DeJarnette v. Corning Inc.
| Citation | 133 F.3d 293 |
| Decision Date | 05 January 1998 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 96-1897,96-1937,s. 96-1897 |
| Parties | 75 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1088, 72 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 45,103 Regina W. DeJARNETTE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CORNING INCORPORATED, Defendant-Appellee. Regina W. DeJARNETTE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CORNING INCORPORATED, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
ARGUED: Barbara Rubin Hudson, Danville, VA, for Appellant. Scott F. Zimmerman, Reed, Smith, Shaw & McClay, Pittsburgh, PA, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Carole S. Katz, Reed, Smith, Shaw & McClay, Pittsburgh, PA, for Appellee.
Before MURNAGHAN and NIEMEYER, Circuit Judges, and MAGILL, Senior Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.
No. 96-1897 dismissed and No. 96-1937 reversed by published opinion. Senior Judge MAGILL wrote the majority opinion, in which Judge NIEMEYER joined. Judge MURNAGHAN wrote a dissenting opinion.
Regina DeJarnette, a pregnant probationary employee of Corning Inc. (Corning), was discharged during her probationary period after Corning gave her several warnings and negative evaluations based on her poor performance. DeJarnette brought this action of pregnancy discrimination under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994), against Corning. Following a jury trial, the district court granted in part and denied in part Corning's motion for judgment as a matter of law (JAML). Both parties now appeal. Because we find insufficient evidence to support a jury verdict of pregnancy discrimination, we reverse the district court's denial in part of Corning's motion for JAML and we dismiss DeJarnette's appeal as moot.
In November 1992 Corning offered to hire DeJarnette to inspect and package glassware in its Danville, Virginia, facility. On November 5, 1992, Kathy Schrock, a personnel assistant for Corning, met with DeJarnette and told her that an inspector-packer (IP) position was available, and that DeJarnette could have the job if she passed a physical examination and an investigation. DeJarnette understood that Schrock, rather than extending a firm offer of employment, was extending an offer of employment which was strictly conditional on DeJarnette's passing both the examination and the investigation.
During this meeting, and before completing either the physical or the investigation, DeJarnette told Schrock that DeJarnette was pregnant. Schrock, who also was pregnant told DeJarnette that DeJarnette's pregnancy was " '[n]o problem.' " I J.A. at 180 (trial testimony of DeJarnette). Schrock also informed DeJarnette that "there was no need" to inform other Corning employees about the pregnancy, id. at 217, because it was irrelevant to the IP position. 1 Id. at 251 (trial testimony of Schrock). That same day, Schrock informed Barbara Bardo, the Danville facility's Equal Employment Opportunity officer and personnel supervisor, about DeJarnette's pregnancy.
After DeJarnette passed both the physical examination and the investigation, Corning called DeJarnette in to work as an IP. DeJarnette was specifically informed that she would be a probationary employee for sixty days, and DeJarnette was aware that she was required to pass this probationary period before she could become a regular employee.
Corning watches its probationary employees closely and holds them to higher standards than its regular employees. Corning evaluates its probationary employees on the basis of their overall job performance, including their attitude toward their job and their coworkers.
As a probationary IP, DeJarnette worked alongside a conveyor belt and inspected and packaged glassware traveling along the belt. DeJarnette's primary duties included ensuring that the conveyor belt did not clog, inspecting the glassware for defects, discarding defective glassware, and packaging acceptable glassware in boxes. When not busy inspecting and packaging glassware, DeJarnette was required to perform housekeeping duties such as making boxes, cleaning her work area, and cleaning her coworkers' work areas.
While employed as a probationary employee, DeJarnette was supervised and evaluated by Wayne Liggon. During DeJarnette's sixty-day probationary period, Liggon gave DeJarnette two negative evaluations. 2 In each evaluation, Liggon criticized DeJarnette's poor attitude, her poor use of slack time, her lack of enthusiasm, and her poor inspecting and packing performance. The first evaluation also noted that DeJarnette had overstayed some of her breaks. While reviewing the evaluations with DeJarnette, Liggon specifically warned DeJarnette that he was unsure that she should be retained as an employee and that she needed to show dramatic improvement.
After these negative evaluations, Corning extended DeJarnette's probationary period an additional thirty days. In a letter informing DeJarnette about the extension, Liggon commented on DeJarnette's lack of enthusiasm, poor attitude, poor use of slack time, and poor inspecting and packaging performance, and warned her "that a dramatic improvement in her performance must occur or she [would] be terminated with the company." II J.A. at 625.
During the extended probationary period, Liggon evaluated DeJarnette on three separate occasions. These evaluations noted that DeJarnette's inspecting and packaging performance was improving. However, these evaluations continued to criticize DeJarnette's poor use of slack time, her poor housekeeping habits, and her lack of enthusiasm. These evaluations also explicitly warned DeJarnette that dramatic improvement in these areas was required.
Despite Liggon's consistent warnings and negative evaluations, DeJarnette failed to make the necessary improvement. Accordingly, Liggon, Bardo, and Judith Breznay, Corning's plant manager, decided to discharge DeJarnette near the end of the extended thirty-day probationary period.
While DeJarnette was employed as a probationary employee, forty of Corning's forty-three IPs were female. In addition, nine of the eleven IPs under Liggon's supervision were female. Furthermore, between 1989 and 1993, twelve of Corning's female employees took pregnancy-related leaves of absence, and each of these employees was reinstated.
After being discharged, DeJarnette filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The EEOC declined to act on DeJarnette's complaint, and provided DeJarnette with a right-to-sue letter.
DeJarnette then sued Corning, claiming that its decision to discharge her constituted discrimination because of her pregnancy. The suit first went to trial in March 1995. The first trial resulted in a hung jury and was declared a mistrial. The suit was tried a second time in October 1995. The second jury found discrimination and awarded DeJarnette $51,451.48 in past wages, $57,334.87 in future wages, $50,000.00 in compensatory damages, and $100,000.00 in punitive damages. Corning then filed a motion for JAML or, in the alternative, for a new trial or, in the alternative, for remittitur. The district court denied Corning's motion for JAML as to liability, reasoning that Liggon's evaluations were subjective and easily fabricated, and asserting that the jury could reasonably rely on DeJarnette's coworkers' testimony to refute Liggon's evaluations. However, the district court granted Corning's motion for JAML with respect to DeJarnette's awards of front pay, compensatory damages, and punitive damages. The district court also conditionally granted Corning's motion for a new trial with respect to front pay, compensatory damages, and punitive damages. DeJarnette now appeals the district court's grant of Corning's motion for JAML as to front pay, compensatory damages, and punitive damages, as well as the district court's conditional grant of a new trial on these issues. Corning cross-appeals the district court's refusal to grant Corning's motion for JAML as to liability.
We review the district court's denial of JAML de novo and examine the evidence in the light most favorable to DeJarnette, the nonmoving party. See Brown v. CSX Transp., Inc., 18 F.3d 245, 248 (4th Cir.1994). A motion for JAML should be granted with respect to an issue if "there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for [the nonmoving] party on that issue...." Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a). Accordingly, this Court must determine whether "there is substantial evidence in the record to support the jury's findings." Wilhelm v. Blue Bell, Inc., 773 F.2d 1429, 1433 (4th Cir.1985). When determining whether substantial evidence exists supporting the jury's verdict, this Court
may not weigh the evidence, pass on the credibility of the witnesses, or substitute our judgment of the facts for that of the jury. That deference to the jury's findings is not, how ever, absolute: A mere scintilla of evidence is insufficient to sustain the verdict, and the inferences a jury draws to establish causation must be reasonably probable.
Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 6 F.3d 243, 248 (4th Cir.1993) (quotations and citations omitted).
"[A] claim of discrimination on the basis of pregnancy must be analyzed in the same manner as any other sex discrimination claim brought pursuant to Title VII." Boyd v. Harding Academy, 88 F.3d 410, 413 (6th Cir.1996). In a Title VII discrimination case, the plaintiff bears "the ultimate burden of persuading the court that she has been the victim of intentional discrimination." Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1095, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). In a pregnancy discrimination case, the plaintiff thus bears the ultimate burden of establishing that the defendant discriminated against her "because of" her pregnancy. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1) & (2) (1994). Because this appeal follows a trial on the merits, this Court only addresses the issue...
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