Delia Moffitt v. Kelly

• Decision Date: 28 November 1910
• Docket Number: No. 37,37
• Citation: 31 S.Ct. 79,218 U.S. 400,54 L.Ed. 1086
• Parties: DELIA MOFFITT and Delia Moffitt, Executrix, and James K. Moffitt and Herbert C. Moffitt, Executors of the Will of James Moffitt, Deceased, Plffs. in Err., v. M. J. KELLY, Treasurer of the County of Alameda, State of California
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

218 U.S. 400

31 S.Ct. 79

54 L.Ed. 1086

DELIA MOFFITT and Delia Moffitt, Executrix, and James K. Moffitt and Herbert C. Moffitt, Executors of the Will of James Moffitt, Deceased, Plffs. in Err.,

v M. J. KELLY, Treasurer of the County of Alameda, State of California.

No. 37.

Argued November 4, 1910.

Decided November 28, 1910.

James Moffitt was married in California in the year 1863, and there resided with his wife until his death, on October 25, 1906. He left a large amount of property, all of which formed part of the community which existed between himself and his wife. By a will, duly admitted to probate, Moffitt disposed of all his estate to his wife and children in the same proportions as if he had died intestate.

The probate court held that 'the interest of the widow in the community property of herself and her deceased husband' was subject to be taxed under a law of California of 1905, which taxed all property passing by will or in case of intestacy from any person who may die seised or possessed of the same. A tax of $26,684.57 was thereupon assessed as against Mrs. Moffitt's one half interest in the estate, and an order was entered directing payment of the tax by the executors. An appeal was taken to the supreme court of California. The single question presented by the appeal, as stated in the opinion of the supreme court, was 'whether the surviving wife's share of the community property is subject to this inheritance tax.' The question was answered in the affirmative. In an opinion denying an application for a rehearing, the court also adversely disposed of the contention that the enforcement of the tax would violate the contract clause or the equal protection and due process clauses of the Constitution of the United States. 153 Cal. 359, 20 L.R.A. (N.S.) 207, 95 Pac. 653, 1025. The case was then brought to this court.

Mr. Warren Olney for plaintiffs in error.

Messrs. Robert A. Waring, U. S. Webb, and Snook & Church for defendant in error.

Statement by Mr. Justice White:

Mr. Justice White, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court:

While the plaintiffs in error rely on both the contract clause and the equal protection clause of the Constitution, the latter contention is in substance but an incident, and the former is the fundamental proposition counted on to procure a reversal. We come, however, separately to consider the two contentions.

1. The alleged violation of the contract clause.—Considered merely subjectively, the contention is that the rights vested in the wife as a partner in the community existing by virtue of the constitution and laws of the state of California governing at the time of the marriage were contractual rights of such a character that they could not be essentially changed or modified by subsequent legislation without impairing the obligations of the contract, and thereby violating the Constitution of the United States. But even although this theoretical proposition be fully conceded, for the sake of the argument, it is apparent that it is here a mere abstraction, and is therefore irrelevant to the case to be decided. We say this because there is no assertion of the giving effect to any law enacted subsequent to the contracting of the marriage which purports to essentially modify the rights of the wife in and to the community, as those rights existed at the time the marriage was celebrated. This is so because the state law the enforcement of which it is asserted will impair the obligation of the contract is merely a law imposing a tax. It is evident, therefore, when the contention is concretely considered, it involves but a single proposition; that is, that the state of California could not, without violating the Constitution of the United States, impose a tax on the share of the wife in the community property on the occasion of the cessation by the death of the husband of his dominion and control over the common property, and the consequent complete vesting in enjoyment of such share in the wife. But, in every conceivable aspect, this...