Dejarnette v. State
| Decision Date | 06 July 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 2316, Sept. Term, 2019,2316, Sept. Term, 2019 |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
| Parties | Alexander DEJARNETTE v. STATE of Maryland |
Argued by: Stephanie Asplundh (Paul B. DeWolfe, Public Defender, on the brief), Baltimore, MD, for Appellant.
Argued by: Gary E. O'Connor (Brian E. Frosh, Atty. Gen., on the brief), Baltimore, MD, for Appellee.
Panel: Leahy, Shaw Geter, Robert A. Zarnoch (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.
In 2019, a Somerset County jury convicted Alexander Dejarnette ("Dejarnette") of driving under the influence of alcohol per se and driving while impaired by alcohol. Dejarnette was sentenced to one year incarceration, all but ten days suspended, and one year of supervised probation. Dejarnette presents one question for our review:
Did the trial court err in admitting evidence of the breath test results?
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the circuit court.
On April 6, 2019, State Trooper Derek Brown was driving and observed a vehicle change lanes without using a signal. Later, he saw the same vehicle slide onto the shoulder of the road and subsequently jerk back into the lane in front of his car, causing him to brake suddenly. Trooper Brown conducted a traffic stop at 1:59 a.m. on the vehicle, which Dejarnette was driving. Trooper Brown smelled alcohol emanating from the vehicle and saw that Dejarnette's eyes looked bloodshot and glossy. When Dejarnette exited the vehicle, Trooper Brown smelled alcohol on his breath. Dejarnette admitted to having some drinks hours earlier. Trooper Brown conducted field sobriety tests with Dejarnette and determined that he exhibited numerous signs that he was under the influence of alcohol. Trooper Brown arrested Dejarnette at 2:12 a.m. for suspected driving under the influence of alcohol. After the arrest, Trooper Brown searched Dejarnette's mouth and pockets. He handcuffed his hands behind his back and placed him in the front passenger seat of the police car.
Trooper Brown and Dejarnette arrived at the Princess Anne barracks at 2:21 a.m. Upon arriving, Trooper Brown secured his weapon in the vehicle's safe, then escorted Dejarnette in the back door. They were met by Sergeant George Todd, the duty officer at the barracks. Trooper Brown conducted another search of Dejarnette in Sergeant Todd's presence. Trooper Brown did not find anything in Dejarnette's mouth, and placed the contents of his pockets in a plastic bag. Trooper Brown then escorted Dejarnette into the processing room down the hallway.
From 2:21 to 2:37 a.m., Trooper Brown and Dejarnette were together in the processing room, a small room approximately eight feet by ten feet with two chairs. Dejarnette was not handcuffed while he was seated in the processing room. Trooper Brown read the DR-15 Advice of Rights form1 to Dejarnette, while Sergeant Todd was in and out of the processing room. At approximately 2:37 a.m., after reading the form, Dejarnette agreed to submit to an alcohol concentration test. At 2:43 a.m., Sergeant Todd began the breath test2 in the presence of Trooper Brown. At no point in time between the arrest and the administration of the breath test did Trooper Brown witness Dejarnette eat, drink or smoke anything, or put anything in his mouth. Dejarnette blew into the breathalyzer twice: at 2:43 a.m. and at 2:47 a.m. Both times, the breath test detected .094% blood alcohol concentration.
Prior to trial, Dejarnette filed a motion in limine arguing that the results of the breath test should be excluded at trial because the quality of the police observation of Dejarnette was insufficient. The court determined that both Trooper Brown and Sergeant Todd observed Dejarnette for twenty minutes prior to the administration of the breath test, and neither observed any behavior that would invalidate the test. The court concluded that the challenge to the compliance with the twenty-minute observation period, specified in an administrative regulation, see pp. 527-28 infra , went to the weight of the evidence, and was admissible at trial.
Dejarnette was acquitted of negligent driving and driving under the influence, but was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol per se3 and driving while impaired by alcohol.
This timely appeal followed.
Dejarnette contends that the court erred in admitting the breath test results; specifically, Dejarnette argues that the officer's failure to strictly comply with the twenty-minute observation period rendered the results inadmissible because it violated the requirements of Code of Maryland Regulations ("COMAR") 10.35.02.08(G). He also asserts that the record does not support a factual finding that the police officers complied with the COMAR regulation. The State responds that the court properly determined that compliance with a COMAR regulation with respect to observation of an individual before administering the breath test goes to the weight of the evidence, not the admissibility of the evidence, at trial.
Though Dejarnette maintains that this case hinges on whether the court erred in admitting evidence, the crux of this case is the interpretation of Title 10, Subtitle 3 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Maryland Code § 10-309(a)(1)(ii)4 and whether it requires compliance with COMAR regulations in order for evidence of a breath test to be admissible at trial. This Court reviews de novo the interpretation of a statute and "provides judicial deference to the policy decisions enacted into law by the General Assembly." Johnson v. State , 467 Md. 362, 371, 225 A.3d 44 (2020) (Internal citation omitted). "We assume that the legislature's intent is expressed in the statutory language and thus, our statutory interpretation focuses primarily on the language of the statute to determine the purpose and intent of the General Assembly." Id .
Dejarnette was charged with violations of Transportation Article sections 21-901.1, negligent driving, and 21-902, driving under the influence of alcohol. Title 10, Subtitle 3 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Maryland Code governs the use of chemical tests for blood alcohol content, stating that "[i]n a prosecution for a violation of a law concerning a person who is driving ... a vehicle in violation of ... § 21-902 of the Transportation Article, ... a test of the person's breath or blood may be administered for the purpose of determining alcohol concentration of the person's blood." Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 10-302. The statute imposes numerous requirements for the administration of the breath test. The statute requires the administration of the breath test "within 2 hours after the person accused is apprehended." Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 10-303(a)(2). The statute also requires the breath test to be administered by a "qualified person with equipment approved by the toxicologist under the Postmortem Examiners Commission at the direction of a police officer," though the arresting officer is not permitted to administer the breath test. Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 10-304(b).
To admit the results of the breath test at trial, the breath test report must comply with the following requirements: "[i]dentify the technician or analyst as a ‘qualified person’ as defined in § 10-304 of this subtitle;" "[s]tate that the test was performed with equipment approved by the toxicologist under the Postmortem Examiners Commission at the direction of a police officer;" and "[s]tate that the result of the test is as stated in the report." Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 10-306(a)(2). Evidence of a breath test in a prosecution for § 21-902 is inadmissible "if obtained contrary to the provisions of this subtitle." Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 10-309(a)(1)(ii).
The Postmortem Examiners Commission adopted COMAR regulations for the testing procedures required for evidentiary tests of breath for alcohol. The COMAR regulation states that "[f]or at least 20 minutes before a breath sample is taken," an individual is not permitted to eat, drink, smoke, or have any foreign substance in the mouth. Md. Code Regs. 10.35.02.08(G). Prior to taking the breath sample, "the individual shall be observed and mouth checked." Id . The individual may be observed by the breath test operator, law enforcement personnel, or a combination of both. Id . The COMAR regulation does not provide requirements for how an individual is to be observed, nor does it define "observe."
Both parties agree that § 10-309 acts as a statutory exclusionary rule because evidence of the breath test is inadmissible "if obtained contrary to the provisions of this subtitle." Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 10-309(a)(1)(ii). From this starting point, Dejarnette alleges that, based on the language of this statute, strict compliance with related COMAR regulations is required for the breath test to be admissible, including the twenty-minute observation period. Dejarnette maintains that "where the State seeks to admit the results of a breath test but fails to establish compliance with the observation period, the test results are inadmissible." The State asserts that Dejarnette's interpretation of the statute requires reading additional language into the statute to read: "Evidence of a test or analysis provided for in this subtitle is not admissible in a prosecution ... if obtained contrary to the provisions of this subtitle and all relevant COMAR provisions ." (emphasis added).5
The statutory construction analysis commences "with the plain language of the statute." Johnson v. State , 467 Md. 362, 372, 225 A.3d 44 (2020) (Internal citations and quotations omitted). "If the language is clear and unambiguous, we ordinarily need not look beyond the statute's provisions and our analysis ends." Opert v. Criminal Injuries , 403...
To continue reading
Request your trial