DeKine v. District of Columbia
| Decision Date | 14 October 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 79-663.,79-663. |
| Citation | 422 A.2d 981 |
| Parties | Robert DeKINE et al., Appellants, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Appellee. |
| Court | D.C. Court of Appeals |
Samuel J. Buffone, Washington, D. C., with whom Robert Case Liotta, Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellants.
James C. McKay, Jr., Asst. Corp. Counsel, Washington, D. C., with whom Judith W. Rogers, Corp. Counsel, and Richard W. Barton, Deputy Corp. Counsel, Washington, D. C., at the time the brief was filed, were on the brief, for appellee.
Before GALLAGHER, MACK and FERREN, Associate Judges.
Robert and Aline DeKine appeal from summary judgment in favor of the District of Columbia based on the trial court's ruling that appellants failed to meet the notice requirements of D.C.Code 1973, § 12-309. They contend that their attorney's April 30, 1975, letter to the District and/or their December 5, 1975, complaint in this action provided timely and adequate notice of their claims for wrongful arrest, unlawful impoundment of their horses, and tortious interference with their business of horse-drawn carriages for hire. We conclude that both the letter and the complaint were untimely. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
On May 2, 1975, the Mayor's Correspondence Unit of the District of Columbia government received a letter from appellants' attorney, dated April 30, 1975, giving notice of a claim for damages against the District pursuant to D.C.Code 1973, § 12-309.1 The letter was date-stamped (at 11:43 a. m. on May 2, 1975), logged, tagged as a "claim letter," and transmitted to the Mayor's Executive Secretary.2 The letter stated:
We represent Mr. and Mrs. Robert De Kine in a claim against the District of Columbia arising from the actions of the District of Columbia acting in concert with the Washington Humane Society on and after October 31, 1974. This notice is submitted pursuant to the provisions of 12 D.C.Code 309.
Mr. and Mrs. De Kine were at the time operating a business involving horse drawn carriages for hire. On or about October 31, 1974, the District of Columbia, acting through its officers and agents, caused Mr. De Kine to be wrongfully arrested and deprived of his liberty and unjustly and without compensation impounded property of Mr. and Mrs. De Kine, to wit three horses. The horses were seized from private property leased to Mr. De Kine by Park and Lock Parking Lot owned by Rorke Management Enterprises, 900 Wisconsin Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C.
These acts were part of a pattern and practice of unlawful interference with the business affairs of Mr. and Mrs. De Kine in which the District of Columbia participated. The District of Columbia participated in and aided this unlawful attempt to harass and deprive Mr. and Mrs. De Kine of property and personal liberty without good cause or just compensation.
If any additional information is necessary to constitute sufficient notice of these claims, please contact the undersigned.
By letter dated May 23, 1975, the Executive Secretary acknowledged the District's receipt of the claim letter and noted that it had been referred to the Corporation Counsel for consideration. On August 11, 1975, the Corporation Counsel's Chief Investigator wrote to appellants' attorney requesting ten items of additional information. Their attorney replied by letter of August 27, 1975, that he could not provide any of the requested information because his clients were out of town. He indicated that upon their return in September 1975 he would provide the information. The District received no further information, however, until December 9, 1975, when the Chief Investigator received a letter informing him that appellants had filed a civil action on December 5, 1975.3
The suit was styled "Complaint for False Arrest, Unlawful Seizure and Detention of Property, Negligence, Conspiracy, Misuse of Legal Process, and Intentional Interference with Business Relationship" against the Washington Humane Society, its past and present presidents, and the District of Columbia. Appellants alleged that the Society had "embarked upon a pattern of had[]assment and intimidation of the [plaintiffs] designed to drive them out of business." " They further claimed that District "employees, officers and agents" had participated in those activities by (1) arresting Robert DeKine without proper legal process, (2) seizing appellants' property without proper justification or process, and (3) harassing and intimidating appellants and preventing them from carrying out their normal business functions. The complaint referred to 13 separate incidents occurring between September 22, 1973, and June 4, 1975.
The District moved for summary judgment on the ground () that appellants had not satisfied § 12-309. The trial court granted the District's motion on January 4, 1977.4 This appeal followed.5
Appellants contend, first, that their attorney's April 30, 1975, letter provided timely and adequate notice of their claims of false arrest and unjust impoundment against the District.6 They premise their contention (as, on the facts, they must) on their view that § 12-309 requires only that a claimant send notice to the District within six months of the injury, not that the District also receive it within that period. We disagree with that interpretation. Consequently, the letter was untimely.
A. The timeliness of notice turns on construction of the phrase "has given notice in writing to the [Mayor]." D.C.Code 1973, § 12-309. No case has decided whether the mere sending of notice satisfies this requirement or whether, in addition, the District must receive notice within six months of the injury.7 Courts in other jurisdictions construing similar notice requirements almost unanimously have rejected the view that mailing, in itself, satisfies the statute. Timely receipt is required. See, e. g., Oquendo v. Insurance Co. of Puerto Rico, 388 F.Supp. 1030, 1032 (D.P.R.1974) (); Rapid Motor Lines, Inc. v. Cox, 134 Conn. 235, 238, 56 A.2d 519, 521 (1947) (); Shields v. State Highway Commission, 178 Kan. 342, 346, 286 P.2d 173, 176 (1955) (). But see Grubbs v. Prince George's County, 267 Md. 318, 325, 297 A.2d 754, 758 (1972) ().
We agree with the approach taken by most of these courts, especially because one of the purposes of the statute is to afford "the opportunity for appropriate government officials to ascertain the facts, and, if appropriate, to adjust the claim." Jenkins v. District of Columbia, D.C.App., 379 A.2d 1177, 1178 (1977). Because this purpose can be achieved only by the District's timely receipt of notice, and the method of delivering written notice under § 12-309 is entirely within the claimant's discretion, we perceive no unfairness in placing the consequences of less-than-rapid postal service upon the claimant, rather than upon the District. See Oquendo, supra at 1032 (); Shields, supra 178 Kan. at 346, 286 P.2d at 176 (same). But see Grubbs, supra 267 Ind. at 325, 297 A.2d at 758 (). Accordingly, we hold that § 12-309 requires that the District receive written notice within six months of the injury giving rise to the claim.8
B. We consider, next, whether the District's receipt of the letter on May 2, 1975, occurred within the six-month period applicable to the false arrest and impoundment claims. Two computation rules control the inquiry. First, § 12-309 "starts the clock at the moment `the injury or damage was sustained.'" Kelton v. District of Columbia, D.C.App., 413 A.2d 919, 921 (1980). Second, the computation excludes the date of injury while including the date notice is received. See Rapid Motor Lines, supra, 134 Conn. at 237, 56 A.2d at 520-21; 18 E. McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 53.161, at 576 & nn. 24-25 (3d ed. 1977).9
The injury from false arrest occurs at the first moment of detention.10 The only arrest specifically complained of in the April 30, 1975, notice letter allegedly occurred "on or about October 31, 1974." The letter, received May 2, 1975, was therefore one day late as to the false arrest claim.
Similarly, the letter was a day late with respect to the impoundment claim. In reaching this conclusion, we reject appellants' assertion that the impoundment claim is to be measured from the date the horses were released (allegedly November 1, 1974) rather than the date of their seizure (October 31, 1974). We do so because the gist of a claim of unlawful seizure or impoundment is conversion or trespass to chattels, which relates the inquiry to the moment of the taking. As Prosser notes:
The conversion is complete when the defendant takes, detains or disposes of the chattel. At that point, it is the traditional view that the plaintiff acquires the right to enforce a sale, and recover the full value of the property. The defendant cannot undo his wrong by forcing the goods back upon their owner, either as a bar to the action, or in mitigation of damages.
. . . In any case, return of the chattel, whether consented to by the plaintiff or compelled by the court, does not bar the action, but goes merely to reduce the damages. [W. Prosser, The Law of Torts § 15, at 97 (4th ed. 1971) (...
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