Degi v. Varano Glass Co.

• Decision Date: 14 May 1987
• Docket Number: Docket No. 86985
• Citation: 405 N.W.2d 129,158 Mich.App. 695
• Parties: Paul G. DEGI, Claimant-Appellee, v. VARANO GLASS COMPANY, Respondent-Appellant. 158 Mich.App. 695, 405 N.W.2d 129
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 129

405 N.W.2d 129

Paul G. DEGI, Claimant-Appellee, v. VARANO GLASS COMPANY, Respondent-Appellant.

Docket No. 86985.

158 Mich.App. 695, 405 N.W.2d 129

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted June 11, 1986.

Decided Jan. 27, 1987.

Released for Publication May 14, 1987.

[158 MICHAPP 696] Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., and Morris J. Klau, Asst. Atty. Gen., for Michigan Employment Security Commission.

Landman, Latimer, Clink & Robb by Paul M. Kara, Muskegon, for respondent-appellant.

Before R.B. BURNS, P.J., and GRIBBS and COOPER, ^* JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Respondent appeals from an order of the circuit court affirming a decision of the Michigan Employment Security Commission Board of review, which found that claimant Paul G. Degi was entitled to unemployment benefits. The board of review decision reversed a decision of a commission referee, who concluded that Degi had been discharged for misconduct under M.C.L. Sec. 421.29(1)(b); M.S.A. Sec. 17.531(1)(b).

The board of review made the following findings of fact:

"The claimant worked approximately six or seven years for this employer as a glass cutter.

"The employer has four departments; the flat glass department, the insulated glass department, the auto glass department and the commercial [158 MICHAPP 697] new construction department. The claimant last worked in the flat glass department.

"The employer decided to start a new department specializing in art glass. The claimant, at his own expense and on his own time, had acquired skills and experience in beveling glass and stained glass. The employer knew that claimant had these skills. The employer called claimant in and discussed the idea of setting up an art glass department. The claimant was amenable to working in this new department. The employer, during this meeting, mentioned a contract to protect the employer's as well as the claimant's interests. An increase in wages was also discussed.

"The claimant, having limited knowledge of employment contracts, contacted a lawyer. The claimant's lawyer drafted a proposed employment contract. The claimant presented the proposed contract to the employer.

"The claimant spent the next two months setting up the machinery for beveling glass and performed various tasks related to art glass work.

"The claimant heard nothing further from the employer and called the employer regarding the proposed contract. The claimant had also not received an increase in wages. The employer was not pleased that claimant had consulted a lawyer. The claimant advised the employer that he wanted to return to his old job in the flat glass department and would not continue to work in the art glass department without a contract. The employer then advised claimant to continue working in the art glass department and do it the employer's way or punch out. The claimant punched out and did not return."

These factual conclusions are supported by competent, material and substantial evidence on the whole record. M.C.L. Sec. 421.38(1); M.S.A. Sec. 17.540(1). Accordingly, we accept them as true for purposes of this appeal.

The commission initially disqualified Degi for [158 MICHAPP 698] benefits on the grounds of employee misconduct under Sec. 29(1)(b) of the act. The referee affirmed the commission's decision. The board of review reversed, finding no misconduct:

"The Referee's finding of misconduct is not supported by the record. It is not misconduct to consult an attorney to protect one's interests, especially if an employee has specialized skills and knowledge acquired on his own time and at his own expense. This was a new venture and under the circumstances the claimant acted reasonably and prudently. Also, the claimant did what the employer asked him to do; namely, present a proposed contract covering their new relationship.

"In these circumstances, the claimant's separation from work was not for disqualifying misconduct. The claimant is not subject to disqualification under Section 29(1)(b) of the Act."

The circuit court affirmed the board of review, but it is not entirely clear to what extent the circuit judge followed the reasoning of the board of review. At one point in his opinion, the circuit judge indicates that he adopts the findings of the board of review. The circuit court opinion thereafter discusses this case in terms of whether Degi "left with good cause attributable to the employer." We believe that the circuit court analyzed the real issue in this case.

Respondent does not argue that Degi was discharged for misconduct. Rather, it argues, as it did below, that Degi left voluntarily without good cause attributable to the employer. See M.C.L. Sec. 421.29(1)(a); M.S.A. Sec. 17.531(1)(a). This is the position respondent has taken from the outset of this case, including its initial contact with the commission. Since respondent concedes that, if Degi was discharged, it was not for misconduct, we need not [158 MICHAPP 699] address that issue, but may proceed with consideration of respondent's theory that Degi voluntarily quit.

In analyzing this, or any other unemployment compensation case, it must be remembered that the purpose of the Employment Security Act is to relieve workers from the deprivations of involuntary unemployment. M.C.L. Sec. 421.2; M.S.A. Sec. 17.502; Larkin v. Bay City Public Schools, 89 Mich.App. 199, 208, 280 N.W.2d 483 (1979).

We conclude that the employer's actions in this case constitute good cause attributable to the employer and that, on the facts of this case, a reasonably prudent person would be justified in giving up employment. The employer's activity would motivate the average able-bodied and qualified worker to give up his or her employment in such a situation. Respondent promised claimant a raise several months previously. Respondent originally approached claimant concerning a possible contract to protect both parties' interest and requested that he come forward with suggestions. Claimant provided respondent with a possible contract. Claimant proceeded in good faith in setting up the specialized department and attempting to secure customers without a raise or a contract. Claimant proceeded to practice his highly skilled talent and share it with other employees. Claimant was willing to continue work in a less-skilled capacity when respondent refused to give him the raise as promised and refused to negotiate an employment contract with him. Accordingly, we conclude that the record supports the conclusion that Degi did not voluntarily...