Deherrera v. Decker Truck Line, Inc.

• Decision Date: 21 April 2016
• Docket Number: No. 15–1220.,15–1220.
• Citation: 820 F.3d 1147
• Parties: Joe DEHERRERA, a/k/a Joe “J.R.” Deherrera; Joe Griego; Jennifer Johnson; Scott Johnson; Tom Lark, on behalf of themselves, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs–Appellants, v. DECKER TRUCK LINE, INC., Defendant–Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

820 F.3d 1147

Joe DEHERRERA, a/k/a Joe “J.R.” Deherrera; Joe Griego; Jennifer Johnson; Scott Johnson; Tom Lark, on behalf of themselves, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs–Appellants

v.DECKER TRUCK LINE, INC., Defendant–Appellee.

No. 15–1220.

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

April 21, 2016.

David H. Miller (Rachel Graves with him on the briefs), The Sawaya & Miller Law Firm, Denver, CO, for Plaintiffs–Appellants.

Emily F. Keimig (Matthew M. Morrison with her on the brief), Sherman & Howard, L.L.C., Denver, CO, for Defendant–Appellee.

Before HARTZ, PHILLIPS, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.

McHUGH, Circuit Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This case involves a dispute over the scope of the Motor Carrier Act exemption from the overtime pay requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the Colorado Minimum Wage Order (Wage Order). Joe Deherrera and several other complainants (Plaintiffs), who were commercial truck drivers for Decker Truck Line, Inc. (Decker), claim Decker failed to pay them proper overtime wages. Decker contends Plaintiffs were exempt employees under both the FLSA and the Wage Order. The district court granted summary judgment to Decker, and we affirm. By driving an intrastate leg of shipments in interstate commerce, Plaintiffs became subject to the authority of the Secretary of Transportation and were thus exempt from the overtime pay requirements of the FLSA and the Wage Order.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Facts ¹

Decker is a for-hire motor carrier, regulated by the U.S. Department of Transportation (USDOT) and the Secretary of Transportation, with its principal office in Fort Dodge, Iowa. Decker signed a transportation contract with New Belgium Brewing Company (New Belgium) to make two classes of shipments: (1) outbound shipments of beer from New Belgium's brewery to its warehouse (known as the “Rez”), and (2) backhaul shipments of empty kegs, pallets, hops, and other materials from the Rez to the brewery. These two facilities are located approximately five miles apart in Fort Collins, Colorado. And Decker employed Plaintiffs (all of whom are commercial truck drivers) to transport both categories of shipments.²

New Belgium sells its beer primarily through distributors located outside the State of Colorado. To determine the composition and volume of the outbound shipments, New Belgium uses a forecast that accounts for historical demand and pending customer orders. This process requires its distributors to place orders at least 21 days before shipment, but New Belgium allows the distributors to modify their orders up until the time of shipment if New Belgium can satisfy the production request. At the time these orders are placed, the distributors also generally designate which carrier will retrieve the shipment from the Rez. In a number of cases, New Belgium arranges the carrier as a “value-added service” to the goods they provide. New Belgium then prepares a monthly schedule showing what beer will be brewed and packaged on each day of the month.

Because New Belgium lacks sufficient refrigerated storage at its brewery, Decker's drivers (including Plaintiffs) transport approximately 99 percent of the beer New Belgium produces from the brewery to the Rez. The rest remains on-site for local sales. New Belgium tracks the content of these shipments by affixing “license plates” to each pallet and logging each one using modern tracking software. Upon arrival at the Rez, approximately 10% of beer is repackaged, but most of it is left undisturbed. New Belgium then exercises complete control over the beer until carriers retrieve the product from the Rez at the designated date and time for delivery to the distributors.

On average, beer remains at the Rez for two weeks before it is shipped to New Belgium's customers. But on occasion some beer is never stored at the warehouse. Instead, it is shipped from the brewery to the Rez, scanned into the Rez's inventory, and then loaded directly into an outbound truck. It is unclear whether these particular trucks then make intrastate or interstate deliveries. But overall, of the beer that Plaintiffs transported to the Rez in November 2013, roughly 86 percent was later shipped to locations outside of Colorado. That figure rose to 89 percent in February 2015. For all shipments, New Belgium has a “first-in/first-out” policy which means that the first beer to come into the Rez is the first beer to leave the Rez. New Belgium also places a “best by” date on its beer and assures its customers that it will not ship beer to them with less than sixty days remaining before that date. Beer that is too close to the best by date is discarded.

Plaintiffs' backhaul shipments take a different form. After delivering beer to the Rez, Decker's drivers then load empty kegs, pallets, hops, and other materials from the Rez onto their trucks and haul them back to the brewery. Distributors receive $30 and $7, respectively, for each keg and pallet returned to New Belgium. It is unclear whether New Belgium arranges for the kegs and pallets to be returned or whether the distributors handle that responsibility entirely. Regardless, most of these backhaul materials arrive at the Rez from locations outside the state.

B. Proceedings Below

Plaintiffs allege that in making these shipments for Decker, they were required to work overtime hours but were not given overtime pay as required under the FLSA and the Wage Order. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege they worked a repeating schedule, one week working 4 days with shifts of 12 hours and 15 minutes, followed by another week working 3 days with shifts of 12 hours and 15 minutes. Plaintiffs first claim a violation of the FLSA for failure to pay overtime wages. Plaintiffs' second cause of action alleges Decker violated the Wage Order because they (1) were not paid overtime when working 12–hour shifts, (2) were not given paid breaks, (3) worked off the clock for 15 minutes each day, and (4) were not paid overtime when working over 40 hours during a work week.

Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint against Decker in federal court on September 19, 2013, incorporating both causes of action. On November 20, 2013, Decker filed a motion to dismiss, asserting the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and Plaintiffs had failed to state a claim. The district court denied the motion and opened the case for limited discovery on whether Plaintiffs were exempt employees under the FLSA and the Wage Order.

Decker then filed a motion for summary judgment on February 9, 2015, arguing Plaintiffs moved goods in “interstate commerce” and were thus exempt from the overtime provision under the FLSA. Decker also argued that Plaintiffs were not “equipment operat[ors]” and did not belong to any of the industries covered by the Wage Order. The district court granted Decker's motion on June 10, 2015.

In its decision, the court laid out the “Undisputed Facts” and the “Disputed Facts.” With respect to the latter, the court noted that “[t]he parties hotly dispute[d]” whether in a separate adjudication before the NLRB the Plaintiffs had admitted to being subject to regulation by the USDOT. But the court ultimately decided resolution of that issue was “not necessary to [the] resolution of the motion” and granted summary judgment on the basis of the undisputed facts alone.

As to Plaintiffs' FLSA claim, the district court determined Plaintiffs were engaged in interstate commerce based entirely on their backhaul shipments of materials from the Rez to the brewery. The court concluded these shipments were “clearly sufficient to place plaintiffs in interstate commerce and under the authority of the Secretary of Transportation which in turn, exempts plaintiffs from the overtime provision of the FLSA.” As to Plaintiffs' claim under the Wage Order, the court agreed with Decker that Plaintiffs were not “equipment operators” and were exempt from the provisions of the Wage Order as “interstate drivers.” The district court entered final judgment in Decker's favor, and Plaintiffs timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

III. DISCUSSION

In affirming the district court's grant of summary judgment, we first analyze the scope of the Motor Carrier Act (MCA) exemption to the FLSA and conclude—based on the undisputed facts—that Plaintiffs' backhaul shipments of hops, pallets, empty kegs, and other materials took place in interstate commerce. As a result, Plaintiffs were exempt from the FLSA's overtime provisions. Because Plaintiffs were engaged in interstate commerce, we also conclude they were “interstate drivers” under the Wage Order and therefore exempt from its overtime provisions as well. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Decker on both claims.

A. Standard of Review

“We review summary judgment orders de novo and may affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment on any grounds adequately presented below.” Reinhart v. Lincoln Cty., 482 F.3d 1225, 1228 (10th Cir.2007) (brackets omitted) (quoting Medina v. City & Cty. of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1500 (10th Cir.1992) ). As defendant, Decker “is entitled to summary judgment if it ‘raises at least one legally sufficient defense that would bar plaintiff's claim and that involves no triable issue of fact.’ ” Archuleta v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 543 F.3d 1226, 1232–33 (10th Cir.2008) (quoting 10B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2734 (3d ed.1998)). Here, Decker's defense is that the overtime provisions of the FLSA do not apply because Plaintiffs fall under the MCA exemption. Because FLSA exemptions are “narrowly construed against ... employers,” Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S. 388, 392, 80 S.Ct. 453, 4 L.Ed.2d 393 (1960), “in considering an FLSA exemption, a court must find that the claimed exemption falls ‘plainly and unmistakably’ within the terms of the statute,” Lederman v. Frontier Fire Prot., Inc....