Delco Ice Manufacturing Co. v. Frick Company, Inc.

• Decision Date: 25 March 1935
• Docket Number: 145
• Citation: 178 A. 135,318 Pa. 337
• Parties: Delco Ice Manufacturing Co., Appellant, v. Frick Company, Inc
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

178 A. 135

318 Pa. 337

Delco Ice Manufacturing Co., Appellant, v. Frick Company, Inc

No. 145

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

March 25, 1935

Argued January 15, 1935

Appeal, No. 145, Jan. T., 1935, by plaintiff, from order of C.P. Delaware Co., Dec. T., 1932, No. 702, in case of Delco Ice Manufacturing Co. v. Frick Company, Inc. Judgment reversed and a procedendo is awarded.

Rule to show cause why a conditional sales contract should not be stricken from the record.

The opinion of the Supreme Court states the facts.

Rule discharged, opinion by MacDADE, J. Plaintiff appealed.

Error assigned, among others, was discharge of rule, quoting record.

The judgment is reversed and a procedendo is awarded.

John Martin Doyle, with him William Taylor, for appellant.

E Wallace Chadwick, of Taylor, Chadwick & Weeks, with him Sterling & Willing, for appellee.

Before SIMPSON, KEPHART, SCHAFFER, MAXEY, DREW and LINN, JJ.

OPINION

MR. JUSTICE KEPHART:

The Frick Company entered into a written contract with the James Ice Manufacturing Company for the conditional sale of certain chattels, which were to be affixed to the realty of the James Ice Manufacturing Company. The original conditional sales contract was not filed, but a verified statement of the contract was filed in the prothonotary's office and indexed in the conditional sales docket, showing the contract dated March 3, 1926.

The Delco Ice Manufacturing Company, in 1929, for valuable consideration, purchased from the James Company the land, situate in Delaware County, with the buildings and improvements thereon erected, together with the machinery, appliances and operating equipment. The improvements included the machinery referred to in the conditional sales contract, which was attached to the buildings as part of the land. The Frick Company has, since the sale, demanded from the Delco Company the balance of the purchase price on this machinery, with interest.

The statement of the contract filed in the prothonotary's office was defective and insufficient to charge the purchaser with constructive notice as it failed to contain a description of the real estate sufficient to identify it as the land to which the chattels were to be affixed. The Delco Company took a rule on the Frick Company to show cause why the verified statement of the contract should not be stricken from the record. The court below dismissed the petition, and this appeal followed.

As between the buyer and seller, a conditional sales contract has always been held good; but as to creditors of and bona fide purchasers without notice from the buyer, the contract has been held to be invalid: Forest v. Nelson, 108 Pa. 481, 488; Com. v. Bowers, 304 Pa. 253, 257.

The Act of May 14, 1925, P.L. 722, ^[1] regulates the procedure necessary in filing conditional sales contracts. An innocent purchaser for value from a conditional vendee in possession acquires title as against the vendor, unless the latter has complied with the conditions of the Conditional Sales Act: Anchor Concrete Machinery Co. v. Penna. Brick & Tile Co., 292 Pa. 86.

The statutory requirements as to the contents of instruments by which a conditional sales contract is made must be strictly complied with, otherwise the instrument is not entitled to be recorded and does not constitute constructive notice: 55 Corpus Juris, page 1262, section 1272; In re Thaler, 1 F.2d 461.

Where a conditional sales contract is filed under the provisions of the Act of May 14, 1925, P.L. 722, and the contract violates the act in that it does not contain a description of the real estate affected, is a rule to show cause why the contract should not be stricken from the record the proper proceeding to be taken by a party affected by the contract?

Is the conditional contract a judicial record when filed in the prothonotary's office? Judicial records have been defined as those associated with the progress of litigated cases. Various other definitions have been given (see 15 Corpus Juris 971; 23 Ruling Case Law, 156; Words and Phrases, volume 3, page 335), but in substance all agree that it relates to litigation present or prospective. In this State we have distinguished between a judicial record and a record made pursuant to a statute in the office of the recorder of deeds for the purpose of giving constructive notice. In Brown v. Henry, 106 Pa. 262, 267, it was said: "But his record in such case, though called a record, lacks the element of verity which exists where a record is made up by an officer of the court and under the eye of the court, after hearing the parties." In Fleming v. Parry, 24 Pa. 47, 52, it is stated: "A record it undoubtedly is, but not a record to which that maxim applies, the proper application of which is to judicial records -- those which are potentially if not actually made up under the eye of the judge, in the presence of the parties, and after hearing them; and these are kept by the custos rotulorum, and not by the recorder."

Since the purpose of filing the contract was to give constructive notice of the reservation of title to subsequent purchasers (see section 2 of the act; 55 Corpus Juris 1263), it is argued that the paper, when filed, would be subject to the doctrines applicable to deeds, mortgages, etc., recorded in the recorder's office. There are many reasons why this analogy is not correct.

Under the provisions of the statute, it is directed that the instrument be filed, not recorded, and the word "filed" is customarily used in connection with judicial documents. It is to be filed in the office of the prothonotary. Prothonotaries are public officers upon whom many duties may be imposed by the legislature, and they may have control of documents similar to those filed with the recorder of deeds. But when a paper is directed to be filed in the prothonotary's office, the act may give the record a quasi judicial character.

Section 23 of the Act of April 14, 1834, P.L. 333, provides for the appointment of a prothonotary and clerk, or clerks, for each of the courts, who shall have custody of the records and seal of the court, and keep them at the place where court is held. Subsequent sections of the same act define the powers and authority of the prothonotary and clerks, none of which indicate that they perform other than judicial duties. ^[2]

The Act of 1925, P.L. 722, further provides that an abstract of the contract shall be entered in a "conditional sales docket" and "shall be indexed in said docket by placing the name of the buyer in a column for defendants and the name of the seller in a column for plaintiffs," thus indicating that it was the intention of the legislature to simulate the filing of the contract to the entry of a suit in the prothonotary's office, otherwise the designation of the "plaintiff" and "defendant" would be meaningless. Section 4 of the act requires that the fees for filing, indexing and other services shall be the same "as for like services in connection with mechanics' liens," which are judicial proceedings. It would follow that the provisions of the Act of 1925 would confer on a filed conditional sales contract a character different from that of an agreement or deed filed in the recorder's office, and it would have the characteristics of a judicial record in the office of the prothonotary.

It is unnecessary to discuss the question that every court has absolute control over its own records and may amend, correct, expunge or otherwise control them, and the question remains as to whether a rule to show cause is the proper procedure to correct the wrong done. The question has been made more difficult by the quotation from former Chief Justice MITCHELL'S book on "Motions and Rules at Common Law," where it is stated: "A rule is not properly original process in any case but is auxiliary and for the facilitating of jurisdiction already acquired." No authority is cited to support that statement, which is reprinted in Woodward on "Motions and Rules" [1934 edition]. The Superior Court in Short v. School District, 108 Pa. Superior Court 503, made use of the statement, but the matter at issue was clearly not a court record, it involved a question of exemption from the payment of certain taxes.

In discussing rules to show cause, in Park Bros. & Co. v. Oil City Boiler Works, 204 Pa. 453, Justice MITCHELL says: "The enlarged operation of rules is a somewhat peculiar and very admirable feature of Pennsylvania jurisprudence, growing largely out of the administration of equity through common law forms. It was early held that remedy by rules had supplanted the ancient audita querela and writ of error coram nobis, and the constant tendency of modern practice has been to enlarge rather than to restrict their operation. No serious disadvantages have as yet been perceived and the convenience is such that the legislature has in some cases, . . . carried rules beyond their natural and legitimate province and clothed them with the office of original process."

There are cases in Pennsylvania where rules have been used as original process. In Seigler v. Ripple, 16 Lancaster Law Review 236, a rule to show cause was used, without objection, for the purpose of striking off a mistaken entry of satisfaction of a mortgage. In In re Meloy Mortgage, 8 Dist. Reports 364, a rule to show cause was taken to strike off a release of a mortgage. A case almost in point and one which would seem to be authority for the present proceeding, is Macoluso's Naturalization, 237 Pa. 132. The proceeding was started by a petition and rule for the cancellation of a certificate of naturalization. The court there stated: "'No judgment or decree of this court was ever made naturalizing the said Calogero...