Degroff v. Mascotech Forming Techns.-Fort Wayne

• Decision Date: 06 December 2001
• Docket Number: No. 1:00-CV-456.,1:00-CV-456.
• Citation: 179 F.Supp.2d 896
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana
• Parties: Cindy (Dini) DeGROFF, Plaintiff, v. MASCOTECH FORMING TECHNOLOGIES-FORT WAYNE, INC., Defendant.

179 F.Supp.2d 896

Cindy (Dini) DeGROFF, Plaintiff, v. MASCOTECH FORMING TECHNOLOGIES-FORT WAYNE, INC., Defendant.

No. 1:00-CV-456.

United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, Fort Wayne Division.

December 6, 2001.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Christopher C. Myers, Shane C. Mulholland, Christopher Myers and Associates, Fort Wayne, IN, for Cindy (Dini) Degroff.

Paul Harrison Sinclair, Ice Miller, Indianapolis, IN, for Mascotech Forming Technologies-Fort Wayne Inc.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER

COSBEY, United States Magistrate Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

The Plaintiff, Cindy DeGroff (hereafter "Plaintiff" or "DeGroff") brought this suit against the Defendant, MascoTech Forming Technologies-Fort Wayne, Inc. (hereafter "Defendant" or "MascoTech") alleging that she was constructively discharged as a result of sexual harassment in violation of Title VII ("Title VII")of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. This matter is before the Court¹ on the Defendant's "Motion to Dismiss and Compel Compliance with Defendant's Corporate Dispute Resolution Policy" filed on February 2, 2001. In support of its motion the Defendant submitted the affidavit of Joe Sepkovich (hereafter "Sepkovich affidavit ¶ ___"), MascoTech's Dispute Resolution Policy (hereafter "Policy at ___"), and various other documents.

The Plaintiff responded to the motion to dismiss on February 20, 2001, and submitted DeGroff's affidavit (hereafter "DeGroff aff. ¶ ___") and various letters reflecting settlement negotiations.

The Defendant filed a reply on March 12, 2001, and submitted the supplemental affidavit of Joe Sepkovich (hereafter "Sepkovich supp. aff. ¶ ___"), a question and answer form given to all employees regarding the policy, and a copy of the National Rules for the Resolution of Employment Disputes.

The Court converted the motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment and gave the parties an opportunity to submit additional documentation.² As a result, the Plaintiff filed a sur-reply on March 26, 2001. The Court then stayed the matter until the Seventh Circuit resolved Penn v. Ryan's Steak Houses, 269 F.3d 753 (7th Cir.2001). Penn has now been addressed and all supplemental briefs have been submitted. Therefore, the present motion is now ripe for review. For the reasons hereafter stated, the Defendant's motion for summary judgment and to compel arbitration will be GRANTED.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On January 9, 1998, DeGroff applied for a position at MascoTech. As part of the application process, DeGroff signed an agreement, premised by the words "Read Carefully Before Signing," stating:

I agree that in exchange for consideration of my possible employment with the Company I will be bound, as though an employee, by the Corporate Dispute Resolution Policy. Further, in the event of employment, I will also be bound by the Corporate Dispute Resolution Policy. As a result, Mediation, and, if unsuccessful, Arbitration will be the sole and exclusive remedies for any claims covered by the Corporate Dispute Resolution Policy and I agree not to pursue any such claims in Court through a judge or a jury. I acknowledge that I have had the opportunity to review the Corporate Dispute Resolution Policy prior to signing this document.

(Employment App.) (emphasis added). Notwithstanding the last sentence, DeGroff claims she was never given an opportunity to read the Corporate Dispute Resolution Policy before signing the application. (DeGroff aff. ¶ 4).

DeGroff began working at MascoTech as a furnace operator through a temporary agency in February and March of 1998. (DeGroff aff. ¶ 8.) Then, on April 1, 1998, while at work, MascoTech gave DeGroff an offer of employment. Indeed, Joe Sepkovich, the Human Resource Manager, approached DeGroff during her shift, and told her "you need to sign this paperwork to get you on the payroll — I know you're busy, let's do it quickly and you can go back to work." Id. Apparently, the "paperwork" included an offer of employment conditioned on DeGroff's agreement with the Policy, and a one sentence acknowledgment stating, "I acknowledge receipt of the Corporate Dispute Resolution Policy and the Questions and Answers." (See April 1, 1998 Letter; acknowledgment.) DeGroff signed both documents, but maintains she was not given copies of them, or even an opportunity to review them or the Policy.³ (DeGroff aff. ¶ 4, 8.)

Under the Policy, all claims, including claims of discrimination, arising out of the employee's employment or termination, are to be resolved through mediation, and if necessary, arbitration. (Policy at 1.) The Policy also provides that MascoTech and its employees are subject to the Employment Dispute Resolution Rules of the American Arbitration Association ("AAA"). (Policy at 2.) Additionally, the Policy provides that the "mediation and arbitration will be conducted by a neutral third party, the [AAA]." Id.

On October 27, 1999, the Plaintiff resigned from MascoTech. On January 24, 2000, she filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC, alleging she was sexually harassed while employed at MascoTech. Apparently, this led to some unsuccessful EEOC settlement efforts.⁴ The EEOC then issued a right to sue letter, and the Plaintiff commenced this suit on December 8, 2000.

MascoTech now seeks compliance with what it contends is a legally binding arbitration policy and agreement. While DeGroff acknowledges that she signed the agreement to arbitrate, she contends it is unenforceable because (1) it constitutes an invalid contract; (2) the Policy fails to protect her Title VII rights; and (3) MascoTech waived any right to enforce the arbitration clause. We will eventually address each argument in turn.

III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c). However, Rule 56(c) is not a requirement that the moving party negate his opponent's claim. Fitzpatrick v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 916 F.2d 1254, 1256 (7th Cir.1990). Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery, against a party "who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and in which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The standard for granting summary judgment mirrors the directed verdict standard under Rule 50(a), which requires the court to grant a directed verdict where there can be but one reasonable conclusion. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party's position is not sufficient to successfully oppose summary judgment; "there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Id. at 2512; In Re Matter of Wildman, 859 F.2d 553, 557 (7th Cir.1988); Klein v. Ryan, 847 F.2d 368, 374 (7th Cir.1988); Valentine v. Joliet Township High School District No. 204, 802 F.2d 981, 986 (7th Cir.1986). No genuine issue for trial exists "where the record as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party." Juarez v. Ameritech Mobile Communications, Inc., 957 F.2d 317, 322 (7th Cir.1992) (quoting Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)).

Initially, Rule 56 requires the moving party to inform the court of the basis for the motion, and to identify those portions of the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admission on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. The non-moving party may oppose the motion with any of the evidentiary materials listed in Rule 56(c), but reliance on the pleadings alone is not sufficient to withstand summary judgment. Goka v. Bobbitt, 862 F.2d 646, 649 (7th Cir.1988); Guenin v. Sendra Corp., 700 F.Supp. 973, 974 (N.D.Ind.1988); Posey v. Skyline Corp., 702 F.2d 102, 105 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 960, 104 S.Ct. 392, 78 L.Ed.2d 336 (1983). In ruling on a summary judgment motion the court accepts as true the non-moving party's evidence, draws all legitimate inferences in favor of the non-moving party, and does not weigh the evidence or the credibility of witnesses. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-251, 106 S.Ct. at 2511. However, "[i]t is a gratuitous cruelty to parties and their witnesses to put them through the emotional ordeal of a trial when the outcome is foreordained" and in such cases summary judgment is appropriate. Mason v. Cont'l Illinois Nat'l Bank, 704 F.2d 361, 367 (7th Cir.1983).

Substantive law determines which facts are material; that is, which facts might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Id. 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. Irrelevant or unnecessary facts do not preclude summary judgment even when they are in dispute. Id. The issue of fact must be genuine. Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c), (e). To establish a genuine issue of fact, the non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. at 1356; First National Bank of Cicero v. Lewco Securities Corp., 860 F.2d 1407, 1411 (7th Cir.1988). The non-moving party must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. A summary judgment determination is essentially an inquiry as to "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a...