Dekay v. Oliver

• Court: Iowa Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: WITHROW, J.
• Citation: Dekay v. Oliver, 143 N.W. 508, 161 Iowa 550 (Iowa 1913)
• Decision Date: 23 October 1913
• Parties: DONALD DEKAY, otherwise known as DANIEL DEKAY, a Minor, by F. A. DEKAY, his next friend, Plaintiff, v. JOHN F. OLIVER, as Judge of the District Court of Iowa Fourth Judicial District, Defendant

143 N.W. 508

161 Iowa 550

DONALD DEKAY, otherwise known as DANIEL DEKAY, a Minor, by F. A. DEKAY, his next friend, Plaintiff, v. JOHN F. OLIVER, as Judge of the District Court of Iowa Fourth Judicial District, Defendant

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

October 23, 1913

Certiorari from Woodbury District Court.

TO INQUIRE into the legality of an order and judgment of defendant, who, as Judge of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, committed petitioner, Donald DeKay, to the State Industrial School, this writ of certiorari is brought.--Dismissed.

Writ of certiorari Dismissed.

Edwin J. Stason, for plaintiff.

C. N Jepson, County Attorney, and C. R. Jones, Assistant County Attorney, for defendant.

WITHROW J. WEAVER, C. J., and DEEMER and GAYNOR, JJ., concur.

OPINION

WITHROW, J.

I.

From the petition for writ of certiorari and its return, we gather the following facts: The plaintiff, Donald DeKay, otherwise known as Daniel DeKay, was born October 17, 1894, and is a resident of Woodbury county, Iowa. On the 2d day of August 1912, on his plea of guilty of larceny, he was sentenced by the judge of the police court of Sioux City to pay a fine, and in default of payment to imprisonment. Following such conviction, information was filed by the probation officer against this petitioner, entitled "In the Juvenile Court of Iowa in and for Woodbury County," setting out the fact of his conviction in the police court, and praying that he be committed to the industrial school for boys at Eldora. Upon the filing of such information with a transcript of the proceedings in the police court, and on the same day, September 23, 1912, the defendant, as presiding judge of the district court of Woodbury county, then in regular session, took jurisdiction of the complaint, and after hearing committed the petitioner to the industrial school as prayed.

II. The questions raised by the petitioner are: First. That the defendant, sitting as a juvenile court, and proceeding under chapter 5B (sections 254-a13--254-a30), Code Supplement, was without jurisdiction to commit the petitioner because he was at the time over sixteen years of age. Second. If it be contended that the presiding judge proceeded under Code, sections 2708, 2709, and committed the petitioner under the general law governing commitments to industrial schools, such proceeding was without jurisdiction because the required petition was not filed. The precise point made is that the informant did not "have knowledge of a child in his county who appears to be delinquent," for his knowledge was only of a boy who had been convicted of the crime of larceny, and sentenced to pay the penalty. It also is claimed that the court was without jurisdiction because no summons was issued to the parents of the minor, and also that after sentence in the police court the district court had not the right to commit him to Eldora.

III. The law creating what is generally known as the juvenile court, and which clothes the district court with original and full jurisdiction to determine all cases coming within the purview of the act, which jurisdiction is by chapter 13, Acts 33d General Assembly, extended to superior courts, limits inquiry and judgment to the cases of children under the age of sixteen years. Code Supplement, section 254-a14. Its general purpose is more comprehensive than the law relating to commitment to the industrial schools, in that the juvenile court act is intended to cover not only the cases of delinquent or criminal children, but also to give to the courts in which such matters are triable jurisdiction over dependent or neglected children, with power to make such provision for their government and care as may seem necessary and just. The petitioner in this case having been over the age of sixteen years at the time of his commitment, it follows that he was not within the provisions of the juvenile court law.

IV. The district court of Woodbury county, over which the defendant in this proceeding, the trial judge, was at the time presiding, had jurisdiction to hear and determine whether a boy between the ages of ten and eighteen years who had been convicted of crime in an inferior court should be committed to the industrial school. Code, section 2708, as amended by chapter 136, 34th General Assembly. That section provides that, when such a minor shall be found guilty in a court of record of any crime excepting murder, the court may, instead of entering judgment, direct the party to be sent to the industrial school. If such a minor be convicted of crime before any inferior court, such person may be forthwith sent by the court, accompanied by all the papers filed in the lower court, with an officer, to a judge of a court of record.

We have, then, the inquiry whether, given a case which considered generally, is within the full jurisdiction of the district court, and which is heard and determined by the district court, but when the proceedings are named as being in the juvenile court, but are outside the class provided for by the juvenile court act, is the order of commitment so entered void for want of jurisdiction?...