Dees v. The Ga. Agric. Exposition Auth.

• Decision Date: 17 November 2022
• Docket Number: Civil Action 5:22-CV-266 (MTT)
• Parties: BRITTINI DEES, Plaintiff, v. THE GEORGIA AGRICULTURAL EXPOSITION AUTHORITY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Georgia

BRITTINI DEES, Plaintiff,
v.
THE GEORGIA AGRICULTURAL EXPOSITION AUTHORITY, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 5:22-CV-266 (MTT)

United States District Court, M.D. Georgia, Macon Division

November 17, 2022

ORDER

MARC T. TREADWELL, CHIEF JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Defendant The Georgia Agricultural Exposition Authority (“GAEA”) moves for partial judgment on the pleadings against Plaintiff Brittini Dees. Doc. 7. GAEA argues that Dees' state law claims must be dismissed. Id. at 3-4. For the following reasons, GAEA's motion for partial judgment on the pleadings (Doc. 7) is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

Dees was a program coordinator for GAEA from 2017-2021. Doc. 4 ¶¶ 1, 4. She alleges that while employed by GAEA, she experienced a period of sexual harassment and assault by Philip Gentry, her supervisor. Id. ¶¶ 4-29. Specifically, “[t]hroughout [her] employment, Mr. Gentry was flirtatious and inappropriate.” Id. ¶ 5. This behavior included Gentry allegedly making “sexually charged comments” about Dees and other female GAEA employees. Id. ¶¶ 5-6. Gentry's behavior “escalated.” Id. ¶ 8. He allegedly began to ask Dees for “sexual favors,” send her “inappropriate text messages,” and show her “vulgar and sexually-charged content on his cell phone and computer in the workplace.” Id. ¶ 9.

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Gentry's conduct eventually turned physical. Id. ¶ 10. “During the times that Mr. Gentry and Ms. Dees were alone in the GAEA office, Mr. Gentry attempted to kiss Ms. Dees on several occasions, including one occasion in which he forcibly pinned her against a wall. He attempted to insert his hands inside her clothing, and he continued to proposition her for sexual favors. He also exposed his penis to Ms. Dees and even forced her to touch his penis[.]” Id. ¶ 12. Gentry allegedly “would lock the office door before carrying out his propositions and attacks,” which made “Ms. Dees feel physically trapped[.]” Id. ¶ 13. This conduct further “escalated between May and July 2020” when Gentry allegedly “forced Ms. Dees to engage in non-consensual intercourse on multiple occasions during that three-month window.” Id. ¶ 14.

After Dees confronted Gentry about his behavior in July 2020, he allegedly threatened her employment. Id. ¶¶ 16-18. He “did not deny that his behavior had been without her consent” and “told Ms. Dees that if she ever told anybody about what he had done, he would ‘absolutely deny everything.'” Id. ¶¶ 17, 19. Dees took a medical leave of absence “due to the stress, anxiety, and mental anguish that she was experiencing[.]” Id. ¶ 24. “The Office of the State Inspector General ... eventually conducted an investigation into Ms. Dees' allegations” and “found that Mr. Gentry had violated the Statewide Sexual Harassment Prevention Policy . that governs GAEA and other State employees.” Id. ¶¶ 25-26. Dees was “constructively discharged from employment with GAEA in mid-2021.” Id. ¶ 27.

Dees alleges two state law claims: (1) negligence, and (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”). Id. ¶¶ 43-60. For her negligence claim, Dees alleges that GAEA was negligent in hiring, supervising, and protecting its employees and as a result,

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she “was harassed and tormented by her supervisor and suffered the injuries complained of in this Complaint[.]” Id. ¶¶ 44-53. For her IIED claim, Dees alleges she suffered “real and severe” emotional distress that “GAEA is liable for ... as a result of the actions and omissions described in [her] Complaint” because GAEA's conduct “was extreme, outrageous, and utterly intolerable in a civilized society.” Id. ¶ 55-60.

II. STANDARD

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), “[a]fter the pleadings are closed-but early enough not to delay trial-a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” “Judgment on the pleadings is appropriate when there are no material facts in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Douglas Asphalt Co. v. Qore, Inc., 541 F.3d 1269, 1273 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Cannon v. City of W. Palm Beach, 250 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 2001)). A motion for judgment on the pleadings is governed by the same standard as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See Mergens v. Dreyfoos, 166 F.3d 1114, 1117 (11th Cir. 1999). “Where a defendant moves for judgment on the pleadings, the fact allegations of the complaint are to be taken as true, but those of the answer are taken as true only where and to the extent that they have not been denied or do not conflict with those of the complaint.” Parker v. DeKalb Chrysler Plymouth, 459 F.Supp. 184, 187 (N.D.Ga. 1978) (citing Stanton v. Larsh, 239 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1956)).^[1]

To avoid dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and therefore also Rule 12(c), a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter “to ‘state a

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claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). At the motion to dismiss stage, “all well-pleaded facts are accepted as true, and the reasonable inferences therefrom are construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” FindWhat Inv'r Grp. v. FindWhat.com., 658 F.3d 1282, 1296 (11th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). But “conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal.” Wiersum v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 785 F.3d 483, 485 (11th Cir. 2015) (cleaned up). A Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings, must “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (cleaned up). Where there are dispositive issues of law, a court may dismiss a claim regardless of the factual allegations. Patel v. Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC, 904 F.3d 1314, 1321 (11th Cir. 2018).

III. DISCUSSION

Dees alleges two state law claims against GAEA: negligence and IIED. Doc. 4 ¶¶ 43-60. GAEA argues that these claims must be dismissed because they are barred by sovereign immunity under the Georgia Tort Claims Act (“GTCA”). Doc. 7 at 5-10.^[2]

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A. The Assault and False Imprisonment Exceptions.

First, GAEA argues that Dees' state law claims should be dismissed because the claims arise from conduct-assault and false imprisonment-for which the state has not waived sovereign immunity under the GTCA and are thus barred. Id. at 5.

The GTCA provides a limited waiver of sovereign immunity: “The state waives its sovereign immunity for the torts of state officers and employees while acting within the scope of their official duties or employment and shall be liable for such torts in the same manner as a private individual or entity would be liable under like circumstances; provided, however, that the state's sovereign immunity is waived subject to all exceptions and limitations set forth in this article.” O.C.G.A. § 50-21-23(a). And although the state “does not waive any immunity with respect to actions brought in the courts of the United States,” it can waive that federal forum immunity through removal. § 50-21-23(b); Stroud v. McIntosh, 722 F.3d 1294, 1302 (11th Cir. 2013) (“[A] state waives its immunity from a federal forum when it removes a case, which voluntarily invokes the jurisdiction of that federal forum.”).

One exception to this sovereign immunity waiver is where a plaintiff's claims involve certain intentional torts: “The state shall have no liability for losses resulting from ... [a]ssault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, or interference with contractual rights[.]” O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(7) (emphasis added). As GAEA correctly points out, Georgia Courts have repeatedly held that “[t]he focus of the exceptions to liability in O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(7) is not on the government action taken, but upon the act that produces the loss.” Dept. of Human Res. v. Hutchinson, 217 Ga.App. 70, 71-72, 456 S.E.2d 642, 644 (1995). For example,

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in Board of Public Safety v. Jordan, the plaintiff sued the defendant for IIED based on the circumstances surrounding his termination, including alleged slander and libel, which are also exceptions under § 50-21-24(7). 252 Ga.App. 577, 577-78, 556 S.E.2d 837, 839, 842 (2001). The court stated, “[t]o determine whether these exceptions protect the [defendant's] sovereign immunity, we focus upon the conduct which actually produced [the plaintiff's] ‘losses,' his severe emotional distress and loss of reputation ... [I]f the [defendant's] acts were slanderous or libelous, then the [defendant] was protected by immunity.” Id. at 583, 556 S.E.2d at 842; see...