Delbridge v. Beach

• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: GOSE, J.
• Citation: Delbridge v. Beach, 66 Wash. 416, 119 P. 856 (Wash. 1912)
• Decision Date: 02 January 1912
• Parties: DELBRIDGE et al. v. BEACH et al.

119 P. 856

66 Wash. 416

DELBRIDGE et al. v. BEACH et al.

Supreme Court of Washington

January 2, 1912

Department 1. Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Wilson R. Gay Judge.

Action by Edward J. Delbridge and others against Alda I. Beach and another. From a judgment for defendants, plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.

William R. Bell, for appellants.

Aust &amp Terhune, for respondents.

GOSE J.

This is a suit to recover for services performed upon an oral contract. Demurrers were sustained to the complaint, and a judgment entered in favor of the defendants. The plaintiffs have appealed.

One of the appellants is an attorney at law. The contract relied upon for a recovery is set forth in paragraph 2 of the complaint, as follows: 'That about the 28th day of April 1909, the defendant Alda I. Beach entered into a formal oral agreement with the plaintiffs, whereby she employed them to investigate, and, if possible, ascertain whether a certain will, executed by one Elizur Beach, shortly after his marriage with the said defendant, by the terms of which she was devised and bequeathed outright a one-third interest of all the property, real and personal, wherever situate, of which the said Elizur Beach should die seised or possessed, had been destroyed or nullified by codicil or codicils, or by the execution of a new will, and if any new will had been made or the old will modified, and to ascertain the tenor and contents of such codicil or codicils or such later will, and, further, to ascertain the condition of the title to the various tracts of land standing in the name of the said Elizur Beach in the state of Washington and other states at and prior to the time of the marriage of the defendant Alda I. Beach to said Elizur Beach, and, further to ascertain what property had been acquired or disposed of by him since the date of their marriage, and particularly to take all steps and proceedings necessary in the judgment of the plaintiffs to ascertain the intention of the said Beach toward the defendant Alda I. Beach in the matter of the final disposition of his property after his death, and to institute such suits or proceedings as in the judgment of the plaintiffs would secure to her the largest posible share in said estate, and to prevent any disposition of any part thereof adverse to her interest, and, if the desired results could not be obtained by any other means, to institute a suit for a legal separation, and as an incident thereto to precipitate a settlement and division of the property rights of the defendant Alda I. Beach and her said husband. That in consideration of such services the defendant Alda I. Beach agreed to and with the plaintiffs to pay all expenses connected with said investigation and with any suits or proceedings which should be instituted, and as compensation to pay to the plaintiffs one-fifth of all money, and to convey to them by a good and sufficient deed an undivided one-fifth of all property turned over to her by the said Beach, whether the money and property so secured should be by voluntary settlement, agreement or compromise, devise or bequest, or as the result of a judgment or decree of court.' It is further alleged that in pursuance of the contract the respondent Beach paid to the appellant Snyder a retainer of $100, and advanced to him for his coappellant the sum of $475 as expense money; that the appellants entered upon and continued in the performance of the contract until about the 25th day of August, 1909, when the respondent Beach repudiated the contract and prevented further performance; that, by utilizing the evidence collected by the appellants and their counsel and advice, she has accomplished a settlement and division of the property rights of herself and husband, and has received $58,666 in money, and real property of large value, a description of which is set forth in the complaint. It is further alleged that for the purpose of defrauding the appellants the respondent Beach conveyed the real estate to her corespondent, and that it accepted the conveyance with knowledge of all the facts and for the purpose of aiding her in the perpetration of a fraud upon the appellants.

Respondents contend (1) that, the contract being oral and having as one of its objects the conveyance of real property, it is within the statute of frauds and void in its entirety; and (2) that it is void as against public policy, in that it is 'an agreement to procure evidence for a contemplated divorce action, and an attempt to facilitate the bringing of an action for divorce, not for the purpose of the divorce itself but to force a settlement of property rights between the defendant Beach and her husband.' We think the second contention must be upheld. It is patent that the employment contemplated coercing the husband into a division of his separate property so as to secure to the wife 'the largest possible share' therein. The charge is that, if this could be accomplished in no other way, a divorce suit was to be instituted, having for its object a division of the husband's property. There is no averment in the complaint disclosing that the wife had any interest in the property. Under certain conditions, the wife may claim a homestead in the separate property of the husband. These conditions are not shown to exist. Under other conditions, the wife could claim support out of the same character of property. These conditions are not alleged. Nor is it alleged that the wife had any ground for divorce. As was said in Hillman v Hillman, 42 Wash. 595, 85 P. 61, 114 [66 Wash. 419] Am. St. Rep. 135, it is the policy of the law to discourage actions for divorce. It is equally the policy of the law to permit one...