DeFusco v. Giorgio
Decision Date | 29 January 1982 |
Docket Number | No. 79-400-A,79-400-A |
Citation | 440 A.2d 727 |
Parties | Pasco DeFUSCO v. Frank GIORGIO, Jr., et ux. ppeal. |
Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
The defendants in this civil action, Frank Giorgio, Jr., and his wife Pauline (the Giorgios), appeal the denial of their motion to vacate a consent judgment under Rule 60(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. The facts pertinent to their appeal are as follows.
The Giorgios had obtained funds from the plaintiff Pasco DeFusco (DeFusco) and executed a promissory note on September 8, 1975, in the amount of $44,000. On January 14, 1977, DeFusco instituted suit on the note to recover a balance allegedly due in the amount of $33,265.67, asserting that the Giorgios were in default. Through their counsel at the time, the Giorgios answered the complaint, denying that the sum DeFusco sought to recover was the amount outstanding on the note. In their answer they also interposed the affirmative defenses of fraud and usury, charging that their signatures on the note had been procured through threats and under duress and that the interest terms of the promissory note were usurious and unenforceable under state law.
On the day of trial, the Giorgios presented the trial justice with a consent judgment drafted by their attorney, agreeing to judgment for DeFusco in the amount of $38,500. This figure included the balance DeFusco alleged was due on the note, interest and costs, plus DeFusco's attorney's fees. Under the terms of the judgment, the Giorgios were to pay DeFusco $3,500 by the end of November 1977, with the balance to be paid in equal monthly installments with 15 percent interest per annum. The Giorgios also agreed to secure the judgment debt by a mortgage on their real estate. The consent judgment was signed by both Frank and Pauline Giorgio and was entered on November 25, 1977.
According to DeFusco, the Giorgios failed to make payments in compliance with the provisions of the judgment. He obtained an execution and levied on their property. In an effort to prevent the impending sale, the Giorgios engaged new counsel, currently representing them on this appeal, and moved to vacate the consent judgment and to recall the execution. The motion to vacate the judgment was made within a few days of the running of the one-year time limitation prescribed by Super.R.Civ.P. 60(b).
After a hearing on these motions, the trial justice determined that, prior to signing the consent judgment, the Giorgios had been fully advised by competent counsel of their rights and of the ramifications of the entry of such a judgment. Concluding that the Giorgios had not satisfied their burden to establish that the "judgment was entered by mistake, accident, or duress, or misrepresentation," he denied the motions.
We now review the Giorgios' assertions of errors by the trial justice, bearing in mind the circumspect nature of our review of such appeals. As noted by Professor Kent: "An appeal from an order denying a motion to vacate judgment under Rule 60(b) presents only the correctness of that order and does not raise questions concerning the correctness of the judgment sought to be vacated." 1 Kent, R.I.Civ.Prac., § 60.10 at 457 (1969).
The Giorgios relied in part on subsections (b)(3) ( ) and (b)(6) (any other reason justifying relief from operation of the judgment) of Rule 60 in seeking to vacate the consent judgment. They assert that the trial justice's ruling was grounded on an incorrect standard of law because he failed to make express findings on the question of whether the Giorgios had established meritorious defenses to DeFusco's original action to recover on the promissory note. Furthermore, the Giorgios contend that it would be inequitable to deny them their day in court to present such meritorious defenses.
This argument misperceives the nature of a consent judgment; the Giorgios have, in effect, already had their day in court to present these defenses. By entering into the consent judgment, they waived all defenses relating to the subject matter underlying the judgment. Walling v. Miller, 138 F.2d 629, 631 (8th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 784, 64 S.Ct. 781, 88 L.Ed. 1076 (1944); Inmates of the Boys' Training School v. Southworth, 76 F.R.D. 115, 124 (D.R.I.1977). A judgment entered by consent cannot "be opened, changed, or set aside without the assent of the parties in the absence of fraud, mutual mistake or actual absence of consent * * *." Douglas Construction And Supply Corp. v. Wholesale Center of North Main St. Inc., 119 R.I. 449, 452, 379 A.2d 917, 918 (1977); In re Julie, 114 R.I. 419, 422-23, 334 A.2d 212, 214-15 (1975) (Joslin, J., concurring); Matthews v. Matthews, 105 R.I. 121, 126, 249 A.2d 647, 650 (1969). Thus, for purposes of the trial court's determination of whether grounds existed under Rule 60(b)(3) and (b)(6) to set aside the judgment, any defenses that the Giorgios may have had against DeFusco's recovery on the note were irrelevant. See also Kitchens v. Clay, 224 Ga. 325, 161 S.E.2d 828 (1968) ( ); Gulf Acceptance Loan Corp. v. Demas, 205 So.2d 855 (La.Ct.App.1968) ( ); Bundy v. Ayscue, 5 N.C.App. 581, 169 S.E.2d 87 (1969) ( ).
The Giorgios bore the burden of convincing the trial court that legally sufficient grounds, as specified under Rule 60(b), existed to warrant vacating the judgment. See Pasquazzi v. Pasquazzi, 119 R.I. 554, 555, 381 A.2d 233, 233-34 (1977). To this end they attempted to show that their consent to the judgment had not been given voluntarily, but rather was a result of duress and coercion. Pauline Giorgio testified that on the day she signed the consent judgment, she was extremely distraught. She stated, "Anything could have been put before me at that time of the day on that particular day, and it would have been completely incomprehensible to me at that time." She explained that she agreed to the judgment out of fear for the safety of her son who had been bringing the weekly payments on the note to DeFusco. Her fear, she stated, stemmed from the possible consequences she perceived might follow if she testified about "loan sharking" activities of DeFusco. The foundation for her perceptions appears to be limited to the alleged experience of a personal friend who also owed DeFusco money. Mrs. Giorgio elaborated:
Mrs. Giorgio did not allege that DeFusco had at any time made specific threats against her or members of her family. Further, the record contains no indication whatsoever of any coercion exerted by DeFusco before or during the period elapsing from the institution of his suit to the entry of the consent judgment. Although Mrs. Giorgio believed that her attorney was aware of how she felt about DeFusco with regard to his "loan sharking" activities, she admitted that on the day she signed the consent judgment she did not inform her attorney that she feared for the physical well-being of her son. Furthermore, she agreed that her attorney had advised her of the nature of the judgment and that she had not objected to any of its terms. Mr. Giorgio took the stand only briefly, stating that he agreed with the testimony of his wife.
In rebuttal DeFusco called the Giorgios' former attorney, who testified that he believed the Giorgios had signed the judgment voluntarily and willingly. He added that they did not appear to be under duress when it was signed; that Mrs. Giorgio appeared no more nervous or upset on that day than she had on other occasions when they discussed the case and other matters he had handled for them; that Mr. Giorgio seemed fully aware of what he was signing; and, finally, that he had advised Mr. Giorgio that if they settled the case, they waived their right to have a court determination that the loan was usurious and unenforceable. In the face of such advice, he was instructed by Mr. Giorgio to work out a possible arrangement with DeFusco's attorney to settle ...
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