Deibeikis v. Link-Belt Co.

• Citation: 104 N.E. 211,261 Ill. 454
• Parties: DEIBEIKIS v. LINK-BELT CO.
• Decision Date: 21 February 1914
• Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

261 Ill. 454

104 N.E. 211

DEIBEIKIS

v.LINK-BELT CO.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Feb. 21, 1914.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Cook County; John P. McGoorty, Judge.

Action by Joseph Deibeikis against the Link-Belt Company. From a judgment for defendant on demurrer to the declaration, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.John F. Bolton and Maurice J. Moriarty, both of Chicago, for appellant.

Bradley.

Harper & Eheim, of Chicago (Samuel A. Harper, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellee.

COOKE, C. J.

This appeal brings in question the constitutionality of the original Workmen's Compensation Act of this state (Laws of 1911, p. 315). This act has been repealed by the present Workmen's Compensation Act (Laws of 1913, p. 335), but the facts upon which this action is based arose under the former act and are governed by it.

Appellant, Joseph Deibeikis, was an employé of the Link-Belt Company, appellee. On January 31, 1913, appellant brought his action on the case against appellee to recover for injuries which it was alleged he had sustained while employed in appellee's machine shop. To the declaration appellee pleaded the general issue and a special plea, in which it is set forth that, before the alleged grievances mentioned in the declaration had been committed, both appellant and appellee had elected to be governed by the terms of the Workmen's Compensation Act; that the appellee had posted the required notices, and had done all that the act required of it; that appellant had accepted certain sums of money under the act, and that appellee was ready to pay any further sums due; that appellant was governed by the terms of that act, and should adjust his grievances thereunder instead of bringing his action on the case. To the special plea appellant filed a general and special demurrer, in which it was assigned that the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1911 was invalid and contrary to the Constitution of Illinois. The demurrer was overruled, and, appellant having elected to stand by his demurrer, judgment was entered against him for costs, and this appeal was perfected.

It will be necessary, in order to intelligently discuss the questions raised, to set out a portion of the act of 1911. The first three sections are as follows:

‘Sec. 1. That any employer covered by the provisions of this act in this state may elect to provide and pay compensation for injuries sustained by any employee arising out of and in the course of the employment according to the provisions of this act, and thereby relieve himself from any liability for the recovery of damages, except as herein provided. If, however, any such employer shall elect not to provide and pay the compensation to any employee who has elected to accept the provisions of this act, according to the provisions of this act he shall not escape liability for injuries sustained by such employee arising out of and in the course of his employment because

‘1. The employee assumed the risks of the employer's business.

‘2. The injury or death was caused in whole or in part by the negligence of a fellow servant.

‘3. The injury or death was proximately caused by the contributory negligence of the employee, but such contributory negligence shall be considered by the jury in reducing the amount of damages.

‘a. Every such employer is presumed to have elected to provide and pay the compensation according to the provisions of this act, unless and until notice in writing of his election to the contrary is filed with the state bureau of labor statistics.

‘b. Every employer within the provisions of this act failing to file such notice shall be bound hereby as to all his employees who shall elect to come within the provisions of this act until January 1 of the next succeeding year and for terms of each year thereafter: Provided, any such employer may elect to discontinue the payments of compensation herein provided only at the expiration of any such calendar year, by filing notice of his intention to discontinue such payments, with the state bureau of labor statistics, at least sixty days prior to the expiration of any such calendar year, and by posting such notice in the plant, shop, office or place of work, or by personal service, in written or printed from, upon such employee, at least sixty days prior to the expiration of any such calendar year.

‘c. In the event any employer elects to provide and pay compensation provided in this act, then every employee of such employer, as a part of his contract of hiring or who may be employed at the time of the taking effect of this act and the acceptance of its provisions by the employer, shall be deemed to have accepted all the provisions of this act and shall be bound thereby unless within thirty days after such hiring and after the taking effect of this act, he shall file a notice to the contrary with the secretary of the state bureau of labor statistics, whose duty it shall be to immediately notify the employer, and if so notified, the employer shall not be deprived of any of his common law or statutory defenses, and until such notice to the contrary is given to the employer, the measure of liability of the employer for any injury shall be determined according to the compensation provisions of this act: Provided, however, that before any such employee shall be bound by the provisions of this act, his employer shall either furnish to such employee personally at the time of his hiring, or post in a conspicuous place at the plant or in the room or place where such employee is to be employed, a legible statement of the compensation provisions of this act.

‘Sec. 2. The provisions of this act shall apply to every employer in the state engaged in the building, maintaining, or demolishing of any structure; in any construction or electrical work; in the business of carriage by land or water and loading and unloading in connection therewith (except as to carriers who shall be construed to be excluded herefrom by the laws of the United States relating to liability to their employees for personal injuries while engaged in interstate commerce where such laws are held to be exclusive of all state regulations providing compensation for accidental injuries or death suffered in the course of employment); in operating general or terminal storehouses; in mining, surface mining, or quarrying; in any enterprise, or branch thereof, in which explosive materials are manufactured, handled or used in dangerous quantities; in any enterprise wherein molten metal or injurious gases or vapors or inflammable fluids are manufactured, used, generated, stored or conveyed in dangerous quantities; and in any enterprise in which statutory regulations are now or shall hereafter be imposed for the guarding, using or the placing of machinery or appliances, or for the protection and safeguarding of the employees therein, each of which employments is hereby determined to be especially dangerous, in which from the nature, conditions and means of prosecution of the work therein, extraordinary risks to life and limb of the employee engaged therein are inherent, necessary or substantially unavoidable, and as to each of which employments it is deemed necessary to establish a new system of compensation for accidents to the employees therein.

‘Sec. 3. No common-law or statutory right to recover damages for injury or death sustained by any employee while engaged in the line of his duty as such employee other than the compensation herein provided shall be available to any employee who has accepted the provisions of this act or to any one wholly or partially dependent upon him or legally responsible for his estate: Provided, that when the injury to the employee was caused by the intentional omission of th employer, to comply with statutory safety regulations, nothing in this act shall affect the civil liability of the employer. If the employer is a partnership, such omission must be that of one of the partners thereof, and if a corporation, that of any elective officer thereof.’

The fourth section provides for the compensation to be paid by the employer who has accepted the provisions of the act for the death of an employé, and the fifth section provides for the compensation to be paid the employé for an injury resulting in disability. Section 5 1/2 provides for the payment of compensation, under certain circumstances, in a lump sum, and for the appointment, in proper cases, of a guardian, conservator, or administrator. The sixth section provides a basis for computing the compensation provided for in sections 4 and 5. The seventh section provides that the compensation specified in the act shall be the measure of the responsibility which the employer has assumed for injuries or death, and that it shall not be reduced in any way by contributions from employés; and the eighth section, that, if it be proved that the injury to the employé resulted from his deliberate intention to cause such injury, no such compensation shall be allowed. By the ninth section an employé entitled to receive disability payments is required, on the request of the employer, to submit himself for examination, at the employer's expense, to a medical practitioner selected by the employer, such examination to be made in the presence of a medical practitioner provided and paid for by the employé, if the employé so desires. The purpose of this examination is to determine the nature, extent, and probable duration of the injury received, and, in the event of a disagreement between the physicians selected by the employer and employé, they may agree upon a third physician, or, failing to agree, the judge of the county court in the county where the employé resided or was employed at the time of the injury shall select a third physician, and the majority report of such three physicians as to the nature, extent, and probable duration of the injury or disability shall be used for the purpose of estimating the amount of compensation payable...