Deford v. State
| Decision Date | 01 December 1983 |
| Docket Number | No. 14423,14423 |
| Citation | 673 P.2d 1059,105 Idaho 865 |
| Parties | Wilber E. DEFORD, Petitioner-Appellant, v. STATE of Idaho, Respondent. |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
William B. Taylor, Jr., Grangeville, for petitioner-appellant.
Jim Jones, Atty. Gen., Lynn E. Thomas, Sol. Gen., Myrna A.I. Stahman, Deputy Atty. Gen., Boise, for respondent.
A criminal complaint charging appellant Deford with grand larceny was filed in Idaho County in October, 1977, and a warrant for his arrest was issued. Deford was arrested in Iowa, but thereafter was released to federal authorities who transported him to Boise, Idaho, apparently for unrelated federal charges. On January 2, 1978, Deford was convicted and sentenced by the United States District Court in Boise to two years in the McNeil Island federal penitentiary.
The State of Idaho lodged a detainer at the federal prison in Washington state. Deford claims that he sent Idaho County authorities written requests that he either be tried immediately on the grand larceny charge or that the charge against him be dismissed. In January, 1979, Deford filed a "motion to quash detainer" for failure of the Idaho County authorities to bring Deford to trial on the grand larceny charge. The State of Idaho filed a motion in opposition to the petition to quash detainer, along with affidavits to show that no such written notice was ever received from Deford. No hearing was held, or disposition made, on these motions concerning detainer.
Deford was released from the federal prison in April, 1979. Idaho initiated extradition proceedings in the State of Washington, but Deford left Washington while the extradition proceedings were pending. Deford went to Florida, and then to Texas, where he was arrested in November, 1979, on the Idaho warrant. Deford waived extradition from Texas, and he was returned to the State of Idaho.
On November 5, 1979, Deford was arraigned in district court. He waived his right to a preliminary hearing, and he waived his right to be represented by an attorney. He then pleaded guilty to the grand larceny charge. The district judge questioned Deford at that time concerning the voluntariness of his plea, and Deford said that he had not been threatened in any way and that he knew he was guilty of the charge.
Deford was sentenced to a ten year term. He appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court, but later made a motion for the appeal to be dismissed, which motion was granted by the Court. Deford subsequently filed this petition for post conviction relief, alleging that he was coerced into waiving his rights and entering a guilty plea to the grand larceny charge. His petition, which was verified, alleged:
"[T]hat his waiver of a preliminary hearing in case no. 13421, and his waiver of right to counsel, and his entry of a guilty plea to the charge contained in the Information filed against him were not done voluntarily by him, but were the result of his being informed by the Chief Deputy Sheriff of Idaho County, shortly after his waiver of extradition from Texas, that the prosecution would file a persistent violator felony charge against him in Idaho County, unless the petitioner pleaded guilty to the grand larceny charge then pending against him."
He also alleged that he was deprived of his right to a speedy trial. There were no affidavits attached to the petition. The state filed a motion to dismiss the petition, supporting the motion with an affidavit from the deputy sheriff of Idaho County stating that no such threat or statement was ever made to Deford. The district court held a hearing in which arguments were heard from the state and from counsel representing Deford. It was stipulated at the hearing that the district court could take judicial notice of the record of Deford's previous arraignment and sentencing in the Idaho County district court. The district court dismissed the petition, concluding that the petition presented no substantial issues of fact and had no merit. We affirm.
At the outset we note that the district court did not summarily dismiss Deford's petition for post conviction relief. A summary dismissal based on the pleadings does not require a hearing. I.C. § 19-4906. Neither does a summary dismissal require the court to file findings of fact and conclusions of law. State v. Christensen, 102 Idaho 487, 632 P.2d 676 (1981). In this case, a hearing was conducted in which the parties stipulated to the record and presented oral arguments. The trial court made findings and conclusions. Therefore, we conclude that the hearing and order dismissing the petition were pursuant to the procedures provided for in I.C. § 19-4907, and not the result of a summary dismissal under I.C. § 19-4906(c).
Deford argues that the district court erred in not granting him a full evidentiary hearing at which he would be permitted to appear and testify. I.C. § 19-4907(b) states:
The issue presented, then, is whether the court abused its discretion in finding no "substantial issues of fact" and not conducting a "full evidentiary hearing" before ordering the dismissal of the petition for post conviction relief.
Deford did raise an issue of fact in his petition as to whether or not his guilty plea was voluntary. This allegation could be given some weight by the trier of fact since it was given under oath. However, the statement by Deford, that the deputy sheriff coerced the guilty plea by threatening an additional charge, was a conclusory allegation unsupported by any evidentiary detail or corroborated by other evidence. The petition does not refer to any corroborating evidence which could be produced at a hearing to support the allegation.
The state's motion to dismiss was supported by the affidavit by the deputy sheriff stating that no threats of additional charges were ever made toward Deford. In addition to the affidavit of the deputy sheriff rebutting Deford's allegation, the trial court also had before it the record of Deford's arraignment and sentencing. The trial judge, at the post conviction hearing, was the same judge who had presided over Deford's arraignment and sentencing. The judge had the benefit of having observed the demeanor of Deford throughout the arraignment and sentencing. It was stipulated at the hearing that the trial court could take judicial notice of these prior records. In the record of the arraignment, the following exchange took place:
The record before the post conviction court rebutting Deford's uncorroborated allegation of threats was overwhelming, and the trial court was given no reason to believe Deford would produce any new evidence. The trial court exercised its discretion under I.C. § 19-4907(b) and decided that the issue was not substantial. Where the trial court has exercised its discretion after careful consideration of relevant factual circumstances and principles of law, without arbitrary disregard for such facts and principles of justice, the reviewing court will not disturb the action without a clear showing of abuse of discretion. Lisher v. Krasselt, 96 Idaho 854, 538 P.2d 783 (1975). We hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in holding that no substantial issue of fact existed and dismissing the petition without a full evidentiary hearing. The dismissal is affirmed.
Although there is much in the majority opinion with which I have no problem, in sum I am unable to agree with its general tenor or result. The opinion notes that DeFord waived his right to counsel, waived his right to a preliminary hearing, and, unremarkably, then pleaded guilty. The opinion further notes that his...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Mathews
...neither does a summary dismissal require the district court to file findings of fact and conclusions of law. Deford v. State, 105 Idaho 865, 867, 673 P.2d 1059, 1061 (1983). B. THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS We address first the question of the sufficiency of an unsigned warrant as this underlies a......
-
Storm v. State
...this circumstance, we must review the decision of the district court as one pursuant to I.C. § 19-4907 (1979). Deford v. State, 105 Idaho 865, 867, 673 P.2d 1059, 1061 (1983). Thus, the standards for review described above III. FAILURE TO INVESTIGATE VICTIM'S BACKGROUND Storm first argues t......
-
Freeman v. State
...either of actual bias or prejudice on the part of that judge. See Sivak v. State, 112 Idaho 197, 731 P.2d 192 (1987); DeFord v. State, 105 Idaho 865, 673 P.2d 1059 (1983); State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 662 P.2d 548 (1983). As a general rule the issue of bias in connection with the dis......