DeLeon v. Little, Civil No. 3:94CV902 (RNC).
| Decision Date | 05 June 1997 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 3:94CV902 (RNC). |
| Citation | 981 F.Supp. 728 |
| Parties | Agnes DeLEON, Plaintiff, v. Sandra E. LITTLE and City of Hartford, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
C. Thomas Furniss, James M. Quinn, Furniss & Quinn, Hartford, CT, Anne Kelly Zovas, Pomeranz, Drayton & Stabnick, Glastonbury, CT, for plaintiff.
Joseph A. Moniz, John B. Ashmeade, Marquis D. Jones, Jr., Day, Berry & Howard, Cityplace, Hartford, CT, Thomas F. Kelsey, Duburg & Deganis, Glastonbury, CT, Margaret J. Strange, Jackson, Lewis, Schnitzler & Krupman, Hartford, CT, Linda L. Yoder, John W. Mahoney, Charles L. Howard, Shipman & Goodwin, Hartford, CT, Margaret E. Corrigan, Lucas D. Strunk, Pomeranz, Drayton & Stabnick, Stephen J. Courney, Gesmonde, Pietresimone, Sgrignari, Pinkus & Sachs, New Haven, CT, for defendants.
After review and over objection, the Magistrate Judge's recommended ruling is hereby approved and adopted. So ordered.
Plaintiff seeks damages from defendants for alleged violations of her civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and intentional infliction of emotional distress in violation of Connecticut common law. Defendants each move for summary judgment on their respective counts of the Complaint. For the reasons that follow, Defendant Little's motion should be granted in part and denied in part; Defendant City of Hartford's motion should be granted.
Plaintiff Agnes DeLeon ("DeLeon") began her employment with the City of Hartford as a clerical employee in City Hall on December 2, 1985. On January 4, 1988, DeLeon transferred from a Senior Clerk Typist position in the Personnel Department to a Senior Clerk Typist position in the Court of the Common Council's ("City Council") office for the political party "People for Change" ("PFC"), which had won two seats on the City Council in the November 1987 election. On May 13, 1988, DeLeon became an Administrative Clerk for PFC, and on January 17, 1989, she was promoted to an Administrative Assistant.
As an Administrative Assistant, Plaintiff engaged in constituent services and provided office and secretarial support for the PFC Council members. The two PFC council members with whom Plaintiff initially worked were Eugenio Caro ("Caro") and Marie Kirkley-Bey ("Kirkley-Bey"). Defendant Sandra Little ("Little") won a council seat as a member of PFC in the November 1989 election, replacing Kirkley-Bey.
On June 5, 1992, DeLeon suffered a psychiatric episode (referred to by all parties as a "nervous breakdown") at work, during which she threw furniture from the third-floor office in which she worked to the atrium floor below. Plaintiff was restrained by police officers called to the scene, taken via ambulance to Hartford Hospital, and admitted for recurrent major depression. DeLeon was discharged from the Hospital on June 7, 1992, but remained under the care of a psychiatrist thereafter.
After an extended disability leave, Plaintiff returned to work for the City of Hartford in December, 1992. Advised by her physician not to return to her prior position, DeLeon was transferred to work as an Administrative Assistant in the Department of Social Services. She has worked continually in this capacity since that date.
Plaintiff alleges generally that Little's cruel and abusive treatment as her supervisor caused DeLeon's breakdown. Specifically, DeLeon alleges that Little: displayed in the workplace an openly hostile attitude towards her; openly and repeatedly criticized her work; intimidated and threatened her job security; criticized her attendance record; required her to obtain written excuses from a physician for absences from work; criticized and humiliated her before others; harassed her at home regarding work; showed animosity towards her as a result of her racial and ethnic status and political affiliation; threatened to replace her with a member of another race; compelled her to perform personal errands and to work for her private employer; compelled her to purchase illegal drugs; and made her stand guard while Little used drugs.
Counts One and Two of Plaintiff's four-count Complaint allege that Little's treatment of her in the workplace violated rights secured to her by the First, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Specifically, these rights include Plaintiff's alleged rights to be free from interference in the pursuit of her occupation, free from emotional and criminal harassment in the workplace, free from racial discrimination in the workplace, and free from interference with her personal liberties. In addition, Counts Three and Four allege that Little's treatment constituted intentional infliction of emotional distress under Connecticut common law.
Counts One and Three of Plaintiff's Complaint are addressed to Defendant Little in her individual and official capacity as a former Hartford City Councilor. Counts Two and Four also seek to hold the City of Hartford, acting through its elected officials, liable for the alleged constitutional and common law violations. Defendants each move for summary judgment on their respective counts of the Complaint.
In a motion for summary judgment, the burden is on the moving party to establish that there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2514, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A dispute regarding a material fact is genuine "`if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'" Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 520, 523 (2d Cir.) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 965, 113 S.Ct. 440, 121 L.Ed.2d 359 (1992). The court resolves "all ambiguities and draw[s] all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party in order to determine how a reasonable jury would decide." Aldrich, 963 F.2d at 523. Thus, "[o]nly when reasonable minds could not differ as to the import of the evidence is summary judgment proper." Bryant v. Maffucci, 923 F.2d 979, 982 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 849, 112 S.Ct. 152, 116 L.Ed.2d 117 (1991); see also Suburban Propane v. Proctor Gas, Inc., 953 F.2d 780, 788 (2d Cir.1992).
As Defendants have moved for summary judgment on substantially different grounds, the court will address each motion individually.
In support of her motion for summary judgment, Little argues that: (1) Plaintiff cannot support a First, Fifth, Ninth or Fourteenth Amendment claim under § 1983; (2) the doctrine of qualified immunity shields her from any liability; and (3) the Complaint fails to allege conduct egregious enough to sustain a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Some, though not all, of these arguments have merit.
Plaintiff claims that her First Amendment rights were violated when she was pressured to involve herself with the political activities of the PFC party, when she was harassed by Defendant due to her political affiliation, and when she was discouraged from filing grievances over her ill treatment at work by her supervisors, one of whom was Defendant Little. Defendant argues that none of these alleged actions resulted in deprivation of Plaintiff's First Amendment rights. While the court finds no First Amendment violation with respect to Plaintiff's attempts at filing grievances, there remain genuine issues of material fact regarding Plaintiff's First Amendment claims based upon political affiliation.
With regard to her attempts at filing grievances, Plaintiff alleges that on at least two occasions she inquired about voicing a grievance concerning her ill treatment at work, and on both occasions she was discouraged from filing a formal grievance. The first incident occurred on June 26, 1989, after she had complained to Kirkley-Bey regarding problems she had been having working with Caro, the other councilperson in PFC at the time (Defendant Little had not yet been elected councilperson). In response to her complaint, Kirkley-Bey convened a meeting at City Hall on June 26, 1989, with the Plaintiff, Caro, and several leaders of the PFC party in an attempt to mediate the problem. At that meeting, Kirkley-Bey urged Plaintiff not to file a formal grievance against Caro because of the potential political implications. No formal grievance was filed.
The second incident during which Plaintiff was discouraged from filing a grievance against her supervisor, this time the Defendant, occurred during the winter and spring of 1992. During this time Plaintiff approached colleagues and City officials with complaints regarding Defendant, only to be discouraged again from filing a grievance with the personnel department. Once again, Plaintiff failed to file a formal grievance.
While these incidents may be troubling, they do not support a First Amendment claim against Little because in neither case did Defendant personally discourage Plaintiff from exercising her First Amendment petition rights.1 The first incident occurred months before Little was a councilperson. The second incident, while during Little's tenure, does not support Plaintiff's First Amendment claim against Defendant because there is no allegation that Little herself suggested directly or indirectly that DeLeon should not file a grievance. The court therefore finds that Defendant did not violate Plaintiff's First Amendment rights with regard to Plaintiff's attempts at filing grievances, and grants summary judgment in favor of Defendant as to these claims.
Plaintiff further asserts that Little violated her First Amendment rights by pressuring her to involve herself with the political activities of the PFC party, of...
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