Delaware County v. Delaware County Prison Employees Independent Union
| Decision Date | 02 July 1998 |
| Citation | 713 A.2d 1135,552 Pa. 184 |
| Parties | , 158 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2922 DELAWARE COUNTY, Pennsylvania; the Delaware County Council; Ward T. Williams, Paul G. Mattus, Thomas H. Killion, Wallace H. Nunn, and John J. McFadden, in their Capacity as Members of the Delaware County Council; the Delaware County Board of Prison Inspectors; and Charles Sexton, William Kelly, Elizabeth Signor, Ward Williams, and John McKenna, in their Capacity as Members of the Delaware County Board of Prison Inspectors and Wackenhut Corrections Corporation v. DELAWARE COUNTY PRISON EMPLOYEES INDEPENDENT UNION, Robert Pizzi, President, Delaware County Prison Employees Independent Union, in His Official Capacity and as a Taxpayer; and Michael Pelleritti, Secretary, Delaware County Prison Employees Independent Union, in His Official Capacity and as a Taxpayer. Appeal of DELAWARE COUNTY, Pennsylvania, Delaware County Council, Ward T. Williams, Paul G. Mattus, Thomas H. Killion, Wallace H. Nunn, John J. McFadden, Delaware County Board of Prison Inspectors, Charles Sexton, Jr., William Kelly, Elizabeth Signor and John McKenna. DELAWARE COUNTY, Pennsylvania; the Delaware County Council; Ward T. Williams, Paul G. Mattus, Thomas H. Killion, Wallace H. Nunn, and John J. McFadden, in their Capacity as Members of the Delaware County Council; the Delaware County Board of Prison Inspectors; and Charles Sexton, William Kelly, Elizabeth Signor, Ward Williams, and John McKenna, in their Capacity as Members of the Delaware County Board of Prison Inspectors and Wackenhut Corrections Corporation v. DELAWARE COUNTY PRISON EMPLOYEES INDEPENDENT UNION, Robert Pizzi, President, Delaware County Prison Employees Independent Union, in His Official Capacity and as a Taxpayer; and Michael Pelleritti, Secretary, Delaware County Prison Employees Independent Union, in His Official Capacity and as a Taxpayer. Appeal of WACKENHUT CORRECTIONS CORPORATION. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Robert M. DiOrio, Media, Robert F. Stewart, Jr., Philadelphia, for Del. Co. Bd. of Prison Insp., et al.
Richard P. McElroy, Bruce W. Kauffman, Michael J. Hanlon, Philadelphia, for Delaware County, Penn.
Ralph J. Teti, Wayne Wynn, Philadelphia, for Delaware County Prison, et al.
Richard H. Glanton, Christopher Walters, Sean M. Halpin, Philadelphia, for Wakenhut Corrections Corp.
Before FLAHERTY, C.J., and ZAPPALA, CAPPY, CASTILLE, NIGRO and NEWMAN, JJ.
OPINION ANNOUNCING JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
This is an appeal by allowance from an order of the Commonwealth Court which reversed an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County and reinstated an arbitrator's award prohibiting Delaware County from "privatizing," i.e., fully subcontracting, the operation of a prison facility. The factual background of the case is as follows.
In July of 1995, the Delaware County Prison Employees Independent Union was notified by Delaware County Council that, effective September 30, 1995, all of the correctional officers employed at the county's prison would be laid off. The layoff was due to the fact that the county had entered a contract with Wackenhut Corrections Corporation to have Wackenhut's employees serve as corrections officers.
In an effort to avert the planned layoff, the union filed a grievance under the existing labor contract and filed charges of unfair labor practices against the county. The union also sought a preliminary injunction.
The court of common pleas denied injunctive relief. On September 29, 1995, the commonwealth court granted an injunction pending appeal. Subsequently, it reversed the lower court's denial of a preliminary injunction and remanded for further proceedings. On March 19, 1996, the court of common pleas granted a preliminary injunction with a proviso that the injunction would expire on March 31, 1996, the date when the collective bargaining agreement was to lapse. On March 28, 1996, arbitration proceedings under the collective bargaining agreement culminated in a decision by an arbitrator that the county's prison privatization efforts violated the bargaining agreement. Nevertheless, on April 1, 1996, Wackenhut assumed control over operation and management of the prison and laid off all of the correctional officers. Wackenhut then rehired nearly all of the officers to serve as its own employees and to perform the same work at the prison. 1
On April 15, 1996, the court of common pleas denied additional requests by the union for injunctive relief and granted the county's petition to vacate the arbitrator's award. An appeal was taken to the commonwealth court, whereupon the decision below was reversed, the arbitrator's award was reinstated, and the county was directed to cease and desist from privatizing the prison operation. We reverse on the ground that the arbitrator's decision was erroneous.
The standards governing review of an arbitrator's award are well established. As we stated in Greater Johnstown Area Vocational-Technical School v. Greater Johnstown Area Vocational-Technical Education Association, 520 Pa. 197, 199-200, 553 A.2d 913, 914-15 (1989) (citations omitted),
It is well settled that, in reviewing an arbitrator's interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement, broad deference is to be accorded the arbitrator's decision....
The so-called "essence of the collective bargaining agreement" test has been frequently enunciated by this Court as the standard governing judicial deference to arbitrators' decisions. It requires that an arbitrator's interpretation be upheld if it can, in any rational way, be derived from the language and context of the agreement. When an issue, properly defined, is within the terms of a collective bargaining agreement and the arbitrator's decision can in a rational way be derived from the terms of the agreement, one can say that the decision draws its "essence" from the agreement, and reversal is not warranted even if a court believes that the decision, though rational, is incorrect.
We perceive no rational manner in which an arbitrator, upon consideration of the provisions of the present agreement, could have determined that privatizing operations at the county prison by subcontracting operation of the facility to Wackenhut was violative of the agreement. The decision prohibiting Wackenhut from being retained to operate the prison simply does not derive its "essence" from the agreement.
Article 2, Section 1 of the agreement is entitled "Inherent Management Rights." In pertinent part, it provides:
The Employer [Delaware County] reserves the right to manage and operate its establishment in such manner as it sees fit, including but not limited to:
(a) Right to hire, transfer, promote, demote, lay off, discipline or discharge employees to the extent not modified by this Agreement;
....
(c) To subcontract work and services and delete and discontinue departments and personnel within County Government;
In the most plain and unambiguous terms, this provision invests the county with authority to manage and operate the prison "as it sees fit," to "lay off" or "discharge" employees, to "subcontract work," and to "discontinue departments and personnel." Such powers are precisely those which the county exercised by hiring Wackenhut to operate the prison. There is no language in any other portion of the agreement that contradicts the powers conferred by this section. Further, Article 28, Section 1 of the agreement sets forth an integration clause which provides that "[t]he parties mutually agree that the terms and conditions expressly set forth in this Agreement represent the full and complete understanding, Agreement and commitment between the parties thereto." Thus, Article 2, Section 1 constitutes the entire agreement of the parties as to the subject matter under dispute.
The intent of the parties to a written contract is deemed to be embodied in the writing itself, and when the words are clear and unambiguous the intent is to be gleaned exclusively from the express language of the agreement. Steuart v. McChesney, 498 Pa. 45, 48-49, 444 A.2d 659, 661 (1982). Indeed, "the focus of interpretation is upon the terms of the agreement as manifestly expressed, rather than as, perhaps, silently intended." Id.
The arbitrator in the present case concluded that the union would not have intended to confer such broad powers upon the county as those that were ostensibly expressed in the agreement. He determined, therefore, that the county's right to subcontract was limited in scope, to wit, that it did not permit such extensive subcontracting as would amount to privatization of the entire prison operation. He viewed the unfettered power to subcontract as being highly unfavorable to the interests of union employees and concluded that if the parties had really intended that such extensive subcontracting could occur then there should have been language in the agreement specifying that a complete privatization was permitted. Absent such language, the power to subcontract was deemed to have been intended as limited in scope.
Under Steuart v. McChesney, however, the inquiry must focus on what the agreement manifestly expressed, not what the parties may have silently intended. It is not proper, under the guise of construction, to alter the terms to which the parties, whether in wisdom or folly, expressly agreed. Id. at 51, 444 A.2d at 662. Here, the agreement expressly provided the county with power to subcontract work and lay off employees. No limits on that power were set forth in the agreement. The arbitrator was obliged to apply the agreement as written, without imposing additional...
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