Delgado v. Rice

• Decision Date: 20 September 1999
• Docket Number: No. SA CV 96-372 AHS (MAN).,SA CV 96-372 AHS (MAN).
• Citation: 67 F.Supp.2d 1148
• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of California
• Parties: Steven DELGADO, Petitioner, v. Bert RICE, Warden, Respondent.

Page 1148

67 F.Supp.2d 1148

Steven DELGADO, Petitioner, v. Bert RICE, Warden, Respondent.

No. SA CV 96-372 AHS (MAN).

United States District Court, C.D. California, Southern Division.

September 20, 1999.

Frederick L. McBride, Orange, CA, for petitioner.

Keith Motley, Deputy Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, San Diego, CA, for respondent.

ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

STOTLER, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

On April 19, 1996, petitioner Steven Delgado filed a "Petition For Writ Of Habeas Corpus By A Person In State Custody" ("Petition") pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner's remaining claim is that he was denied his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights when the trial judge conducted an ex parte communication with the deliberating jury. After duly considering the record and available law, the Court concludes that petitioner has been denied due process of law and the right to the assistance of counsel. He is entitled to issuance of a conditional writ of habeas corpus which provides for a new trial if the State of California so elects or which grants petitioner his freedom if the State does not initiate proceedings for a new trial within 120 days from the date this Order is filed.

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND OF PETITION

Although only the first claim remains, Petitioner Steven Delgado originally asserted that his state conviction is unconstitutional on numerous grounds, contending that: (1) the trial judge's ex parte communication with the deliberating jury violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights; (2) the trial court excluded relevant evidence thereby denying him due process and the right to present a defense; (3) he was denied due process when the state court failed to grant him a new trial after the victim's mother confessed to the crime; and (4) due process requires a reviewing court to "include it's [sic] doubts" regarding the defendant's guilt when weighing prejudice. (Order filed July 29, 1996, citing Petition, 6-7, by Magistrate Judge Edwards).

As noted in Magistrate Judge Nagle's Report and Recommendation filed June 8, 1998 ("Report"), Respondent filed his Answer on May 13, 1996, and a Supplemental Answer on June 11, 1996. Petitioner filed his Traverse to the Answer and Supplemental Answer on July 10, 1996.

While the matter was still pending before Magistrate Judge Edwards, he issued the July 29, 1996 Order finding that the Petition contained two unexhausted claims, claims two and four, as set forth above. On August 29, 1996, petitioner notified the Court that he elected to dismiss his unexhausted claims and proceed with the two exhausted claims. On October 3, 1996, respondents filed their Second Supplemental Answer. Petitioner filed his Traverse to the Second Supplemental Answer on November 12, 1996.

After the matter was reassigned to Magistrate Judge Nagle, a Memorandum and Order was filed on November 7, 1997, which found that petitioner's third claim, as set forth above, was unexhausted. On November 26, 1997, petitioner elected to dismiss only the unexhausted claim. Petitioner therefore proceeds only on his first claim that the trial judge's ex parte communication with the deliberating jury violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. The June 8, 1998 Report recommended that the Petition be denied. On June 29, 1998, petitioner filed Objections to the Report.

The Court heard oral argument on April 16, 1999. On April 26, 1999, petitioner filed a Supplemental Memorandum of Points and Authorities. After consideration of the Report and the parties' submissions, oral argument, and the Court's independent research, this Court adopts most of the findings of the Report, but concludes that, on balance, the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus should be granted.

III. STATE COURT PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Following a jury trial in Orange County Superior Court, Case No. C-76591, petitioner was convicted on June 29, 1990, of the second degree murder of an eleven-month old infant and misdemeanor child abuse. (The trial court treated the misdemeanor child abuse conviction (Cal.Pen. Code § 273, subd. (a)(2)) as a felony per § 273, subd. (a)(1). The appellate court detected the error and determined that "no more than a misdemeanor may result on retrial in view of the verdict" of the jury. See Opinion, Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, filed April 30, 1992.) Delgado was found not guilty of assault. (Petition at 2; Clerk's Transcript, "CT", at 158-60.) On October 26, 1990, petitioner received a sentence of imprisonment for 15 years to life for the murder charge and a sentence of 4 years imprisonment on the child abuse conviction to run concurrently. (CT at 437, 439, 440).

Petitioner timely appealed his conviction, raising the issues that the trial judge erred in engaging in an ex parte communication with the jury during deliberations and erred in denying a defense motion for a new trial based on the post-trial confession of the infant's mother. Petitioner also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting conviction.

In an unpublished opinion filed April 30, 1992, the California Court of Appeal for the Fourth Appellate District reversed on two grounds. The court held that "the judge erred in holding an informal conversation with members of the jury and in denying the defense motion for new trial" relating to the post-verdict confession. However, the court found that there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions, and thus held that the case could be retried. See People v. Delgado, Unpublished Opinion, No. G010336, filed April 30, 1992 (Crosby, Acting P.J., Wallin, J., concurring; Moore, J., dissenting).

The California Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal. People v. Delgado, 5 Cal.4th 312, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 529, 851 P.2d 811 (1993) (Arabian, J.). The Supreme Court held that there was no basis for interfering with the trial court's denial of petitioner's motion for new trial based on the post-trial declaration. The Supreme Court noted that the trial court's ruling on a motion for a new trial "will not be disturbed unless a manifest and unmistakable abuse of discretion clearly appears." Id. at 328, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 529, 851 P.2d 811, citing People v. Williams, 45 Cal.3d 1268, 1318, 248 Cal.Rptr. 834, 756 P.2d 221 (1988). The Court concluded that in light of the facts, the trial judge was "well within his discretion in finding the proffered new testimony lacked credibility, and implicitly finding that it would not have changed the result on retrial." Id.

Relevant to the Petition, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal's decision that the ex parte communication between the judge and jury was prejudicial error. The Supreme Court held that although the communication was error, it was not prejudicial. First, the Court found that petitioner

fail[ed] to point to, and we fail to discern, any misstatement of law in the judge's answer. More importantly, [petitioner] did not object at trial to any misstatement or omission in the trial judge's answer, but rather cooperated in drafting a written answer to the subsequent written jury question.

Id. at 331. Second, the Court noted that the petitioner was notified promptly of both the ex parte communication and the subsequent written jury question. In response, the petitioner agreed with the court's proposed instructions, requested nothing additional, and then waited until the next day to move for a mistrial. Further, petitioner failed to assert what would have occurred differently had counsel been present during the communication. The Supreme Court concluded that

any error by the trial judge in engaging in the ex parte communication with the jurors was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in light of the trial court's correct instructions on the matter, its prompt notification of counsel of the conversation, defendant's agreement to the court's response to the written question, and defendant's failure to request further instructions.

Id. at 332.

On remand, the Fourth Appellate District considered several evidentiary issues not relevant here and denied relief. (Supplemental Answer, Ex. B, at 66-69). The California Supreme Court denied review. (Supplemental Answer, Ex. C, at 71).

IV. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. The Murder of Amanda Ruiz

The California Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court summarized the events of September 25 and 26, 1989, from which the following account is drawn, including the state's case against Delgado as to the charge of murder for the death of Amanda Ruiz, the eleven-month old daughter of his girlfriend, Elizabeth Ruiz.

At the time of the murder, Elizabeth Ruiz was separated from her husband, Manuel Ortiz, and was seeing defendant Steven Delgado. (Reporter's Transcript, "RT", 362). She lived in a one-bedroom apartment with her five-year old son Johnnie and eleven-month old daughter Amanda. (RT 361, 511). On September 26, 1989, just before 8:00 a.m., Elizabeth Ruiz contacted "911" to report that she had awakened to find her daughter Amanda dead.

According to the autopsy, Amanda was beaten to death. She had suffered massive abdominal bleeding, with lacerations of her liver and intestinal wall. She had two skull fractures, numerous facial bruises, and her brain was swollen and showed signs of hemorrhage. The abdominal injuries were consistent with blunt force trauma, the fractures with being thrown against a wall. She also suffered multiple external bruises on her forehead, left cheek area, and right ear, and internal bruises in the back of her head, her back, and her abdominal wall. Her death was attributed to both her massive abdominal bleeding and the swelling of her brain. (RT 896-905).

The pathologist who performed the autopsy testified the victim lived for approximately eight hours after the injuries were inflicted, although the time could have been anywhere from six to twenty-four hours. (RT 900-902). Rigor mortis had already set in...