Deering.
No brief filed for Donald Deering.
Argued before MURPHY, C. J., and SMITH, DIGGES, ELDRIDGE, COLE, DAVIDSON and RODOWSKY, JJ.
It has been said that when a marriage begins, it is made in heaven and will last for life. Modern earthly experience, however, has frequently proven otherwise. Thus, when the marital bond is terminated by law, there inevitably arises a profound necessity to determine as between the former partners what is to be the property of each. 1 To this end, Maryland's new Property Disposition in Divorce and Annulment law, Md.Code (1974, 1980 Repl.Vol.), §§ 3-6A-01 et seq. of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, has substantially modified the traditional property rights of the husband and wife in a divorce proceeding by allowing the chancellor to grant a monetary "adjustment of the equities ... of the parties concerning marital property...." With this opinion, in which we decide two cases involving the same basic issues, we shall address the scope of a spouse's rights in civilian retirement benefits acquired by his or her marriage partner during the coverture period. 2 In the cases here, each wife has appealed from the chancellor's decision that the husband's pension rights do not in any way constitute marital property under the statutory scheme. We disagree with these sweeping determinations, however, and remand these cases for further consideration of the claims here asserted. Before addressing the merits, we set forth the relevant facts of each action.
In the first case we consider, the appellant, Rochell K. Deering, was granted a divorce a vinculo matrimonii from Donald A. Deering, the appellee, by the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, in March, 1981, after a marriage of sixteen years. At the time of the divorce, the husband had been employed by the Maryland National Capital Park and Planning Commission as a park police officer for fifteen years and had attained the rank of captain. As a result of this employment, appellee possesses certain unmatured, fully vested pension rights based on obligatory contributions deducted from his pay. 3 The record discloses that between April, 1966, and June, 1972, Captain Deering contributed 5.5% of his base wages to a pension fund under a mandatory payroll deduction; since that time, 7% of his salary has been taken for this purpose. All of the husband's payments to the pension fund, as of the divorce date, were made during the marriage, and, by December, 1980, these remittances, including interest, amounted to $18,181.68. The only way for appellee to withdraw his contributions to the retirement plan in a lump sum, however, is to resign his position and surrender all future rights to the plan benefits. In an effort to determine the value of the husband's retirement annuity obtained during the marriage, Mrs. Deering adduced actuarial testimony to the effect that if the husband were to terminate his employment at the time of the divorce but leave his pension contributions in the park police retirement system, then in 1991, when appellee could begin to receive full benefits he would collect $7,775.00 per year. The actuary calculated the present value of this stream of future pension income to be $64,233.00.
In the trial court, Mrs. Deering claimed that, along with other enumerated items, her husband's retirement fund constituted marital property, thus requiring a monetary award to adjust the equities between the parties. The chancellor, in granting the divorce, ruled that his pension right did not constitute marital property and denied the wife's prayer for relief in this regard. Appellant was, however, awarded custody of the parties' two children and exclusive possession of the family home and the family use personal property for a period of three years. See Md.Code (1974, 1980 Repl.Vol.), §§ 3-6A-01, 3-6A-06 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. In addition, the husband was ordered to pay $150.00 per month in technical alimony and $300.00 per month for child support. The wife appealed from that part of the decree which denied her an interest in the husband's pension and we granted certiorari before the Court of Special Appeals ruled on the matter.
Mary J. Andrews, the appellant in the other case before us, obtained in November, 1980, a divorce a vinculo matrimonii from appellee Samuel Justus Andrews in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. The parties, by stipulation, settled in this case all issues concerning the termination of their sixteen-year marriage except one; Mr. and Mrs. Andrews could not agree on the proper consideration to be given the husband's civil service pension when adjusting the equities of each spouse in marital property pursuant to §§ 3-6A-01, et seq. of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.
The record discloses that the husband, age 52, is employed by the United States Government as a pipe fitter and that he has worked in that capacity for fifteen years; Mr. Andrews served in the military for about six years before he obtained his present job. This combined 21 year government service entitled the husband to a civil service pension upon retirement at age 59. 4 Like that of Captain Deering in the other case now before us, appellee Andrews' pension has vested and is funded in part by obligatory deductions from his basic pay. 5 U.S.C. §§ 8334(a)(1), 8338(a). Mr. Andrews acknowledges that he had contributed approximately $12,675.00 toward his retirement and that all of these payments were made during the marriage period. For her part, Mrs. Andrews pointed out to the chancellor that, "she stayed at home, ... worked, ... (and) helped (the husband) during (the) entire time that he was earning this pension...." The wife then argued that "she shouldn't be cut our entirely ..." from enjoyment of a portion of the husband's retirement benefits "just because (the parties) are getting a divorce" on the eve of the husband's retirement, and that it was the intention of the new divorce statute "to make this type of property marital property." The chancellor, however, declared that Mr. Andrews' pension rights were not marital property within the statute's purview, prompting the wife to bring this appeal which we also examine on certiorari before the intermediate court has passed judgment on it.
This State's recently enacted Property Disposition in Divorce and Annulment Act, which spawned these twin controversies, is codified in sections 3-6A-01 through 3-6A-07 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (1974, 1980 Repl.Vol.), and, before discussing the merits of the issues presented here, we set forth its pertinent provisions. Preliminarily, we are informed by section 3-6A-01(e) of the act that
"(m)arital property" is all property, however titled, acquired by either or both spouses during their marriage. It does not include property acquired prior to the marriage, property acquired by inheritance or gift from a third party, or property excluded by valid agreement or property directly traceable to any of these sources.
In dealing with such property, section 3-6A-05(a) directs that
(i)n granting an absolute divorce or annulment, or at any time within 90 days thereafter, if in its decree granting the divorce or annulment the court has expressly reserved the power to do so, the court shall determine which property is marital property if the division of property is an issue. Family use personal property or the family home shall not be considered marital property so long as it is the subject of a use and possession order.
Next, part (b) of section 3-6A-05 commands the court to determine the value of all such marital property. Part (b) then continues:
After making the determination (of value of marital property), the court may grant a monetary award as an adjustment of the equities and rights of the parties concerning marital property, whether or not alimony is awarded. The amount of the award and the method of its payment shall be determined after considering each of the following factors:
(1) The contributions, monetary and nonmonetary, of each party to the well-being of the family;
(2) The value of all property interests of each spouse;
(3) The economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the award is to be made;
(4) The circumstances and facts which contributed to the estrangement of the parties;
(5) The duration of the marriage;
(6) The age and the physical and mental condition of the parties (7) How and when specific marital property was acquired, including the effort expended by each party in accumulating the marital property;
(8) Any award or other provision which the court has made under this Subtitle 6A with respect to family use personal property or the family home, and any award of alimony; and
(9) Such other factors as the court deems necessary or appropriate to consider in order to arrive at a fair and equitable monetary award.
Finally, part (c) of section 3-6A-05 provides that "(a) monetary award made under this section may be reduced to a judgment to the extent that any part of the award is due and owning."
Our initial task under this statutory outline, therefore, is to review the determination of the trial courts in these cases that the pension benefits acquired by the husbands did not constitute "marital property." In considering the answer to this query, it is well to recognize that section 3-6A-01 et seq. represents a new legislative approach to the concept of marriage....
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