Delbridge v. Schaeffer

• Decision Date: 23 January 1989
• Citation: 569 A.2d 872,238 N.J.Super. 323
• Parties: Adolph and Jill DELBRIDGE, Plaintiffs, v. Honorable Stephen J. SCHAEFFER, J.S.C., et al., Defendant.
• Court: New Jersey Superior Court

Page 323

238 N.J.Super. 323

569 A.2d 872

Adolph and Jill DELBRIDGE, Plaintiffs, v. Honorable Stephen J. SCHAEFFER, J.S.C., et al., Defendant.

Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division Hudson County.

Decided Jan. 23, 1989.

Adolph Delbridge and Jill Delbridge, plaintiffs, pro se

Michael Furda for defendants (W. Cary Edwards, Atty. Gen. of New Jersey, attorney; Michael Furda, Irvington, and Pamela Katten, New York City, on the brief).

VILLANUEVA, J.S.C.

Plaintiffs filed 42 complaints ¹ against state, county and governmental agencies as well as private agencies and persons alleging, inter alia, conspiracy, fraud, malice, malicious prosecution, legal malpractice, medical malpractice and civil rights violations.

This is a motion for summary judgment made by all of the above-listed defendants represented by the Attorney General to dismiss the complaint against them. ²

The issues are: (1) whether judges enjoy absolute immunity; (2) whether the complaints against Governor Kean, Attorney General Edwards, DYFS and all other persons involved in the child-abuse proceedings are barred by the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity; (3) whether Attorney General Edwards, his deputy, DYFS and the other defendants are immune from suit under N.J.S.A. 59:3-3 for their good faith execution and enforcement of law; (4) whether Governor Kean, Attorney General Edwards and all other state employees involved are immune because of the discretion vested in them under N.J.S.A. 59:2-3 and :3-2; (5) whether Governor Kean, Attorney General Edwards and other superiors are liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior; (6) whether DYFS, Bayonne Agency, Adoption Resource Center and the Department of Civil Service are "persons" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; (7) whether any respondeat superior theory exists under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; (8) whether plaintiffs have established the required elements of malicious prosecution based upon either a prior criminal judicial proceeding or a prior civil proceeding when no proceeding was terminated in their favor; (9) whether defendants are immune from suit, in any event, under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; and (10) whether claims for improper medical examinations are barred by N.J.S.A. 59:6-4.

The court holds that defendants are immune under all theories, and therefore, grants summary judgment dismissing the complaints against them.

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS.

November 30, 1984.

Jill Schneider (now Delbridge) called a state hotline alleging ³ that daughter Jill had been sexually abused by the girl's father, Adolph Delbridge. This prompted an immediate investigation by DYFS.

January 25, 1985.

Five Delbridge children were placed in DYFS foster care.

April 10, 1985.

Adolph Delbridge pleaded guilty to a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a) (endangering the welfare of a child) and was sentenced to five years probation.

December 17, 1987.

The sixth Delbridge child, born subsequent to the above date, was placed in DYFS foster care.

December 23, 1987.

The seventh Delbridge child, born November 1987, was placed in DYFS foster care. April 1988.

Parental rights of plaintiffs to six of their children were terminated by order of the Hon. J. Leonard Hornstein, J.S.C. His findings of fact were made on April 14, 1988. Plaintiffs' appeal of this decision is pending.

PLAINTIFFS ARE COLLATERALLY ESTOPPED FROM ARGUING THE MERITS

AND/OR THE EFFICACY OF THE DECISION TO REMOVE

THEIR CHILDREN.

Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel,

[O]nce an issue is actually and necessarily determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, that determination is conclusive in subsequent suits based on a different cause of action involving a party to the prior litigation. [Montana v. U.S., 440 U.S. 147, 153, 99 S.Ct. 970, 973, 59 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979) ]

A party is thus precluded by collateral estoppel from relitigating matters or facts which the party actually litigated and which were determined in a prior action, involving a different claim or cause of action, and which were directly in issue between the parties. Mazzilli v. Accident & Casualty Ins. Co., etc., 26 N.J. 307, 314-316, 139 A.2d 741 (1958). This basic principle has been fully adopted and enforced by the courts of New Jersey. See, e.g., State v. Gonzalez, 75 N.J. 181, 186-187, 380 A.2d 1128 (1977).

Plaintiffs are collaterally estopped from pursuing these actions as the thrust of consolidated complaints against all defendants, including but not limited to DYFS, its various offices, staffers and consultants, because the decision to remove the Delbridges' children from them was already the subject of two prior family court actions. Plaintiffs cannot, and do not, now complain that they lacked a full and fair opportunity to litigate that decision in those prior actions. Their complaints are confined primarily to allegations of conspiracy, malice and intentional or negligent medical and legal malpractice. Indeed, Mr. Delbridge was present, and participated, in both proceedings.

Likewise, when a party is "precluded from re-litigating an issue with an opposing party, he is also precluded from doing so with another person unless he lacked a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the first action or unless other circumstances justify affording him an opportunity to relitigate the issue." United Rental Equipment Co. v. Aetna Life & Cas Ins. Co., 74 N.J. 92, 101, 376 A.2d 1183 (1977); Feniello v. University of Pennsylvania Hospital, 558 F.Supp. 1365, 1367 (D.N.J.1983); Melikian v. Corradetti, 791 F.2d 274 (3 Cir.1986).

All of plaintiffs' complaints arise out of the proceedings in the Family Court before Judge Hornstein or in the criminal matter to which Mr. Delbridge pled guilty. For this court to allow the present complaints to stand and proceed to trial would require relitigation of issues already decided by courts of competent jurisdiction. This would not only damage or strain the foundation of American jurisprudence, but also destroy the concept of finality of court determinations and totally negate it. Any time a litigant, in any proceeding, whether a municipal traffic violation or an appeal to the United States Supreme Court, can by paying $75 (nothing if you claim indigency as here) relitigate the case ad infinitum. ⁴

To the extent that Mr. Delbridge was a party in both family court proceedings, there is nothing to suggest he did not have a full and fair opportunity to voice those complaints with Judge Hornstein's decision to remove his children, which he voices now in some 41 ⁵ consolidated complaints. Moreover, plaintiff Review is clearly available to plaintiffs in the form of an appeal (which is currently pending). If any of the decisions to remove the children were erroneous, as plaintiffs allege, it can be reversed by a higher court. To give plaintiffs a new avenue of recourse now for an old issue would defeat the purpose of the doctrine of collateral estoppel.

offers no reason why he could not, as a matter of law, obtain review of either or both family court orders.

Therefore, plaintiffs are collaterally estopped from relitigating them.

JUDGES HORNSTEIN, HUMPHREYS AND SCHAEFFER ARE ABSOLUTELY

IMMUNE FROM SUITS FOR DAMAGES ARISING OUT OF

JUDICIAL ACTS WITHIN THEIR JURISDICTION.

"Few doctrines [are] more solidly established at common law than the immunity of judges from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction." Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-554, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 1217, 18 L.Ed.2d 288, 294 (1967). "A judge is absolutely immune from liability for his judicial acts." Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 1106, 55 L.Ed.2d 331, 341 (1978); Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 334, 103 S.Ct. 1108, 1115, 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983).

In Pierson, the Supreme Court held that this absolute immunity applies to suits brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Later cases have affirmed this principle. See Stump, supra, 435 U.S. at 356, 98 S.Ct. at 1104; Briscoe, supra, 460 U.S. at 334, 103 S.Ct. at 1115 and Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 418, 96 S.Ct. 984, 989, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976). The Supreme Court has consistently adhered to the rule that judges defending against § 1982 actions enjoy absolute immunity for acts performed in their judicial capacities. Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27, 101 S.Ct. 183, 186, 66 L.Ed.2d 185 (1980); Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union A judge is not deprived of this immunity even when an action taken is in error, malicious or in excess of his authority. Stump, supra, 435 U.S. at 356, 98 S.Ct. at 1104. See also Pierson, supra, 386 U.S. at 554, 87 S.Ct. at 1217 (immunity applies even when judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly).

of the United States, 446 U.S. 719, 733-734, 100 S.Ct. 1967, 1975, 64 L.Ed.2d 641, 654-655 (1980).

The rationale for this rule was explained in Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974):

Public officials, whether governors, mayors or police, legislators or judges, who fail to make decisions when they are needed or who do not act to implement decisions when they are made do not fully and faithfully perform the duties of their offices. Implicit in the idea that officials have some immunity--absolute or qualified--for their acts, is a recognition that they may err. The concept of immunity assumes this and goes on to assume that it is better to risk some error and possible injury from that error than not to decide or act at all. [416 U.S. at 241-242, 94 S.Ct. at 1689; emphasis supplied]

As further explained by the Supreme Court in Dennis, supra:

Judicial immunity arose because it was in the public interest to have judges who were at liberty to exercise their independent judgment about the merits of a case without fear of being mulcted for damages should an unsatisfied litigant be able to convince another tribunal that the judge acted not only mistakenly but with malice and corruption. [449 U.S. at...