Deleonardis v. Page

• Citation: 998 A.2d 1072,2010 VT 52
• Decision Date: 04 June 2010
• Docket Number: 09-150.,No. 09-068,09-068
• Parties: Kara DeLEONARDISv.Sarah PAGE.
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court

998 A.2d 1072

2010 VT 52

Kara DeLEONARDISv.Sarah PAGE.

Nos. 09-068, 09-150.

Supreme Court of Vermont.

June 4, 2010.

Cynthia L. Broadfoot of Broadfoot & Associates, Burlington, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Catherine E. Clark of Clark, Werner & Flynn, P.C., Burlington, for Defendant-Appellant.

Present: REIBER, C.J., DOOLEY, JOHNSON, SKOGLUND and BURGESS, JJ.

DOOLEY, J.

¶ 1. These consolidated cases arise out of a civil union dissolution involving defendant Sarah Page and plaintiff Kara DeLeonardis. Defendant appeals the Chittenden Family Court's property division, maintenance award, parent-child contact order, and child custody award. She also appeals the family court's summary denial of the parties' post-judgment stipulation to amend the court's parent-child contact decision. We vacate the family court's property division and maintenance award and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We affirm the court's parent-child contact and child custody decisions.

¶ 2. Plaintiff and defendant entered into a civil union in 2001 and have two minor children. In 2004, the couple, together with defendant's mother, purchased a duplex in Burlington for $283,000. The couple and defendant's mother agreed that the mother would pay half of the purchase price ($141,500), receive a one-half interest in the property, and live in the ground-floor unit. The couple would pay the remaining half, share a one-half interest in the property, and live on the second floor. At the closing, defendant's mother paid $83,079.36, and plaintiff and defendant executed a promissory note to cover both their share of the purchase price and the remaining $58,420.64 still owed by defendant's mother. Within two years of the closing, defendant's mother paid the couple the balance of her portion of the purchase price. The couple did not apply this payment toward the outstanding mortgage amount, however. The present value of the house is $300,000, and the debt owed on the house is $195,000.

¶ 3. In addition to the house, the parties share limited assets and have a number of outstanding liabilities. Each owns a car of roughly the same value. Defendant owns most of the household furnishings, as well as a retirement account valued at $9850. The parties owe approximately $14,000 in credit card debt used to finance home renovations, as well as $45,000 to defendant's mother. Defendant also has $4500 in credit card debt that she incurred after the separation. Plaintiff holds a master's degree and earns approximately $54,000 a year. Defendant has an annual salary of roughly $38,000.

¶ 4. In 2008, the couple separated. Plaintiff moved out of their residence and rented a nearby apartment. She filed a complaint for civil dissolution in May 2008, and dissolution was granted in January 2009. In its opinion and order dissolving the civil union, the family court found that defendant has been extremely upset with plaintiff since the separation. It noted that defendant refuses to speak with plaintiff, even about their minor children, and has insisted that she and plaintiff communicate only over e-mail or via a journal. The court also found that defendant refuses to allow the children to bring their belongings to plaintiff's household, thus requiring them to have many duplicate possessions. The court concluded that defendant seems to feel that she is “in competition with the Plaintiff in winning over the children's affection.”

¶ 5. The family court further found that although both parents have a strong and loving relationship with their children and could provide for their children's needs, defendant's hostility towards plaintiff negatively affected the children, causing them unnecessary stress. It recited how defendant has intentionally avoided contact with plaintiff, going so far as to hide from her, and that when the two have interacted, defendant has been rude to plaintiff and prone to angry outbursts, and has sworn at her. In addition, the court noted, plaintiff gives in to defendant's demands so as to avoid arguing in front of the children. The court found that, generally, defendant's resentment toward plaintiff prevents her from communicating with plaintiff, even when doing so is in the children's best interest.

¶ 6. The family court concluded that, with respect to parenting, the parties played roughly an equal role in the children's lives. Plaintiff generally cared for the children in the morning while defendant cared for them in the evening. They shared the bedtime rituals as well as the responsibility for bringing the children to appointments. Defendant typically cooked for the family and bought the children's clothes. However, the court concluded that plaintiff was more sensitive to the needs and struggles of the children. The court also found that although plaintiff and defendant both cared for the children and were involved in the children's lives, their parenting styles differed. Plaintiff was more flexible, whereas defendant had a stricter style that was structured and more consistent. The court noted that plaintiff continually felt pressured into defendant's way of parenting.

¶ 7. The family court awarded plaintiff sole legal and physical parental rights over the children because the court found that plaintiff was more sensitive to the children's needs and more likely to encourage the children's contact with the other parent, and because defendant harbored so much resentment toward plaintiff. The court found that defendant perceives plaintiff “as an adversary, not as a loving, capable parent whose presence in the children's lives is necessary for their continued happiness and welfare.” Similarly, due to defendant's animosity, controlling behavior, and lack of communication with plaintiff, the court awarded plaintiff more parent-child contact than defendant.

¶ 8. With respect to the property division, the family court found that plaintiff and defendant had $52,500 equity in the house. The court appears to have reached that conclusion by subtracting the amount of the debt still owed on the house from its present fair market value and then dividing the result by two. The court awarded plaintiff's interest in the house, as well as the concomitant mortgage obligations, to defendant. The court also assigned to defendant the $45,000 debt owed to her mother and allocated to plaintiff the $14,000 home improvement credit card debt. Finally, the court awarded the parties the personal property in their possession, their respective vehicles and accounts, and the credit card debts in their names.

¶ 9. The court denied defendant's claim for spousal maintenance. The court reasoned that defendant was not entitled to maintenance, as she received a “favorable apportionment of the assets,” “provided no reason she cannot remain gainfully employed,” and could provide for herself at the standard of living the parties had shared.

¶ 10. Defendant appealed the order, arguing that the family court erred in finding that she and plaintiff had $52,500 equity in the house, in allocating only $14,000 of debt to plaintiff-the higher earning spouse-and nearly $240,000 of debt to defendant, and in denying her spousal maintenance. In addition, defendant asserts that the family court abused its discretion in not awarding her fifty percent parent-child contact and in awarding plaintiff sole parental rights, particularly given the court's finding that she has “a strong, loving relationship with the children and can provide for their physical needs, emotional needs, and developmental needs.”

¶ 11. After the appeal, in an attempt to settle the matter, the parties filed a stipulation to amend the order. Specifically, the parties stipulated to afford defendant fifty percent parent-child contact. The family court rejected the stipulation, however, writing only: “The court disagrees with expanded P.C. contact.” Defendant appealed from this decision, and the appeals have been consolidated.

¶ 12. We first address the family court's property distribution. As we have often said, “the distribution of property in not an exact science.” Victor v. Victor, 142 Vt. 126, 130, 453 A.2d 1115, 1117 (1982). Therefore, we afford the family court wide discretion in distributing the marital estate ¹ and will uphold the court's distribution unless its “discretion was abused, withheld, or exercised on untenable grounds.” Scott v. Scott, 155 Vt. 465, 472, 586 A.2d 1140, 1144 (1990). We will affirm the family court's valuation of assets if the court's discretion was exercised within the range of presented evidence. Kanaan v. Kanaan, 163 Vt. 402, 407, 659 A.2d 128, 132 (1995).

¶ 13. The criteria governing property division in a divorce are set forth in 15 V.S.A. § 751, and these criteria also apply to civil union dissolutions. Id. § 1204(d) (“The law of domestic relations, including ... property division and maintenance shall apply to parties to a civil union.”). First, the court must define the marital estate, which includes “[a]ll property owned by either or both of the parties, however and whenever acquired.” Id. § 751(a); accord Golden v. Cooper-Ellis, 2007 VT 15, ¶¶ 10, 36, 181 Vt. 359, 924 A.2d 19 (noting that court must first determine what assets make up the marital estate and then assign value to each asset). The court must then “equitably divide and assign the property” included in the marital estate. 15 V.S.A. § 751(a). The family court “may consider all relevant factors” in making the division, including “the value of all property interests, liabilities, and needs of each party.” Id. § 751(b).

¶ 14. We conclude that the family court erred in the first step of its analysis-defining the assets in the marital estate. As mentioned above, the family court correctly found that the house had a fair market value of approximately $300,000 and an outstanding mortgage of roughly $195,000. The parties do not dispute either of these findings. However, the family court further found that the couple had $52,500 in...