Deferrell v. State

Decision Date17 August 2016
Docket NumberNo. 4D13–3985.,4D13–3985.
Citation199 So.3d 1056
Parties Barrington DEFERRELL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Mara C. Herbert, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Rachael Kaiman, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

CONNER

, J.

Barrington Deferrell appeals his judgments and sentence after he was sentenced to forty-eight months in the Department of Corrections based on a violation of probation and substantive new law violation. Deferrell argues that the trial court erred in failing to hold a competency hearing and submit an order determining competency and also in failing to hold a Faretta1 hearing. We agree with both arguments and reverse.

Factual Background and Trial Court Proceedings

In 2011, Deferrell was placed on probation for four years for attempted burglary of a dwelling and preventing or obstructing the extinguishment of a fire charges. In May 2012, Deferrell was arrested and formally charged with three crimes. The new law charges also served as the basis for a violation of probation (“VOP”) proceeding.

During the pendency of the proceedings in both cases, several hearings were held which are relevant to the determination of the issues on appeal. At a May 2013 status hearing, after voicing some general complaints about his attorney's lack of communication with him, Deferrell addressed the trial court:

THE DEFENDANT: I can't speak to you now?
THE COURT: Yes.
THE DEFENDANT: Alright. I got a problem with my attorney. I don't want him no longer as my attorney.
THE COURT: Okay.
THE DEFENDANT: And I would like to represent myself if I can do that.
THE COURT: Then we're going to schedule this for hearing. But sir, you do understand what it means in a very serious case like this to represent yourself.
THE DEFENDANT: I understand.
THE COURT: I'll set this down for a hearing and I'm going to encourage you to think about this. Alright? June 21st, sir. June 21st for Mr. Barrington. I'm sorry. Deferrell. Okay? June 21st.
THE DEFENDANT: And that's for what?
THE COURT: A Faretta hearing. Alright, sir?

In June 2013, Deferrell filed a pro se motion to discharge his case based on speedy trial grounds, inserting a handwritten notation on the bottom of the form motion: “Been waiting to go to trial since 12/10/12 [his public defender] refuse violating my rights.” On the same date, Deferrell filed a pro se motion for a Nelson2 hearing, with the same handwritten notation, with the addition of: “Cancel my Ferratta [sic] hearing without my consent.” Deferrell also wrote another letter to the trial court judge, in June 2013, stating:

I'm having a lot of problems with defense counsel were [sic] twice I ask for a nelson hearing “Ferrata [sic] hearing” to have him off my case. My Public defender ... has lied to and violated my amendment rights, he has without consent giving up my speedy trial rights, violated my 6th amendment.
....
Judge Rosenthal in your favor I'm asking again for a ferratta [sic] hearing which I had a court date on 6–21–2013 “ferratta [sic] hearing” but was cancel with out [sic] question.

Another hearing was held in July 2013, where Deferrell's attorney expressed concerns as to Deferrell's competency to proceed. The trial court noted the fact that there had already been two competency evaluations, with both evaluators opining that Deferrell is competent. However, Deferrell's public defender stated that he did not believe that Deferrell was competent to proceed. Deferrell himself then addressed the trial court, stating that he wanted to go to trial and wanted his public defender off his case if he would not go to trial, and the trial court acknowledged that Deferrell filed a motion for a Nelson inquiry. The trial court stated that it would “take care of that,” and that it was “making a little note.” The trial court then stated that it was going to set the case for a Nelson hearing, and set the case for a date at the end of the month, to “discuss how we're going to proceed.”

In late July 2013, Deferrell's case was called and the following transpired:

THE COURT: Barrington Deferrell.
....
THE DEFENDANT: Excuse me, ma'am. This is supposed to be a Faretta hearing.
THE COURT: No. Today is a status hearing, sir. It's not a Faretta hearing.
[PUBLIC DEFENDER]: I actually understood it to be a Nelson slash Faretta.
THE COURT: No. I set it for a status hearing today. Not a Faretta hearing. Because, can you call Court Services? I'm ordering another one.
[PUBLIC DEFENDER]: Ordering a what?
THE COURT: Another exam.
[PUBLIC DEFENDER]: Oh, please. Thank you.
[STATE]: And Your Honor, for the record, the State would object.
THE COURT: I understand. I'm ordering another one. So could you bring up Court Services on Mr. Deferrell?
....
THE COURT: Counsel. I'm sorry. Court Services. Based on the representations that were made by counsel, I am going to go ahead and order a third exam.
[PUBLIC DEFENDER]: We appreciate that, Your Honor.
THE COURT: You pick the doctor on Mr. Deferrell.
[PUBLIC DEFENDER]: Barrington is his name.
THE COURT: I know you all have two priors, but I'm ordering a third.
COURT SERVICES: I'll put in a doctor real quick.
THE COURT: I know that there was an issue, but I am ordering a third.

The same day, the trial court entered a written order appointing an expert to determine competency, stating:

It appearing unto this court that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the Defendant is not mentally competent to proceed at this material state of the criminal proceeding, it is [ordered that a third evaluation shall be submitted].

Within the same order, the trial court also set a next court date, presumably for a hearing on the competency issue in compliance with Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.210(b)

, which requires a court date to be set within twenty days of the order. In early August 2013, the trial court entered an order stating: “In addition to determining defendant's competency to proceed in this case and in [the VOP case], Dr. [name] shall evaluate for competency to proceed ‘pro se’ in both cases.”

Two days later, a competency evaluation by the appointed doctor was filed with the court, finding Deferrell competent to proceed and [c]ompetent to waive his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and proceed Pro Se should he choose to do so and be permitted by The Honorable Court.”

The next day, another status hearing was held. Deferrell's attorneys indicated that Deferrell wished to have a nonjury trial for the new law charges, with a VOP hearing at the same time. When asked directly, Deferrell stated that he wanted to do this as [s]oon as possible.”

At the end of August 2013, the joint nonjury trial on the new charges and VOP hearing was held. The trial court found that Deferrell willfully and substantially violated his probation, revoked Deferrell's probation, and sentenced him to forty-eight months of incarceration on each of the charges in the VOP case, to run concurrently with the forty-eight month sentences on two of the felonies in the new case. He was sentenced to time served on the misdemeanor charge in the new case. Deferrell gave notice of appeal.

Appellate Analysis

Deferrell makes two arguments on appeal, and we agree with both. First, he argues that the trial court erred in failing to hold a competency hearing and enter an order determining his competency status. Second, he argues that the trial court erred in failing to hold a Faretta hearing.

Competency Hearing and Order

This court's standard of review of a trial court's decision regarding whether to hold a competency hearing is an abuse of discretion.” Kelly v. State, 797 So.2d 1278, 1280 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)

(citing Hodgson v. State, 718 So.2d 330, 331 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) ).

The procedure for determining a defendant's competency is outlined in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.210(b)

, which states:

(b) Motion for Examination. If, at any material stage of a criminal proceeding, the court of its own motion, or on motion of counsel for the defendant or for the state, has reasonable ground to believe that the defendant is not mentally competent to proceed, the court shall immediately enter its order setting a time for a hearing to determine the defendant's mental condition, which shall be held no later than 20 days after the date of the filing of the motion, and may order the defendant to be examined by no more than 3 experts, as needed, prior to the date of the hearing. Attorneys for the state and the defendant may be present at any examination ordered by the court.

Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.210(b)

(emphases added). Here, in its order, the trial court stated:

It appearing unto this court that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the Defendant is not mentally competent to proceed at this material state of the criminal proceeding, it is [ordered a third evaluation shall be submitted].

(emphasis added). Therefore, the trial court expressly stated that it found reasonable grounds to believe that Deferrell was not mentally competent to proceed.

Rule 3.210(b)

then states that, after reasonable grounds are found, “the court shall immediately enter its order setting a time for a hearing to determine the defendant's mental condition.” (emphasis added). Clearly, the rule contemplates a hearing within twenty days after a motion for an evaluation is filed, if the motion is granted (or the court orders an evaluation sua sponte ).

In its order, the trial court did set a hearing date, and a status conference occurred on that date. However, no competency hearing occurred; in fact, no discussion of the evaluation or the report occurred on the record. Since rule 3.210(b)

requires that the court set the hearing, and then that the hearing shall be held no later than 20 days after the date of the filing of the motion,” Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.210(b) (emphasis added), it was reversible error not to conduct a hearing.

Additionally, the...

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