Deerman v. Board of County Com'rs of County of Dona Ana
| Decision Date | 17 September 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 13,290,13,290 |
| Citation | 864 P.2d 317,1993 NMCA 123,116 N.M. 501 |
| Parties | Willard L. DEERMAN, Jr., individually and as a partner in Heritage Dairy, Petitioner-Appellant, v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF the COUNTY OF DONA ANA, Respondent, and Ramiro and Eloisa Ramos, et al., Intervenors-Appellees. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
Willard L. Deerman Jr. (Deerman), a partner in Heritage Dairy, appeals a district court decision regarding a special-use permit to operate a dairy on property he owns in Dona Ana County. Although the parties raise a number of issues in their briefs, the dispositive issue in this appeal is whether SCRA 1986, 1-060(B) (Repl.1992), authorized the court to vacate an earlier judgment in favor of Deerman. We reverse because a motion pursuant to SCRA 1-060(B) to set aside a judgment on the ground of an error of law by the district court must be filed within the time permitted for an appeal of the judgment.
We divide the discussion of the litigation into two sections: the pre-intervention phase and the intervention phase.
Over the objections of some area landowners and residents, the Dona Ana County Planning and Zoning Commission (PZC) granted Deerman's application for a special-use permit to operate the dairy, contingent on state Environmental Improvement Division approval of the dairy's wastewater discharge plan. The protestors appealed the PZC decision to the Board of County Commissioners sitting as the county's Board of Appeals (Appeals Board).
One member of the Appeals Board, County Commissioner Everardo Chavez, represented the district encompassing the proposed dairy site. Before the PZC hearing Chavez signed a petition objecting to Deerman's application for a special-use permit. In response to Chavez's endorsement of the petition and other alleged actions, Deerman sought to disqualify Chavez from voting on the appeal. The Appeals Board rejected Deerman's claim that Chavez should be disqualified. Chavez participated in the January 5, 1990, hearing and voted with three other board members to overturn the PZC decision. One commissioner abstained from voting.
Deerman petitioned the district court to overturn the Appeals Board decision. He claimed that the decision was arbitrary and capricious, that Chavez should have been disqualified from voting, and that he had been denied a fair and impartial hearing. Deerman filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that because Chavez's vote should be disqualified, the Appeals Board decision lacked the two-thirds majority--four votes--required by a county zoning ordinance to overturn a PZC decision. The Board of County Commissioners responded that Chavez need not be disqualified and that the two-thirds majority required by county ordinance meant two-thirds of those present and voting. None of the landowners or residents opposing the dairy was a party to the original district court proceeding.
On July 30, 1990, the district court filed its findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court held that Chavez's vote would be disqualified for bias, leaving the Appeals Board without the four votes necessary to overturn the PZC decision. On September 4, 1990, the court entered its judgment reversing the Appeals Board decision and reinstating the PZC's grant of the special-use permit. The County chose not to appeal the judgment.
On October 2, 1990, seven individuals (Intervenors) filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the district court, seeking a review of the Appeals Board decision. They apparently argued that the petition was timely because the district court's September 4, 1990, judgment amounted to a filing of the Appeals Board's January 5, 1990, decision. The court quashed the writ, holding that Intervenors had failed to file a timely petition, that no Appeals Board decision was filed on September 4, 1990, and that the court had no jurisdiction over the matter.
On October 31, 1990, nearly a month after the time for appeal had expired, see SCRA 1986, 12-201(A) (Repl.1992) (), Intervenors filed their motion to intervene in this case. The motion claimed that until the time for appeal had expired they did not realize that the County was inadequately protecting their interests. Intervenors sought a stay of the district court's September 4, 1990, judgment and vacation of the judgment under SCRA 1-060(B)(4) and (B)(6). As grounds for vacating the judgment, Intervenors filed a series of motions arguing that (1) the judgment was void because the disqualification of Chavez's vote and reinstatement of the PZC decision was not within the court's jurisdiction and Intervenors were indispensable parties; (2) the disqualification deprived Intervenors of representation on the Appeals Board; and (3) the court's judgment deprived Intervenors of liberty and property interests without due process. After a hearing on November 9, 1990, the district court denied the motion to intervene. Intervenors then petitioned the New Mexico Supreme Court for either a writ of mandamus directing the district court to remand the matter to the Appeals Board or a writ of superintending control allowing intervention. On January 23, 1991, the Supreme Court granted the writ of superintending control. The writ was filed in district court on February 5, 1991.
Following a hearing on April 18, 1991, the district court decided that the supermajority requirement of the county ordinance violated state law. Although the court ruled that Chavez's vote would still be set aside, it held that a county ordinance could not require a two-thirds majority to overturn the PZC decision when NMSA 1978, Section 3-21-8(C)(2) (Repl.1985),1 requires only a majority vote. The district court order filed May 28, 1991, affirmed the Appeals Board decision to deny the special-use permit.
We need not reach the merits of whether the decision of the Appeals Board was lawful. The district court lacked authority to set aside its judgment of September 4, 1990. Because the Intervenors filed their motion after the time had expired for appeal from the judgment, they could not obtain relief on the ground that the court had made a legal error. Nor did Intervenors establish any extraordinary circumstance that would entitle them to relief in circumvention of the requirement of a timely appeal.
SCRA 1-060(B) provides in pertinent part:
B. Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order or proceeding for the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 1-059;
(3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party;
(4) the judgment is void (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or
(6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2) and (3) not more than one-year after the judgment, order or proceeding was entered or taken.
For convenience we shall refer to the rule, and the virtually identical Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), as Rule 60(B).
In their answer brief Intervenors rely on two provisions of the rule. They claim that Rule 60(B)(1) applies because "it is entirely appropriate for the Court to have ruled that it made a mistake in that the law governing the dispositive issue was not brought to the Court's attention during the proceedings which lead to the September 4, 1990 Order, and the Court wished to correct its Judgment." In other words, they contend that the district court made a "mistake" which could be cured under Rule 60(B)(1). Intervenors also contend that an extraordinary circumstance justified relief pursuant to Rule 60(B)(6). The sole extraordinary circumstance relied upon by Intervenors is that the Supreme Court issued an extraordinary writ--a writ of superintending control--to permit Intervenors to intervene in this case.
We first consider the application of Rule 60(B)(1). In construing NMSA 1978, Section 52-5-9(B)(2) (Repl.Pamp.1991), the counterpart of Rule 60(B)(1) for proceedings under the Workers' Compensation Act, we interpreted "mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect" to include judicial error. See Lucero v. Yellow Freight Sys., 112 N.M. 662, 666-67, 818 P.2d 863, 867-68 (Ct.App.1991). In reaching that result we were guided by federal authority construing Rule 60(B)(1). But Lucero is not controlling here because there is a significant difference between judicial procedures and procedures in workers' compensation cases. As we noted in Lucero, one reason given by some federal courts for not interpreting Rule 60(B)(1) to include judicial error does not apply to Section 52-5-9(B)(2). The Workers' Compensation Act has no provision comparable to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), the equivalent of New Mexico's SCRA 1986, 1-059(E) (Repl.1992), which states that motions to alter or amend a judgment must be served within ten days after entry of judgment. Interpreting Rule...
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