DeLeon-Reyes v. Guevara
| Decision Date | 29 September 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:18-cv-01028,Case No. 1:18-cv-02312 |
| Parties | ARTURO DeLEON-REYES, Plaintiff, v. REYNALDO GUEVARA, et al., Defendants. GABRIEL SOLACHE, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF CHICAGO, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Defendants City of Chicago, Cook County and the individual defendant officers and prosecutors in this case have brought a joint motion to compel the testimony of Adriana Mejia. [DeLeon-Reyes 354; Solache 246].1 In ruling on this motion, the Court is presented with the question of whether a witness who pled guilty to, and was convicted for, a murder nearly twenty years ago can invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to avoid testifyingabout those crimes. For the reasons stated below, the Court finds that Adriana Mejia cannot invoke the Fifth Amendment under these circumstances, and grants Defendants' motion to compel.
In these separate lawsuits, consolidated for purposes of discovery, see Doc. [49], Plaintiffs Arturo DeLeon-Reyes and Gabriel Solache claim that they were wrongfully convicted and that they served almost 20 years in prison for the 1998 double murder of Mariano and Jacinta Soto. Solache Doc. [171] at 4. Plaintiffs assert that their convictions were the result of constitutional violations committed by Chicago police officers during the investigation of the Soto homicides. Id. Specifically, Plaintiffs bring claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for coerced confession, fabrication of false witness statements, deprivation of liberty without probable cause, violations of due process, failure to intervene, and conspiracy. Id. Plaintiff DeLeon-Reyes additionally asserts 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against certain state prosecutors for coerced confession and fabrication of false witness statements. Id. Both Plaintiffs allege Monell policy and practice claims, as well as state law claims for malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, civil conspiracy, respondeat superior, and indemnification. Id.
Defendants deny Plaintiffs were wrongfully convicted, deny the claims against them, and assert various defenses, such as qualified immunity, absolute immunity, a bar under Heck v. Humphrey, estoppel, statute of limitations, Illinois Tort Immunity Act, and failure to mitigate damages. Solache Doc. [171] at 4.
On October 22, 2019, counsel for Plaintiffs and Defendants traveled to Logan Correctional Center to depose Adriana Mejia. Doc. [354] at 3-4. Mejia is currently serving time for her involvement in the Soto homicides. In 2001, she pled guilty to two counts of first-degree murder, two counts of aggravated kidnapping, and one count of home invasion in exchange for life-imprisonment without possibility of parole. Doc. [354-1] at 22-23, 30-38. According to her confession at the time of arrest, Mejia wanted to have a baby so desperately, that she faked a pregnancy and scouted the pediatric wards of hospitals in the Chicago area in search of a baby to kidnap and disguise as her own child. Id. at 42-43. When she spotted Jacinta Soto holding the hand of her three-year old son while cradling her two month-old daughter at the University of Illinois Hospital, Mejia decided to target Jacinta Soto. Id. at 43. Mejia confessed that she followed Jacinta Soto home to find out where she lived. Id. at 44. The next morning, according to Mejia's confession, she was picked up by Plaintiffs, and they drove to Jacinta Soto's home, stabbed Jacinta Soto and her husband to death, and kidnapped the couple's two children. Id. at 44-45.
At her October 22, 2019 deposition, Mejia invoked the Fifth Amendment in response to numerous questions. See, e.g., Doc. [354-1] at 88, 89. However, Mejia did testify about some of the circumstances surrounding her confession. See id. at 80-83. Specifically, Mejia testified that Defendant Guevara brought her some blank pieces of paper to sign, so that she could get a lawyer, food, and access to the telephone. Id. at 82-83. Mejia also stated that Guevara mistreated her by hitting her and by not letting her use the restroom. Id. at 87-88.
On August 4, 2020, Defendants brought the Motion to Compel Witness Adriana Mejia to Testify that is currently before the Court. Doc. [354]. Defendants ask the Court to "order Mejia to answer all questions concerning the details and circumstances surrounding her and Solache and Reyes' involvement in the Soto murders and kidnappings and her admissions to those horrific offenses." Id. at 15. On August 16, 2020, Mejia filed a response in opposition. Doc. [359]. On August 18, 2020, Plaintiffs filed a response as well, stating they take no position on whether Mejia should be compelled to testify. Doc. [360] at 2.
The parties are currently engaged in discovery. Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Privilege, thus, is one of the limitations to obtaining information about relevant matters. The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination can be invoked in both civil and criminal proceedings, and deponents in civil actions are generally entitled to invoke the privilege during pretrial discovery. Witness Adriana Mejia has invoked that privilege during a deposition in response to numerous questions about the Soto homicides, and now Defendants move to compel her to answer those questions. Defendants assert that there is no risk of further prosecution for Mejia's crimes because all proceedings related to those convictions have been completed or are time-barred. In the alternative, Defendants assert that Mejia waived her Fifth Amendment right by pleading guilty, discussing the crimes with government investigators, and by testifying at the October 22, 2019 deposition. As discussed below, the Court finds that Mejia does not bear a reasonable risk of further prosecution and cannot invoke the Fifth Amendment. Although not outcome determinative, the Court does not find for the Defendants on their second contention.
The Fifth Amendment provides that "[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. Const. amend. V. The right "reflects a complex of our fundamental values and aspirations, and marks an important advance in the development of our liberty." Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444 (1972). It can be asserted in any proceeding, id., and must be construed broadly "to assure that an individual is not compelled to produceevidence which later may be used against him as an accused in a criminal action." Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 461 (1975) (citations omitted).
Nevertheless, the Fifth Amendment cannot be invoked as "an obstructionist tactic, and thus a party that relies on the privilege as a discovery shield must establish that a truthful answer to an inquiry would have some tendency to subject the person being asked the question to criminal liability." In re Pansier, 417 F. App'x 565, 568 (7th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). By that same token, a witness does not have "carte blanche by virtue of the Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination clause to refuse to answer questions." In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 663 (7th Cir. 2002). Rather, "the protection afforded by the Fifth Amendment is limited to instances in which the witness has reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer." Shakman v. Democratic Org. of Cook Cty., 920 F. Supp. 2d 881, 887 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (citation omitted). It is the court, not the witness, who decides whether the Fifth Amendment applies, and the court "may order the witness to answer if it clearly appears that no danger of prosecution exists." Ryan v. Comm'r, 568 F.2d 531, 539 (7th Cir. 1977) (citing Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486, 71 S.Ct. 814, 95 L.Ed. 1118 (1951)).
Nearly twenty years ago, Mejia pled guilty to, and was convicted for, numerous crimes in connection with the Soto homicides. Since that time, Mejia has not made any attempts to attack her convictions or sentence. Mejia's sentence has thus been fixed and the judgment of her convictions has been final (and unchallenged) for nearly two decades. Time has run out for any realistic pursual of post-conviction relief and for the prosecution of other crimes Mejia might have committed at the time of the Soto homicides. Because the Court cannot discern a real risk of prosecution or jeopardy facing Mejia, as discussed below, the Fifth Amendment does not apply to her statements regarding the crimes she was convicted of in 2001.
To assess Mejia's risk in testifying about the Soto homicides, the Court first examines the potential crimes for which Mejia could face prosecution. The Fifth Amendment applies so long as there is a possibility of prosecution, even if this Court thinks that the government would be unlikely to prosecute. In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 661 F.2d 1145, 1150 (7th Cir. 1981), aff'd sub nom. Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 103 S. Ct. 608, 74 L. Ed. 2d 430 (1983) (citation omitted). To evaluate the possibility of prosecution, courts in this circuit look for indicia of an "absolute bar to subsequent prosecution," such as "statues of limitations, immunity, and double jeopardy." Id. at 1151 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
In re High Fructose Corn Syrup presents an example of the absolute bar analysis. In that antitrust class action, former executives at Archer Daniels Midland Co. (ADM) indicated that they would invoke the Fifth Amendment rather than testify about the price-fixing crimes they were convicted of...
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