DeLaire v. Kaskel

• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: PER CURIAM.
• Citation: DeLaire v. Kaskel, 842 A.2d 1052 (R.I. 2004)
• Decision Date: 22 January 2004
• Docket Number: No. 2002-477-Appeal.,2002-477-Appeal.
• Parties: David DeLAIRE v. Rick H. KASKEL, et al.

842 A.2d 1052

David DeLAIRE v. Rick H. KASKEL, et al.

No. 2002-477-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

January 22, 2004.

Ronald J. Creamer, Esq., Wakefield, for Plaintiff.

Mark T. Reynolds, Esq., for Defendant.

Present: WILLIAMS, C.J., FLANDERS, GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, and SUTTELL, JJ.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

The plaintiff in this personal injury action, David DeLaire (DeLaire), appeals from the entry of summary judgment in favor of the defendants, Rick and Louise Kaskel (defendants). We directed both parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not summarily be decided. No such cause having been shown, we proceed to decide the appeal at this time.

The facts of this case are not in dispute. The plaintiff, an animal-control officer for the Town of East Greenwich, was called to defendants' property on February 16, 2000, to remove a stray cat. The defendants had been attempting to remove this cat from their yard for the previous five months; DeLaire testified that he had visited the home on at least three separate occasions attempting to corral the animal. On the day in question, the defendants already had trapped the cat in a cardboard box at the time they called animal control. After plaintiff pulled into defendants' driveway and exited his van, he slipped and fell on a patch of snow, breaking his arm. DeLaire managed to get up from his fall and retrieve the cat from defendants, but sought medical attention later in the day.

On May 25, 2001, DeLaire filed suit in the Superior Court against defendants, alleging negligence and seeking compensatory damages for personal injury. The defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting that plaintiffs claim was precluded by the "public safety officer's rule" (the rule). After a hearing, the trial justice granted defendants' motion and entered judgment in their favor.

The plaintiff argues on appeal that the trial justice erred in granting defendants' motion for summary judgment. He contends that the rule does not apply to the facts of this case because he is neither a police officer nor a firefighter. DeLaire also argues that the rule does not apply because as an animal-control officer, he was not responding to an emergency similar to a police officer or firefighter.

This Court undertakes de novo review of a trial justice's decision on a motion for summary judgment, applying the same standards to determine that motion as the trial court. Sakonnet Point Marina Association v. Bluff Head Corp., 798 A.2d 439, 441 (R.I.2002). We will uphold a grant of summary judgment if, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, no genuine issues of material fact are revealed, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.; J.R.P. Associates v. Bess Eaton Donut Flour Co., 685 A.2d 285, 286 (R.I.1996) (mem.).

In the current case, we are asked to determine whether an animal-control officer falls within the public safety officer rule. Despite the fact that the rule's broad name might suggest that an animal-control officer is included in its ambit, we have never expressly held that the rule applies to public employees other than police officers and firefighters. See, e.g., Sobanski v. Donahue, 792 A.2d 57, 60 (R.I. 2002) (barring police officer from suing landlord for injuries resulting from dog attack); Krajewski v. Bourque, 782 A.2d 650, 651 (R.I.2001) (per curiam) (barring police officer's negligence claim after the officer slipped on icy driveway while investigating a damaged mailbox); Martellucci v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., 748 A.2d 829, 832 (R.I.2000) (barring police officer from suing owner for negligent maintenance of parking lot); Day v. Caslowitz, 713 A.2d 758, 759 (R.I.1998) (barring police officer's claim resulting from a slip and fall); Smith v. Tully, 665 A.2d 1333, 1335-36 (R.I.1995) (barring police officer from suing owner of bar where police officer fatally shot bar patron in self-defense); Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Vierra, 619 A.2d 436, 439 (R.I.1993) (holding firefighter's rule applied to police officers as well as firefighters); Mignone v. Fieldcrest Mills, 556 A.2d 35, 36 (R.I.1989) (barring firefighter who fell on water-soaked stairs from suing landowner); Cook v. Demetrakas, 108 R.I. 397, 398-99, 275 A.2d 919, 920-21 (1971) (directing a verdict for defendant landowner when police officer entered a defendant's premises to arrest larceny fugitive). Thus, we are presented with a question of first impression: does the rule apply to animal-control officers? Because we conclude as a matter of law that it does not, we reverse the trial justice's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of defendants.¹

The public safety officer's rule derives from the common law "firefighter's rule," which historically precluded a firefighter from recovering from "one whose negligence causes or contributes to the fire that in turn causes injury or death to the firefighter." Vierra, 619 A.2d at 437 (quoting Mignone, 556 A.2d at 37). More recently, we have applied the rule to both police officers and firefighters, precluding them from suing private landowners for injuries suffered while confronting the normal, foreseeable risks inherent in their jobs. Day, 713 A.2d at 759. Because the rule operates as an exception to the general duty to exercise reasonable care to protect persons who may come upon one's property, we have previously approved its application in a limited set of circumstances. See Labrie v. Pace Membership Warehouse, Inc., 678 A.2d 867, 870 (R.I.1996) (by construing the rule narrowly as an exception to the general duty to exercise reasonable care, we seek to avoid either abolishing the rule entirely or else creating numerous exceptions to it).

Our previous cases have identified two rationales to support the rule. Mignone, 556 A.2d at 38-39. The first is based upon the doctrine of primary assumption of risk. This doctrine holds that police officers and firefighters assume the normal, foreseeable risks inherent in their duties as public safety officers when they enter those professions. Id. at 39. Because their normal duties involve assisting people in dangerous situations, these officials assume those risks as a matter of law. Id. Accordingly, police officers and firefighters are precluded from suing private landowners to recover for injuries suffered from confronting those normal, foreseeable risks inherent in their chosen occupation.

The second rationale underlying the rule is one of "fundamental concepts of justice." Vierra, 619 A.2d at 438 (quoting Mignone, 556 A.2d at 39). Because the public compensates police officers and firefighters for confronting the dangerous situations they may face, this Court has reasoned that officials should not be allowed to seek compensation for the negligence that creates the need for their services in the first place. Id. (citing Mignone, 556 A.2d at 39). To rule otherwise would be to allow police officers and firefighters a form of double compensation. The New Jersey Supreme Court has stated:

"[A]s with the homeowner who hires a contractor to repair a weakened roof, the taxpayer who pays the fire and police departments to confront the risks occasioned by his own future acts of negligence does not expect to pay again when the officer is injured while exposed to those risks. Otherwise, individual citizens would compensate police officers twice: once for risking injury, once for sustaining it." Berko v. Freda, 93 N.J. 81, 459 A.2d 663, 666 (1983).

Our decision today turns on the fundamental concepts of fairness identified above. The defendants have argued that animal-control officers are sufficiently similar to police officers such that the rule should apply equally to both. To support their position, defendants point to the fact that as an animal-control officer, DeLaire drove a vehicle with police license plates, carried a police-issued firearm, was a police constable,² reported to a police sergeant, and used an office in the East Greenwich Police Department. Although these are valid considerations, they are not compelling for purposes of our present analysis. Instead, we are persuaded that the differences between the duties, training, benefits, compensation and statutory protections afforded Rhode Island police officers and firefighters, and the duties, training, benefits and compensation of a municipality's animal-control officer, are controlling.

Rhode Island police officers and firefighters receive the benefits of G.L.1956 § 45-19-1, the statute that provides that police officers and firefighters injured in the line of duty shall receive their full salary, as well as medical and related expenses, from the respective city, town or fire district where they are employed. Section. 45-19-1(a); Labbadia v. State, 513 A.2d 18, 21 (R.I.1986). Animal-control officers, however, do not enjoy these protections. Compensation for work-related injuries suffered by an animal-control officer is controlled by the Workers' Compensation Act. G.L.1956 § 28-29-2(4). Another difference concerns the training associated with these positions. Although police officers receive the benefit of instruction at a police academy, DeLaire testified that he did not graduate from a police training academy. Furthermore, although the same local chapter of the police union represents both East Greenwich police officers and animal-control officers as their collective bargaining agent, animal-control officers are considered non-police members of the union, and receive separate contracts. Additionally, police officers benefit from a significantly larger salary, pension and benefit program than animal-control officers. Finally, police officers are a statutorily protected class of employees in Rhode Island because they enjoy the protection of the Law Enforcement Officer's Bill of Rights pursuant to G.L. 1956 chapter 28.6 of title 42.

The distinctions identified...