Degorski v. Wilson
| Decision Date | 02 November 2015 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 04-cv-3367 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
| Parties | JAMES DEGORSKI, Plaintiff, v. THOMAS WILSON, et al., Defendants. |
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court are Plaintiff's motion to enforce judgment [226] and Defendant Wilson's motion for indemnification [232], wherein the parties both seek to have Defendant Cook County indemnify Defendant Wilson for an award of attorneys' fees in the amount of $177,570.00 pursuant to the County's purported obligation under its collective bargaining agreement with correctional officers. For the reasons set forth below, both motions [226, 232] are denied. Any attempt to seek indemnification from Cook County pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement must be pursued in accordance with the dispute-resolution provisions set forth in that agreement.
On March 7, 2014, the Court entered a jury verdict in favor of Plaintiff James Degorski on his claim that Defendant Thomas Wilson, a correctional officer, used excessive force against him. [193.] The jury awarded Plaintiff $225,000 in compensatory damages and $226,000 in punitive damages.1 The Court entered an order requiring Defendant Cook County to pay thecompensatory damages award against Defendant Wilson pursuant to its indemnification obligation under state law, 745 ILCS 10/9-102. [194.]
After judgment was entered, Plaintiff, as the prevailing party, filed a motion for attorneys' fees [207] pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The Court granted the motion, awarding Plaintiff $177,570.00 in attorneys' fees. Defendant Cook County declined to indemnify Defendant Wilson for this obligation, prompting Plaintiff Degorski to file a motion to enforce the judgment against Cook County [226] and Defendant Wilson to file a motion for indemnification against Cook County [232], wherein both parties argue that the County is required to indemnify Defendant Wilson for attorneys' fees under the collective bargaining agreement between the County and its correctional officers.
To be clear, the Court entered and continued Plaintiff Degorski's motion to enforce judgment [226], and ordered briefing on Defendant Wilson's motion for indemnification [232]. However, Plaintiff Degorski filed a reply brief [244] in support of Defendant Wilson's motion, effectively joining that motion. Adding further complexity to the procedural posture of the parties' motions, although Defendant Wilson's motion is titled a "motion for indemnification," he argued his motion as though it were one brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69(a) [see 233, 245], which is the procedural vehicle for enforcing judgments, not for obtaining indemnification (i.e., the same Rule 69(a) under which Plaintiff Degorski raised his motion to enforce [226]). In actuality, Defendant Wilson's motion for indemnification is more properly considered a counter-claim under Rule 13(g), filed post-judgment (requiring post-judgment amending of his pleading). As will become clear later in this opinion, the Court need not untangle this procedural knot because any attempt to collect attorneys' fees from the County (either via a counterclaim for indemnification or a post-judgment garnishment proceeding) mustproceed in accordance with the dispute resolution procedures set for in the County's collective bargaining agreement with its correctional officers.
In the underlying civil trial, the only Defendant whom the jury found liable was Defendant Wilson, and the jury awarded Plaintiff $225,000 in compensatory damages and $226,000 in punitive damages based on Defendant Wilson's use of excessive force. The Court added to Defendant Wilson's liabilities by awarding Plaintiff's counsel $177,570.00 in attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. As the Court understands it, the parties agree that Defendant Cook County had an obligation under state law (745 ILCS 10/9-102) to indemnify Defendant Wilson for the compensatory award, and the parties also agree that Defendant Cook County has no obligation to indemnify Defendant Wilson for the punitive award. The only dispute here concerns the $177,570.00 in attorneys' fees.
Wilson and Degorski raise only one argument: that Cook County is required to indemnify Wilson for the attorneys'-fees award pursuant to its obligations under the collective bargaining agreement between the County and its correctional officers. Wilson and Degorski do not argue that the County has any indemnification obligations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 or 745 ILCS 10/9-102. To resolve this issue, the Court's inquiry is two-fold: (1) is the Court permitted to interpret and enforce the collective bargaining agreement (which contains its own dispute-resolution procedure, involving a grievance process and arbitration2), and (2) if so, does the collective bargaining agreement require the County to indemnify Defendant Wilson for the attorneys'-fees award?
A. Interpreting and Enforcing the Collective Bargaining Agreement
As a starting point, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69(a)—which both Wilson and Degorski rely on as the procedural engine for their respective motions—is a vehicle by which a judgment creditor can seek to enforce a judgment in a supplemental proceeding. See Argento v. Vill. of Melrose Park, 838 F.2d 1483, 1487 (7th Cir. 1988) (), abrogated by Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 349 (1996).3 A supplemental, post-judgment collection proceeding under Rule 69(a) is considered a "garnishment" proceeding, and "garnishment proceedings to collect a judgment are not separate lawsuits." Yang v. City of Chicago, 137 F.3d 522, 526 (7th Cir. 1998). As such, federal courts maintain jurisdiction over those claims in order to ensure satisfaction of the underlying judgment. See Argento, 838 F.2d at 1487 ().
Wilson and Degorski rely heavily on Yang v. City of Chicago for their position that the Court has jurisdiction to enforce the County's alleged indemnification obligation under the collective bargaining agreement. In that case, Yang obtained a judgment against certain policeofficers, and then, in a post-judgment collection proceeding brought under Rule 69(a), Yang sought to collect that judgment from the City of Chicago pursuant to its indemnification obligations under 745 ILCS 10/9-102. Yang, 137 F.3d at 523-24. The Seventh Circuit held that the Court had jurisdiction to hear the garnishment claim "by virtue of its supplemental authority to order a third party not subject to the first suit * * * to pay the judgment in the [underlying] suit." Id. at 525 (citing Argento, 838 F.2d at 1495).
There are three notable differences between Yang and this case. First, Yang sought indemnification for his § 1983 liabilities, not his § 1988 liabilities. While this distinction does carry weight in deciding whether the County has an obligation to pay under the collective bargaining agreement, it does not impact Defendant Wilson's ability to raise the claim in a Rule 69(a) post-judgment proceeding (and the County does not argue otherwise).
Second, the Rule 69(a) collection action in Yang was brought by the judgment creditor—i.e., the party to whom the attorneys' fees were owed. Here the attorneys' fees are owed to Plaintiff Degorski, so he is the judgment creditor. Defendant Wilson did not provide any authority as to whether a judgment debtor can bring an enforcement action under Rule 69 (). While Degorski did file his own Rule 69(a) enforcement action [226], that motion was continued pending resolution of Defendant Wilson's claim for indemnification [232]. However, Degorski filed a brief in support of Wilson's motion [244], effectively joining that motion (while simultaneously presenting his own arguments under Rule 69). Regardless, the Court need not enter this procedural quagmire, because regardless of how the issue is framed or who brings it pursuant to what rule, the end result is still the same.
The third and most important difference between this case and Yang is that Yang sought indemnification pursuant to the City's obligations under 745 ILCS 10/9-102, not under a collective bargaining agreement. The County reads Yang narrowly as applying only to post-judgment proceedings interpreting § 9-102, arguing that Yang cannot be extended to allow a court to interpret a collective bargaining agreement. The County relies primarily on Winston v. O'Brien, 773 F.3d 809 (7th Cir. 2014), claiming that Winston "actually did address whether the federal court had jurisdiction to determine the meaning or application of the CBA." [240, at 7.]
The County reads Winston too broadly. In that case, the only issue raised on appeal was whether the City had to indemnify an officer for attorneys' fees assessed under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 by way of 745 ILCS 10/9-102. The plain language of § 9-102 makes indemnification of attorneys' fees discretionary. See 745 ILCS 10/9-102 . To work around the discretionary language of the statute, the officer argued (rather inventively) that "the City 'made this choice in advance' by agreeing in the CBA to pay 'damages or monies' assessed against its officers." Winston, 773 F.3d at 814. In other words, the officer was not arguing that he had a right to indemnification under the collective bargaining agreement ("of course, he would have no standing to do so," because the issue was not properly before the appellate court, Winston, 773 F.3d at 814); instead, the officer attempted...
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