DeJesus v. Cnty. of Mariposa
| Docket Number | 1:21-cv-00520-DAD-BAM |
| Decision Date | 08 February 2022 |
| Parties | MARIO DEJESUS, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF MARIPOSA, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STAY THIS ACTION (DOC. NO. 8)
This matter is before the court on defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or in the alternative, to stay this action pending the resolution of ongoing state proceedings under the Younger abstention doctrine. (Doc. No. 8.) Pursuant to General Order No. 617 addressing the public health emergency posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, defendant's motion was taken under submission on the papers. (Doc. No. 9.) For the reasons set forth below, the court will grant defendant's motion to stay this action pending resolution of ongoing state proceedings without reaching defendant's motion to dismiss.[1]
On March 29, 2021, plaintiff Mario DeJesus filed this action against defendant County of Mariposa, asserting eight causes of action, including: (i) discrimination, harassment, and retaliation claims under California's Fair Employment Housing Act (“FEHA”), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq. (“Title VII”); (ii) whistleblower retaliation under California Labor Code § 1102.5; and (iii) wrongful termination in violation of public policy. (Doc. No. 1.)
In his complaint, plaintiff alleges the following. Plaintiff is a 53-year-old Asian man who became employed as an Eligibility Specialist for defendant Mariposa County on October 3, 2017. (Id. at ¶¶ 2, 4.) Beginning in October 2017, plaintiff “often” went to lunch with his coworkers, either individually or in a group, including a lunch with a female coworker for plaintiff's birthday in October 2017 and a lunch with a prospective female employee as part of her hiring interview panel. (Id. at ¶¶ 5-6.) On May 1, 2019, plaintiff met with Joe Lynch, the Health and Human Services Agency Assistant Director. (Id. at ¶ 7.) Mr. Lynch told plaintiff that he needed to stop going on breaks or lunches with young female coworkers and that plaintiff would not want to be known as the person who “keeps going on breaks or lunches with young girls.” (Id.) Mr. Lynch expressed that there was at that time no cause for imposing discipline against plaintiff and that plaintiff would not be disciplined so long as there were no “future behaviors” moving forward. (Id.) Although Mr Lynch informed plaintiff that a few people in the workplace knew that their conversation was taking place, he instructed plaintiff to not mention their conversation to anyone else. (Id. at ¶ 9.) Mr. Lynch stated that plaintiff would be terminated if plaintiff discussed their conversation with others. (Id.)
Immediately following plaintiff's meeting with Mr. Lynch, plaintiff told his supervisor about his meeting with Mr. Lynch. (Id. at ¶ 10.) Plaintiff expressed concerns that Lynch's comments were discriminatory and harassing and stated that Lynch had threatened retaliation against him. (Id. at ¶ 10.) Plaintiff's supervisor shared plaintiff's comments with Mr. Lynch and a human resources director, despite plaintiff expressly requesting that she keep their conversation private. (Id. at ¶¶ 10-11.)
On May 2, 2019, plaintiff reported his conversation with Mr. Lynch to Director of Human Resources Kimberly Williams, alleging that Mr. Lynch's actions were discriminatory, harassing and threatening. (Id. at ¶ 12.) On May 16, 2019, Ms. Williams notified plaintiff that defendant would investigate both Mr. Lynch and plaintiff as a follow-up to plaintiff's conversation with Mr. Lynch. (Id. at ¶ 13.)
In early July 2019, plaintiff helped one of his coworkers report and file a discrimination charge against a supervisor. (Id. at ¶ 14.) Plaintiff's supervisor and other managers were aware of his actions. (Id.) A few days later, plaintiff was informed that he was being placed on paid administrative leave and given a report regarding an investigation into his conduct. (Id. at ¶ 15.)
On July 14, 2019, plaintiff filed a charge with both the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing (“DFEH”), alleging that he had been retaliated against by Mr. Lynch on the basis of his age, gender, and race following their May 2019 conversation (“July 14, 2019 charge”). (Id. at ¶ 18.)
On October 10, 2019, plaintiff filed a second charge with the EEOC and DFEH, alleging that defendant retaliated against him for assisting his coworker with the filing of a discrimination charge against her supervisor (“October 10, 2019 charge”). (Id. at ¶ 20.)
Defendant terminated plaintiff's employment on November 30, 2019, ostensibly due to allegations that he had sexually harassed certain female employees and, according to plaintiff, he was replaced by a “less qualified, younger, Caucasian female.” (Id. at ¶¶ 19, 24.) Plaintiff also contrasts his disciplinary treatment at work to that of a female coworker who twice showed a fellow employee pictures of a naked man, but received only a written reprimand without other discipline being imposed for her actions. (Id. at ¶ 17.)
As a result of his termination, plaintiff filed a third charge with the EEOC and DFEH on May 6, 2020, alleging that defendant had terminated him based on his age, gender, and race (“May 6, 2020 charge”). (Id. at ¶ 21.) Plaintiff received a right to sue letter from the EEOC as to his third EEOC charge on January 5, 2021. (Id. at ¶ 22.)
Plaintiff filed his complaint in this court on March 29, 2021. (Doc. No. 1.) Shortly thereafter, on April 6, 2021, plaintiff filed a verified petition for the issuance of a writ of mandate and an award of damages in the Sacramento County Superior Court, seeking to vacate his termination and his reinstatement to his position as an eligibility supervisor for Mariposa County. (See Doc. No. 8-2 at 18, 29.) On June 4, 2021, defendant filed the pending motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint, or in the alternative, to stay these proceedings until the resolution of the ongoing action that plaintiff had filed in state court. (Doc. No. 8.) On June 18, 2021, plaintiff filed his opposition to the pending motion to dismiss but joined in defendant's request to stay these proceedings. (Doc. No. 10.) On June 29, 2021, defendant filed its reply. (Doc. No. 14.)
“Younger abstention is a jurisprudential doctrine rooted in overlapping principles of equity, comity, and federalism.” San Jose Silicon Valley Chamber of Commerce Political Action Comm. v. City of San Jose, 546 F.3d 1087, 1091 (9th Cir. 2008). In Younger, the Supreme Court held that “absent extraordinary circumstances, a federal court may not interfere with a pending state criminal prosecution.” Potrero Hills Landfill, Inc. v. County of Solano, 657 F.3d 876, 882 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 54 (1971)). The Supreme Court has since extended Younger abstention to two additional categories of cases identified in its decision in New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of New Orleans (NOPSI), 491 U.S. 350, 367-68 (1989): “‘state civil proceedings that are akin to criminal prosecutions, and . . . state civil proceedings that implicate a State's interest in enforcing the orders and judgments of its courts.'” Herrera v. City of Palmdale, 918 F.3d 1037, 1043 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting ReadyLink Healthcare, Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 754 F.3d 754, 759 (9th Cir. 2014)). Together, these three categories of cases are known as the NOPSI categories. Id. at 1044.
“To warrant Younger abstention, a state civil action must fall into one of the NOPSI categories, and must also satisfy a three-part inquiry: the state proceeding must be (1) ‘ongoing,' (2) ‘implicate important state interests,' and (3) provide ‘an adequate opportunity . . . to raise constitutional challenges.'” Id. (quoting Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)). In addition, the Ninth Circuit has “articulated an implied fourth requirement that (4) the federal court action would ‘enjoin the proceeding, or have the practical effect of doing so.'” Potrero Hills Landfill, Inc., 657 F.3d at 882 (quoting AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Roden, 495 F.3d 1143, 1148-49 (9th Cir. 2007)). “For Younger to apply, all four requirements must be ‘strictly satisfied.'” Barra v. City of Kerman, No. 1:08-cv-01909-OWW-GSA, 2009 WL 1706451, at *5 (E.D. Cal. June 9, 2009) (citing AmerisourceBergen Corp., 495 F.3d at 1149).
Defendant argues that plaintiff's complaint must be dismissed in its entirety because each of his eight causes of action are time-barred. (Doc. No. 8 at ¶¶ 2-10.) Defendant also contends that plaintiff's fifth claim, which alleges harassment in violation of the FEHA, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (Id. at ¶ 6.) Finally, defendant argues that if the court does not dismiss plaintiff's entire complaint at this stage, the court should abstain from considering the claims until plaintiff's state court action is decided, pursuant to Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). (Id. at ¶ 11.)
In his opposition to defendant's motion to dismiss, plaintiff rejects defendant's arguments as to his first through sixth causes of action, but withdraws his seventh and eighth causes of action, conceding that they were not timely filed.[2] (Doc. No. 10 at 5-10.) In addition plaintiff agrees with defendant that the Younger abstention doctrine applies to the instant case, and he requests that this court stay this federal proceeding until after his state court action has been decided. (Doc. No. 10 at 10.) In reply, defendant counters that all of plaintiff's causes of action fall within the...
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