Deidun v. Deidun
| Decision Date | 22 November 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 3891.,3891. |
| Citation | 606 S.E.2d 489,362 S.C. 47 |
| Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Patricia E. DEIDUN, Appellant, v. Richard C. DEIDUN, Respondent. |
Daniel D. D'Agostino, of York, for Appellant.
Lucy London McDow, of Rock Hill, for Respondent.
In this domestic matter, Patricia E. Deidun (Wife) appeals the family court's final order, arguing the court erred in: (1) defining a car as nonmarital property; (2) distributing the marital assets and debts; (3) failing to award adequate alimony; and (4) failing to award adequate attorney's fees. We affirm.
Wife and Richard C. Deidun (Husband) were married on April 23, 1977, and separated on December 17, 1999, when Husband left the marital home. The parties had a son during the marriage, born October 27, 1981. Husband worked throughout the marriage, except for a seven-week period in 1999 when he suffered from depression. Wife also worked either part-time or full-time jobs throughout the marriage, with the exception of two years after the birth of their son. Wife was the primary party responsible for caring for the parties' son, cleaning, cooking, buying the family's food and clothes, and handling the family's finances.
The parties lived in Michigan after they were married. In 1988, Husband accepted a position in Charlotte, North Carolina, and the family moved there. Husband's North Carolina position paid him substantially less than his former Michigan position. The parties soon accumulated nearly $33,000 in credit card debt, and Wife did not tell Husband about the debt. Husband discovered the marital debt in 1993, and he took control over the finances. The parties borrowed $28,000 from Wife's father to pay off a portion of the debt. Two years later, Husband repaid Wife's father for the loan, paid off all of the parties' other credit card debts, and reduced the family to one Wachovia credit card which they both used. At that time, Wife resumed responsibility over the family's finances.
The parties lived a comfortable lifestyle. They took vacations each year and enjoyed riding motorcycles. Husband used money inherited from his father to establish Putnam IRA accounts for himself and Wife. In 1996, the parties sold their Charlotte home, clearing nearly $80,000 in equity from the sale. The couple built a 3,400 square foot home in Fort Mill, South Carolina, for $253,000. The parties also took out a $25,000 line of credit on their new home and used $19,000 to purchase a second motorcycle.
In 1999, Husband suffered from depression and he took leave from work. While recovering, he cleaned up his old motorcycle, sold it, and gave $9,200 to Wife to pay on the line of credit used to buy the new motorcycle. He was informed by Wife that there was still $25,000 owing on the line of credit. Because the parties only used $19,000 on the line of credit to purchase the new motorcycle and they had been paying on the line of credit for several years, Husband was surprised. When he investigated the parties' financial status, he learned that the balance on the line of credit was actually $31,000, not $25,000 as Wife had told him. He also learned that Wife had withdrawn and spent nearly $27,000 from her Putnam IRA account without disclosing it to him, and Wife had incurred nearly $7,500 in credit card debt without his knowledge. Wife had also opened a Truliant credit union line of credit, with a balance of $7,218, that Husband was not aware of. The parties eventually separated in December 1999 when Husband left the marital home.
After the parties separated in December 1999, they agreed to sell the marital home and Wife decided to build a new $172,000 home for herself and the parties' son. Wife obtained several credit cards and charged nearly $19,000 before the parties entered into a consent order in March 2000. The March 6, 2000 temporary consent agreement provided that Husband would pay: child support for the parties' seventeen-year old son; $1,000 a month in alimony to Wife; all the marital bills until Wife moved from the marital home; $16,300 to pay off the balance due on Wife's car; and $75,000 to Wife to assist in closing on her new home. Husband liquidated his Putnam IRA account, subject to a substantial early withdrawal tax penalty, and gave Wife $75,000 to put towards her new home and $16,300 to pay off the balance owed on her car. Wife used the funds to put $43,000 down on her new home and to pay off some of the credit card debt. The parties sold their home in September 2000 for $286,000.
At some point, Husband started a relationship with another woman. Husband, his paramour, and the paramour's children eventually moved to California when Husband accepted a job there in 2000. Wife filed a summons and complaint on September 18, 2000, seeking a divorce based on Husband's adultery. On November 7, 2000, a second consent order was filed memorializing the parties' agreement that Husband could have $75,000 from the sale of the parties' house, with Husband's attorney holding the remaining funds in trust. A third consent order was filed on December 13, 2000, in which Wife signed a quit-claim deed to any home Husband purchased in California, a community property state. Husband voluntarily paid his son's college tuition and purchased a car for his son.
This action was tried on July 11, 2001. After hearing testimony from Wife and Husband, the family court granted Wife a divorce based on Husband's adultery. The court also found that Wife's failure to handle the family finances responsibly and failure to inform Husband about the status of their finances or her large expenditures amounted to a form of misconduct that was a contributing factor to the breakup of the marriage. The court found Husband's Corvette was not marital property and ordered the marital assets be split with 65% going to Husband and 35% to Wife. The court also divided the marital debt, awarded Wife $1,200 per month in alimony, and awarded Wife $2,570 in attorney's fees. Finally, the court ordered a qualified domestic relations order to divide the marital portions of Husband's retirement accounts on a 50/ 50 basis.
After Wife filed a motion to reconsider, the family court issued a supplemental order, finding that: (1) Wife was not fiscally responsible and would likely spend beyond her means, regardless of the size of award she were to be given by the family court; (2) Husband voluntarily paid for the son's college expenses; and (3) Wife's expenses cited to support her claim for additional alimony appeared to be inflated by debt service on additional borrowing and appeared excessive in light of Wife's receipt of $75,000 from Husband during their separation. The court noted that its original order actually failed to allocate marital assets 65/35 in favor of Husband, so the court ordered that Husband's attorney distribute the entire $10,240 in funds remaining from the sale of the parties' home to Wife. The court refused to alter the original order further. Although the court intended to divide the non-pension assets on a 65/35 basis, the distribution after the supplemental order amounted to an approximately 59/41 allocation.
Wife timely appealed the family court's order. Husband filed a motion before this court to remand the matter when he learned that his taxes had been miscalculated and he owed an additional $10,002.60 early withdrawal penalty on the Putnam IRA account he cashed in to pay Wife. This court granted the motion to remand on February 20, 2003, and Husband filed a motion for relief from judgment before the family court pursuant to Rule 60, SCRCP.1 The family court indicated at the hearing that it would deny Husband's motion, and the court refused to: grant him relief from judgment; reopen the case; consider the additional $10,002.60 tax penalty as marital debt; or redistribute the marital assets and debts. However, the May 9, 2003 written order granted Husband's motion to the extent that the additional $10,002.60 would be considered marital debt and Husband would be responsible for the debt. Wife appeals both the supplemental order and the order on Husband's Rule 60 motion.
In appeals from the family court, this court has the authority to find the facts in accordance with its view of the preponderance of the evidence. Rutherford v. Rutherford, 307 S.C. 199, 204, 414 S.E.2d 157, 160 (1992). This broad scope of review does not, however, require this court to disregard the findings of the family court. Stevenson v. Stevenson, 276 S.C. 475, 477, 279 S.E.2d 616, 617 (1981). Neither is the court required to ignore the fact that the family court judge, who saw and heard the witnesses, was in a better position to evaluate their credibility and assign comparative weight to their testimony. Cherry v. Thomasson, 276 S.C. 524, 525, 280 S.E.2d 541, 541 (1981).
Wife argues Husband's Corvette was transmuted into marital property during the marriage, and thus the family court erred in determining that it was nonmarital property. Alternatively, Wife asserts that she was entitled to special equity from the increase in value of the Corvette during the marriage. We disagree.
Property acquired prior to the marriage is generally considered nonmarital. S.C.Code Ann. § 20-7-473(2) (Supp.2003). Although nonmarital property is generally not subject to equitable distribution, the other spouse may be entitled to a special equity in the property. S.C.Code Ann. § 20-7-473(5) (Supp.2003). A spouse obtains an equitable interest in improvements to property to which he or she has contributed, even if the property is nonmarital. Johnson v. Johnson, 296 S.C. 289, 299, 372 S.E.2d 107, 113 (Ct.App.1988).
Nonmarital property may be transmuted into marital property. In determining whether property has been transmuted, courts must consider whether the property: (1) "becomes so commingled with marital property as to be...
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