Delade v. Cargan, 3:16-CV-00415
| Decision Date | 27 March 2019 |
| Docket Number | 3:16-CV-00415 |
| Parties | DONALD F. DELADE Plaintiff, v. JOHN CARGAN Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
(JUDGE MARIANI)
On March 8, 2016, Plaintiff, Donald F. DeLade, brought suit against Norman Strauss, III, John Oliver, John Cargan, Bryan Fedor, Stephen Polishan, John Doe #1, John Doe #2, John Doe #3, John Doe #4, John Doe #5 and John Doe #6. (Doc. 1). Each defendant was alleged to have at all relevant times served as a Trooper with the Pennsylvania State Police. (Id. at ¶¶ 10-20). The Complaint alleged in Counts I and II claims for unlawful seizure, wrongful arrest and false imprisonment against all of the defendants. Count III alleged malicious prosecution against all Defendants and Count IV presented a claim for conspiracy to violate civil rights against all defendants.
Defendants filed an Answer to Plaintiff's Complaint on June 10, 2016. (Doc. 17).
Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on September 30, 2016 (Doc. 21) wherein the defendants who had previously been identified as "John Does" were now identified as Peter Gutowski, David Sweeney, Keith Roman, Brandon Allis, Craig VanLouvender and William Wagner. An Answer to the Amended Complaint was filed by the defendants on November 29, 2016. (Doc. 23).
On March 21, 2017, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 31), seeking to withdraw all claims against eight of the ten defendants then named in the action, leaving only two defendants, Troopers John Cargan and John Oliver. Plaintiff also sought to combine Counts I and II into a single Count against the remaining two defendants and sought to withdraw the conspiracy claims asserted in Count IV in its entirety while adding a Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claim against the remaining two defendants. By Order dated May 16, 2017, the Court granted Plaintiff's Motion. (Doc. 36). Plaintiff filed his Second Amended Complaint on May 19, 2017, which named a single defendant, Trooper John Cargan. (Doc. 38). On May 26, 2017, the Plaintiff filed a Motion to correct the caption and docket (Doc. 40) to reflect that Trooper John Cargan was the only remaining defendant with all claims against the other nine defendants having been withdrawn in the Second Amended Complaint. (Id. at ¶¶ 2, 3). Plaintiff's Motion was concurred-in by Defendant Cargan and, by Order of the Court on May 30, 2017 (Doc. 41), the caption and docket of the case was corrected to reflect that John Cargan was the only defendant.
On March 30, 2017, Defendant Cargan, filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 42), brief in support of the motion (Doc. 43), and a "Statement of Material and Undisputed Facts" as to which Defendant contended there was no genuine dispute for trial (Doc. 44).Plaintiff filed a brief in opposition to Defendant's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 53) and response to the Defendant's Statement of Facts (Doc. 54). Defendant thereafter filed a Reply brief. (Doc. 58).
On June 22, 2018, the motion for summary judgment was referred to Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson for a Report and Recommendation ("R&R"). On August 23, 2018, Judge Carlson issued a R&R (Doc. 59) wherein he recommended that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment be granted. Plaintiff filed objections to the Magistrate Judge's R&R, to which Defendant filed a brief in opposition (Doc. 67) and Plaintiff replied (Doc. 68). Plaintiff's objections are fully briefed and are now before the Court for disposition.
For the reasons explained herein, the Court will grant in part and deny in part Defendant's motion for summary judgment and therefore adopt in part and reject in part the pending R&R.
A District Court may "designate a magistrate judge to conduct hearings, including evidentiary hearings, and to submit to a judge of the court proposed findings of fact and recommendations for the disposition" of certain matters pending before the Court. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). If a party timely and properly files a written objection to a Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, the District Court "shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings orrecommendations to which objection is made." Id. at § 636(b)(1)(C); see also, Brown v. Astrue, 649 F.3d 193, 195 (3d Cir. 2011); M.D. Pa. Local Rule 72.3.
Plaintiff DeLade raises three objections to the R&R. First, Plaintiff asserts that the Magistrate Judge erred in making credibility determinations and in weighing the evidence, rather than drawing all inferences from the facts of record in favor of the Plaintiff as the non-moving party. Plaintiff asserts that the Magistrate Judge "improperly substituted his own experience, judgment and opinion for that of the jury." (Doc. 62, at 2). Plaintiff further asserts that Judge Carlson "relied on his own experience to assert facts not in evidence in order to support his conclusion that Plaintiff failed to establish that Defendant knowingly procured false evidence and knowingly provided other evidence to other officers which led to Plaintiff's arrest and detention." Plaintiff in particular takes issue with Judge Carlson's statement in a footnote where, in addressing Defendant Cargan's communication with the Escambia County Sheriff's Office regarding the warrant lodged against DeLade in Florida, the Magistrate Judge stated:
some of the actions that DeLade ascribes to Cargan and would characterize as manipulation, such as contacting an out-of-state law enforcement agency to ask it to reconsider the extradition status of an outstanding warrant, in our view simply constitute law enforcement coordination and the exercise of investigative and prosecutorial discretion. Thus they are not matters which give rise to any constitutional claim whatsoever.
(Id. at 3-4)(quoting Doc. 59, at 24 n. 3). Plaintiff argues that the above-quoted statement (Doc. 62, at 4).
Second, Plaintiff asserts that Judge Carlson erred in concluding that probable cause existed to arrest DeLade for a firearms violation, and that there was no legal basis for a false arrest or malicious prosecution claim by DeLade. (Id. at 11). Plaintiff argues that the cases cited by Judge Carlson, Barna v. City of Perth Amboy, 42 F.3d 809 (3d Cir. 1994), Edwards v. City of Philadelphia, 860 F. 2d 568 (3d Cir. 1998), and Wright v. City of Philadelphia, 409 F.3d 595 (3d Cir. 2005), do not support Judge Carlson's determination. Rather, Plaintiff asserts:
Magistrate Carlson cites to the Barna, Edwards and Wright cases for the proposition that if there is probable cause to arrest someone for any offense, it does not matter that they lacked probable cause for the only offense for which he was arrested. However, it is respectfully submitted that the foregoing cases do not stand for this proposition.
(Id. at 11). DeLade thus argues that at the time of his arrest, there was no probable cause to arrest him on any charge, including the charge of being a fugitive in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105 ().
Third, DeLade argues that the Magistrate Judge erred in recommending dismissal of his Fourteenth Amendment due process claim because there is a dispute of fact for trial asto whether Defendant Cargan fabricated evidence which, under the case law Plaintiff cites, is argued to be a basis for a Fourteenth Amendment claim, notwithstanding the general rule that a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim is unavailable where the claim is encompassed within a more specific amendment, in this case the Fourth Amendment. In arguing that Cargan's actions constituted a fabrication of evidence, Plaintiff asserts:
Defendant arranged to have the extradition status changed from "no extradition" to "full extradition" and made it appear as if the extradition status had always been "full extradition". He did not advise his fellow troopers, who were executing the arrest on the warrant, that he had knowingly caused the change in extradition status to occur. Likewise, he did not advise his fellow troopers that Florida was not coming to get Plaintiff and would not extradite him back to Florida. By his actions and his failure to advise what he had done, he intentionally created the false impression that the warrant was - and had always been - "full extradition" such that Florida was going to extradite Plaintiff back to Florida. He also used false information - that Plaintiff was a convicted felon - to cause the change in extradition status.
To fully evaluate the R&R and Plaintiff's Objections thereto, the Court begins with a review of the facts which are now undisputed as a result of Defendant's Statement of Material and Undisputed Facts and Plaintiff's response thereto (Docs. 44, 54). Those undisputed facts are as follows: On September 13, 2014, Plaintiff DeLade was walking down SR 390 in Greene Township, Pennsylvania, carrying a rifle. At that time the Pennsylvania State Police were searching for the shooter responsible for the attacks on two State Troopers at the Blooming Grove Barracks. After the Pennsylvania State Police learned of Plaintiff's identity, Defendant Cargan initiated a criminal history search forDeLade through a database known as the Commonwealth Law Enforcement Assistance Network ("CLEAN"), which is linked to the National Crime Information Center ("NCIC"). Only the agency that...
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