Deerleader v. Crow

• Decision Date: 14 December 2020
• Docket Number: Case No. 20-CV-0172-JED-CDL
• Parties: FARRON ROBERT DEERLEADER, Petitioner, v. SCOTT CROW, Director of the Oklahoma Department of Corrections, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Oklahoma

FARRON ROBERT DEERLEADER, Petitioner, v. SCOTT CROW, Director of the Oklahoma Department of Corrections, Respondent.

Case No. 20-CV-0172-JED-CDL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

December 14, 2020

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Respondent's motion (Doc. 11) requesting a stay of this habeas proceeding. Respondent filed a brief (Doc. 12) in support of the motion, and Petitioner filed a response (Doc. 13) opposing the motion. For the following reasons, the Court denies Respondent's motion. No later than 21 days after the entry of this opinion and order, Respondent shall file a limited response demonstrating why this Court should not grant Petitioner's request for federal habeas relief on the basis of the jurisdictional claim asserted in claim four of the petition for writ of habeas corpus.

I.

Petitioner seeks federal habeas relief from the criminal judgment entered against him in the District Court of Creek County, Case No. CF-2016-319. Doc. 1, Pet., at 1. Following a trial, the jury in that case found Petitioner guilty of second-degree burglary and larceny of an automobile, both after former conviction of two or more felonies, and recommended a 45-year prison sentence for each conviction. Doc. 1, Pet., at 1; Doc. 12, Resp't's Br., at 2. The trial court sentenced petitioner accordingly and ordered the sentences to be served consecutively. Doc. 12, Resp't's Br., at 2. Petitioner filed a direct appeal, and the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) affirmed his convictions and sentences on August 16, 2018. Doc. 1, Pet., at 2; Doc. 12, Resp't's Br., at 2. Petitioner filed an application for postconviction relief on July 2, 2019, the state district court denied the application on November 18, 2019, and the OCCA affirmed the order denying the application on March 17, 2020. Doc. 1, Pet., at 3, 35-46; Doc. 12, Resp't's Br., at 3.

Petitioner filed the instant federal habeas petition in April 2020, raising six claims for relief. Doc. 1, Pet., at 1, 5-31. As relevant to Respondent's request for a stay of this habeas action, Petitioner asserts in claim four that the State of Oklahoma lacked jurisdiction to prosecute him because he is a member and citizen of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation and he committed the offenses for which he was convicted within the boundaries of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation Reservation. Doc. 1, Pet., at 21-23. To support this claim, Petitioner primarily cites Murphy v. Royal, 866 F.3d 1164 (10th Cir. 2017), and he submitted copies of documents showing that he has been an enrolled member of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation since 1990 and that he is certified as having a certain degree of "Indian blood." Doc. 1, Pet., at 21-23. The Murphy opinion Petitioner cites was issued in August 2017, and was amended and superseded in November 2017 by Murphy v. Royal, 875 F.3d 896 (10th Cir. 2017) ("Murphy I"). In Murphy I, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit concluded that Congress has not disestablished the Muscogee (Creek) Nation Reservation and, as a result, the land within the boundaries of that reservation is "Indian country" for purposes of the Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153. Murphy I, 875 F.3d at 966. Under § 1153, only the federal government has jurisdiction to prosecute certain crimes committed by or against Native Americans within "Indian country." 28 U.S.C. § 1153(a). The U.S. Supreme Court granted a petition for writ of certiorari to review the Tenth Circuit's conclusion in Murphy I. Sharp v. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. 2026 (2018).

In July 2020, about three months after Petitioner commenced this habeas action, theSupreme Court issued decisions in two cases relevant to Petitioner's claim four—McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020), and Sharp v. Murphy, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (2020) ("Murphy II"). McGirt reached the Supreme Court via a petition for writ of certiorari filed by a state prisoner who sought review of the OCCA's decision denying his application for postconviction relief. See McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 659 (Dec. 13, 2019) (granting petition for writ of certiorari). Like Petitioner and the habeas petitioner in Murphy I, the prisoner in McGirt claimed that because he was a Native American, the State lacked jurisdiction to prosecute him for serious offenses he committed within the boundaries of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2459. The McGirt Court held that because Congress did not disestablish the Muscogee (Creek) Nation Reservation the land within the historical boundaries of that reservation is "Indian country," as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a), and, as a result, the federal government has exclusive jurisdiction to prosecute certain crimes committed within those boundaries if those crimes are committed by or against Native Americans. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2468, 2479-80. Relying on McGirt, the Supreme Court in Murphy II summarily affirmed the Tenth Circuit's 2017 decision that had reached the same conclusion. Murphy II, 140 S. Ct. at 2412.

On August 24, 2020, in response to Petitioner's request for habeas relief, Respondent filed a motion (Doc. 11) requesting a stay of this habeas action and an order directing Petitioner to return to state court to "re-exhaust" his claim that the State lacked jurisdiction over his criminal prosecution. Respondent argues that re-exhaustion is warranted to "due to the supervening change in federal law announced in McGirt." Doc. 12, Resp't's Br., at 6. Petitioner opposes Respondent's request for a stay and contends that he should not be required to re-exhaust his claim. Doc. 13, Pet'r's Resp., at 2-3.

II.

Respondent's request for a stay is based on the exhaustion requirement codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). Docs. 11, 12. When a state prisoner, in custody under a criminal judgment issued by a state, requests federal habeas relief, a federal court may grant relief from that judgment if that prisoner shows that he or she "is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). But, under the exhaustion doctrine, a federal court generally may not grant habeas relief from a state-court judgment unless the prisoner first shows that he "has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A); see also Ellis v. Raemisch, 872 F.3d 1064, 1076 (10th Cir. 2017) (noting that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), "prohibits federal courts from granting habeas relief to state prisoners who have not exhausted available state remedies").

The exhaustion requirement promotes comity between state and federal courts because "[s]tate courts, like federal courts, are obliged to enforce federal law." O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844 (1999). See also Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 179 (2001) (noting that the exhaustion "requirement 'is principally designed to protect the state courts' role in the enforcement of federal law and prevent disruption of state judicial proceedings.'" (quoting Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982))). "Comity thus dictates that when a prisoner alleges that his continued confinement for a state court conviction violates federal law, the state courts should have the first opportunity to review this claim and provide any necessary relief." Boerckel, 526 U.S. at 844. The Boerckel Court explained that the exhaustion requirement is satisfied when a state prisoner "invok[es] one complete round of the State's established appellate review process" and that the prisoner need only "give state courts a fair opportunity to act on [the prisoner's] claims." 526 U.S. at 844-45 (emphasis in original). Further fleshing out this requirement, the Supreme Court hasexplained that the prisoner must "provide the state courts with a 'fair opportunity' to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon his [federal] claim." Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982).

Here, Respondent concedes, and the record supports, that Petitioner fairly presented, and therefore properly exhausted, claim four through state postconviction proceedings. Doc. 1, Pet., at 24, 38, 44-45;¹ Doc. 12, Resp't's Br., at 3; Doc. 13, Pet'r's Resp., at 1-3. In state district court, Petitioner asserted that he "is an American Indian member and citizen of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation" and he attached documents to support his assertion. See Appl. for Postconviction Relief (Doc. CC19070300000400), State v. Deerleader, No. CF-2016-319, oscn.net/dockets/GetCaseInformation.aspx?db-creek&number=CF-2016-319&cmid=14389, last visited Nov. 12, 2020. Petitioner further asserted that he was arrested in Kiefer, Oklahoma and held in the Creek County Jail on charges of burglarizing, and stealing a car from, a home in Mounds, Oklahoma which, he argued, "is located within the 1866 Territorial Boundaries of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation which is defined as Indian Country under Title 18 U.S.C. § 1151." Id. at 2. To support his claim that, under these facts, the State of Oklahoma lacked jurisdiction over his criminal prosecution, Petitioner cited State v. Klindt, 782 P.2d 401 (Okla. Crim. App. 1989), and Indian Country, U.S.A., Inc. v. Oklahoma ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 829 F.2d 967 (10th Cir. 1987). Id. at 3. After noting that it had reviewed the "[e]ntire court file," the state district courtrejected Petitioner's claim, stating,

Defendant/Petitioner first states the State has no jurisdiction because he is a citizen of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation. Additionally, he adds that the residence of the victim is within the territorial bounds of the Nation. While he does not cite the Murphy case, now pending before the U.S. Supreme Court, he is making similar allegations. Since there is a stay of the decision of the 10th Circuit, this contention is premature.

Doc. 1, Pet., at 37-38.

On postconviction appeal, the OCCA rejected Petitioner's claim for different reasons, stating,

Finally, Petitioner claims that Oklahoma lacked jurisdiction

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