Delapaz v. Magnifique Parfumes & Cosmetics, Inc.
| Decision Date | 26 September 2012 |
| Docket Number | Cause No. 4:09-CV-026-JD |
| Parties | BRIAN DELAPAZ and, MICHELLE DELAPAZ, Plaintiffs, v. MAGNIFIQUE PARFUMES and COSMETICS, INC., d/b/a PERFUMANIA, and VICTORIA BURTON, in her individual capacity, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
Plaintiffs Brian DeLapaz ("DeLapaz") and Michelle DeLapaz sued defendants Magnifique Parfumes and Cosmetics, Inc, d/b/a Perfumania ("Magnifique") and Victoria Burton ("Burton") in a three-count complaint. [DE 29]. In Count 1, DeLapaz alleges that Magnifique unlawfully terminated his employment for the purpose of preventing him from receiving ERISA benefits, in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 1140, a provision of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). [DE 29 ¶¶ 17-21]. In Count 2, DeLapaz sues Burton for defamation per se under Indiana common law. [DE 29 ¶¶ 22-25]. In Count 3, Michelle DeLapaz levies a derivative claim against both defendants for loss of consortium. [DE 29 ¶¶ 26-27]. On October 26, 2011, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment against all claims. [DE 49; DE 50]. On January 3, 2012, the plaintiffs responded [DE 54], and on January 20, 2012, the defendants replied. Having taken the motion under advisement, the court now grants summary judgment on the plaintiff's ERISA claim, Count 1. That leaves only a state law dispute between two Indiana state residents, and so the court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over Counts 2 and 3. Each is dismissed without prejudice.
Magnifique hired DeLapaz to serve as the manager of its Lafayette, Indiana, retail store in August, 2008. [DE 29 ¶ 9]. As manager of the store, DeLapaz was ultimately responsible for overseeing all activities at the store. [DE 50-1 at 5]. DeLapaz reported to Burton, who served as the acting district manager for the region that contained the Lafayette store from November, 2008, (shortly after DeLapaz was hired) until March, 2009. [DE 50-1 at 4; DE 50-2 at 5].
The chain of events that led to DeLapaz's separation from Magnifique began on December 24, 2008. DeLapaz was scheduled to manage the Lafayette store from open to close, but he did not work all of his scheduled hours. Instead, he took a two-hour break without approval to watch Santa Claus lift off in a helicopter. [DE 50-1 at 8]. The next day DeLapaz was scheduled to work was December 26, 2008, but he never made it to the store. Instead, that afternoon, DeLapaz sent an e-mail message to Burton stating that he had injured his foot and would be seeing his physician on Monday or Tuesday of the following week. [DE 50-3 at 5]. DeLapaz informed Burton that he had slipped while leaving his home for work. The slip re-aggravated a foot injury DeLapaz had originally sustained nine years earlier, and which had required extensive medical attention. [DE 50-1 at 6].
DeLapaz's e-mail to Burton began a series of misunderstandings between the two. DeLapaz asked Burton to put in sick hours for him to cover his shifts until he was able to see a doctor. [DE 50-3 at 5]. Burton responded that she could not do that; putting in sick days had to be done at DeLapaz's store on his payroll, and Burton was off-site. She told DeLapaz he needed to get his sickdays in to the payroll department to cover Friday, December 26, 2008, as well as Saturday, Monday and Tuesday. [DE 50-3 at 5]. Inexplicably, and contrary to everything in Burton's e-mail, DeLapaz replied on Monday that he had sixteen sick hours remaining and asked Burton to put them in for him on Tuesday. [DE 50-3 at 7]. Some context comes from the parties' depositions; over the course of the weekend in question, Burton and DeLapaz also communicated occasionally by phone, although DeLapaz only responded to some of Burton's messages. [DE 50-1 at 10-11]. The two arranged to meet at the store on Tuesday, December 30, 2008, to discuss DeLapaz's injury and how to proceed. [DE 50-1 at 7]. At no time following the injury did anybody tell DeLapaz that he was on leave, nor did he ever request medical leave from Magnifique. [DE 50-1 at 8]. Nonetheless, despite the fact that he had no doctor's note, had not even seen a doctor, and had not requested or been given leave, DeLapaz considered himself "absolved" of all responsibilities relative to the Lafayette store the moment he told his superior he had an injury. [DE 50-1 at 10].
Despite committing to meeting with Burton at the store on Tuesday, December 30, 2008, DeLapaz went straight to the store from his doctor's appointment on Monday, December 29, 2008. [DE 50-1 at 8]. While there, he dropped off his keys to the store, and he carried out his personal belongings, which included some medications and medical equipment as well as more casual items like a microwave. [DE 50-1 at 8; DE 54-5 at 2]. He told the employee on duty at the store that he would need an operation on his foot, and he left her with a doctor's note. [DE 50-1 at 8]. With that, he left. He did not meet with Burton on Tuesday. He did not speak to Burton at any time thereafter.
On Wednesday, December 31, 2008, Burton sent an e-mail to Wendy Mahle, Magnifique's human resources director, asking how to proceed with respect to DeLapaz. She asked whether his conduct constituted a voluntary resignation. [DE 50-2 at 16, 18; DE 54-5 at 2-3]. Mahle told BurtonDeLapaz had resigned. [DE 54-5 at 1]. Thereafter, DeLapaz and Magnifique never had any contact beyond a telephone call by DeLapaz to the benefits department at some later date, and an email to Mahle on January 9, 2009, arguing that he had never meant to resign. [DE 50-1 at 11]. Burton no longer works at Magnifique. DeLapaz, for his part, is now permanently disabled and unable to work. [DE 50-1 at 12]. He currently receives social security benefits for himself and his children. On March 25, 2009, DeLapaz initiated this lawsuit by filing his first complaint. [DE 1]. He amended that complaint twice, leading to the current live document. [DE 29]. The defendants now move for summary judgment against all claims.
Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Lawson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 245 F.3d 916, 922 (7th Cir. 2001). A material fact is one identified by the substantive law as affecting the outcome of the suit. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A genuine issue exists with respect to any such material fact, and summary judgment is therefore inappropriate, when "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." Id. On the other hand, where a factual record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citing Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Servs. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968)).
In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, this court must construe all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, as well as draw all reasonable andjustifiable inferences in her favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; King v. Preferred Technical Grp., 166 F.3d 887, 890 (7th Cir. 1999). Still, the non-moving party cannot simply rest on the allegations or denials contained in its pleadings. It must present sufficient evidence to show the existence of each element of its case on which it will bear the burden at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-323 (1986); Robin v. Espo Eng'g Corp., 200 F.3d 1081, 1088 (7th Cir. 2000). Furthermore, the non-moving party may rely only on admissible evidence. Lewis v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 561 F.3d 698, 704 (7th Cir. 2009).
Count 1: Unlawful Termination under ERISA
The defendants have argued two grounds for summary judgment on Count 1, alleging unlawful termination under ERISA. First, they argue that the relief sought by the plaintiffs is unavailable under the statute, and that the claim must be dismissed as a result. Second, they argue that the claim fails because DeLapaz cannot show that the stated reason for his separation from the company was a pretext. The court disagrees with the former argument, but agrees with the latter. The defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Count 1.
The first argument Magnifique raises in support of summary judgment on Count 1 pertains to justiciability, rather than to the merits. In Count 1, DeLapaz alleges that Magnifique discharged him from his employment for the purpose of preventing him from receiving ERISA benefits, in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 1140. [DE 29 ¶¶ 17-21]. Under the ERISA statutory scheme, a civil action may be brought by a person aggrieved under § 1140 "to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan," or "to obtain other appropriate equitablerelief to redress such violations or to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan[.]" 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3). Absent from the list of available remedies is any right to legal damages, and as a result the courts have consistently noted that the statute provides only for equitable, and not legal, relief. See, e.g., Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002).
In this case, DeLapaz laid out the relief he seeks in both specific and general terms:
As a result of DeLapaz's termination of employment in violation of Section 510 of ERISA, Plaintiff is entitled to "appropriate equitable relief["] pursuant to [§ 1132(a)(3)]. Such "appropriate equitable relief" includes an entitlement to lost benefits, back pay, reinstatement or front pay in lieu of reinstatement and such other equitable restitution,...
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