Delaney v. District of Columbia

Decision Date06 October 2009
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 08-1651 (RMC).
Citation659 F.Supp.2d 185
PartiesMelvin DELANEY, Jr., et al., Plaintiffs, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Columbia

Melvin Delaney, Jr., Washington, DC, pro se.

Melodie Venee Shuler, Washington, DC, pro se.

M. Delaney, Washington, DC, pro se.

Denise J. Baker, Sarah Ann Sulkowski, Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, Larry Dean Williams, Springfield, VA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ROSEMARY M. COLLYER, District Judge.

Melvin Delaney, Jr. and Melodie Venee Shuler, husband and wife, bring this suit pro se on behalf of themselves and their child M. Delaney. The Complaint alleges numerous violations of federal and local law, mostly arising from Mr. Delaney's admitted failure to pay child support and a resulting criminal contempt charge against him. The District of Columbia and its officials and employees move to dismiss for failure to state a claim and for lack of jurisdiction. As explained below, the motion to dismiss will be granted, except with regard to Count 12 of the Complaint.

I. FACTS

The Complaint sets forth numerous claims that are somewhat difficult to decipher and Plaintiffs' responses to the Defendants' motion to dismiss do little to clarify them. Plaintiffs' claims generally arise from a District of Columbia criminal contempt action against Mr. Delaney due to unpaid child support and from difficulties Ms. Shuler encountered when she and their child, M. Delaney, attempted to visit Mr. Delaney while he was held at the D.C. Jail. Ms. Shuler is an attorney, and she sought to assist Mr. Delaney in dealing with his legal problems.

Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Delaney was incarcerated at the Lorton and Rivers Correctional Centers from 2001 to June of 2003 and at the D.C. Jail from May 29, 2007 to September 25, 2007. Compl. ¶¶ 19-20. They allege that Mr. Delaney could have been exempted from liability for child support during these periods if he had been provided access to the courts or the assistance of adequate counsel, or if he had been able to receive visits by and assistance from Ms. Shuler. Id. ¶¶ 19-38.

As a result, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint against the District of Columbia and certain D.C. officials and employees. The District and the following D.C. officials and employees move to dismiss the Complaint: Mayor Adrian Fenty; former Deputy Warden Brenda Ward of the D.C. Department of Corrections ("DOC"), DOC Captain Nora Talley; and former or current Assistant Attorneys General for the District Michael Orton, Arden Harris, and Nancy Johnson1 (collectively the "District Defendants").2

The Counts of the Complaint that purport to allege claims against the District Defendants assert the following causes of action:

Count 1—Fifth Amendment Due Process;

Count 2—Fraud;

Count 4—Fifth Amendment Due Process;

Count 5—Fifth Amendment Due Process;

Count 6—First Amendment;

Count 7—Negligence;

Count 10—First Amendment;

Count 11—Fourth Amendment;

Count 12—Fifth Amendment Due Process;

Count 13—Fifth Amendment Due Process;

Count 14—Fifth Amendment Due Process;

Count 15—Fifth Amendment Due Process;

Count 16—Defamation, Libel and Slander;

Count 18—Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Count 19—Fifth Amendment Due Process and Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel; and

Count 21—Negligent Training and Supervision.3

Plaintiffs seek monetary, declaratory, and injunctive relief with regard to these claims. See id. at p. 80. The details of the allegations are discussed below in the analysis of each legal theory.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Failure to State a Claim

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) challenges the adequacy of a complaint on its face, testing whether a plaintiff has properly stated a claim. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a complaint contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). A complaint must be sufficient "to give a defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (internal citations omitted). Although a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief "requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. Rule 8(a) requires a "showing" and not just a blanket assertion of a right to relief. Id. at n. 3.

A court must treat the complaint's factual allegations as true, "even if doubtful in fact," id. at 1965, and must draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Macharia v. United States, 334 F.3d 61, 64, 67 (D.C.Cir.2003). Even so, the facts alleged "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level," Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, and a court need not accept as true inferences unsupported by facts set out in the complaint or legal conclusions cast as factual allegations. Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C.Cir.2002). "[A] complaint needs some information about the circumstances giving rise to the claims." Aktieselskabet AF 21. Nov. 2001 v. Fame Jeans, Inc., 525 F.3d 8, 16 n. 4 (D.C.Cir. 2008) (emphasis in original).

B. Lack of Jurisdiction

On a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the court has subject matter jurisdiction. Evans v. B.F. Perkins Co., 166 F.3d 642, 647 (4th Cir.1999); McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 182-83, 56 S.Ct. 780, 80 L.Ed. 1135 (1936). Because subject matter jurisdiction focuses on a court's power to hear the claim, however, a court must give a plaintiff's factual allegations closer scrutiny when resolving a Rule 12(b)(1) motion than would be required for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim. Macharia, 334 F.3d at 64 & 69; Grand Lodge of Fraternal Order of Police v. Ashcroft, 185 F.Supp.2d 9, 13 (D.D.C.2001). A court is not limited to the allegations contained in the complaint. Hohri v. United States, 782 F.2d 227, 241 (D.C.Cir.1986), vacated on other grounds, 482 U.S. 64, 107 S.Ct. 2246, 96 L.Ed.2d 51 (1987), but may consider materials outside the pleadings. Herbert v. Nat'l Acad. of Scis., 974 F.2d 192, 197 (D.C.Cir.1992).

III. ANALYSIS
A. Section 1983 Claims Against Mayor Fenty, Deputy Warden Ward, and Supervising Assistant AG Johnson (Complaint Generally and Count 21)

Plaintiffs seek to hold liable Mayor Fenty, Deputy Warden Ward, and Supervising Assistant AG Johnson for the allegedly unconstitutional actions of other D.C. employees via 42 U.S.C. § 1983.4 Plaintiffs also seek to hold liable Mayor Fenty, Deputy Warden Ward, and Supervising Assistant AG Johnson for failing to supervise and train employees, resulting in alleged violations of their constitutional rights, under § 1983. See Compl. ¶¶ 271-278 (Count 21).

The § 1983 claims against these officials fail because (1) there are no allegations that any of these Defendants was personally involved in any of the alleged violations of Plaintiffs' constitutional rights and (2) they cannot be held liable under § 1983 for the actions of their subordinates on the basis of respondeat superior. Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978); Morgan v. District of Columbia, 550 F.Supp. 465, 468 (D.D.C.1982), aff'd without op., 725 F.2d 125 (D.C.Cir.1983) (Table). A supervisor can be held liable for a constitutional violation only if a plaintiff can demonstrate: (1) a grave risk of harm; (2) the supervisor's own actual or constructive knowledge of that risk; and (3) the supervisor's own failure to take available measures to address the risk. Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 582 (1st Cir.1994). Plaintiffs have not so alleged. Thus, Mayor Fenty, Deputy Warden Ward, and Supervising Assistant AG Johnson will be dismissed as defendants in this case. Similarly, Count 21 of the Complaint, alleging § 1983 liability for failure to train or supervise, will be dismissed.

B. Section 1983 Claims Against D.C., Captain Talley, and Assistant AGs Orton and Harris
1. Domestic Relations Exception to Jurisdiction

Counts 1, 4, and 5 of the Complaint allege that Mr. Delaney's Fifth Amendment right to due process5 was violated when the District and its officials allegedly: failed to follow applicable child support guidelines in assessing the arrearage of his child support payments, Compl. ¶¶ 43, 68, & 76; provided allegedly false court orders for garnishment to Mr. Delaney's employers, id. ¶ 44; misallocated the child support payments among his various children, id.; failed to conduct an investigation before pursuing child support payments from him, id. ¶¶ 45-46 & 90; suborned perjury by Bernadette White6 in the child support enforcement proceeding, id. ¶ 47; inaccurately calculated his period of probation when he was transferred to the custody of D.C. from Maryland on the criminal contempt charge, causing him to lose wages, id. ¶ 48; improperly incarcerated him for missing a court date, id. ¶ 49; sent an incorrect hearing notice regarding the enforcement proceeding, id. ¶ 50; failed to file court documents in the correct court file and failed to release certain monies, id. ¶¶ 51-55; failed to post child support payments made by Ms. Shuler on Mr. Delaney's behalf, id. ¶¶ 56 & 78-83,7 failed to pursue child support benefits for M. Delaney, id. ¶ 57-58; and refused to enter a plea bargain "based on [Mr. Delaney's] marital status," id. ¶¶ 60 & 84-100.

As can be seen, many of Mr. Delaney's claims essentially seek to enjoin the enforcement of his child support...

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