Della Lustgarten Nathan Trust, Matter of
| Decision Date | 18 August 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 23S01-9408-CV-791,23S01-9408-CV-791 |
| Citation | 638 N.E.2d 789 |
| Parties | In the Matter of the DELLA LUSTGARTEN NATHAN TRUST. |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
George L. Hanna, Hanna, Gerde & Burns, Lafayette, for trustee-appellants.
Robert O. Williams, Williams Law Office, Covington, for appellees.
This is an appeal from a trial court judgment terminating a trust which by its express terms terminated upon the settlor's death. Following the settlor's demise, the trial court denied trustees the authority to sell real estate and entered an order terminating the trust. The trustees sought to sell the real estate primarily to resolve unpaid administrative expenses and advancements. The Court of Appeals reversed, believing that the trustees' power to sell real estate was not destroyed by the death of the settlor. Matter of Nathan Trust (1993), Ind.App., 618 N.E.2d 1343.
In 1977, settlor Della Lustgarten Nathan entered into a trust agreement. The trust corpus consisted primarily of a 510-acre farm in Fountain County. Trust income was to be paid to the settlor during her lifetime. Terms of the trust also provided that, upon the settlor's death, the trust was to be terminated and the corpus of the trust and any accumulated income distributed equally to the five beneficiaries.
After the settlor's death on January 4, 1992, trustees, while engaged in the winding up of the trust, concluded that the accumulated trust income was insufficient to pay accumulated administrative costs, advancements, and other obligations. Trustees initiated steps to sell the farm property to meet these obligations and docketed the trust in the Fountain Circuit Court. Four of the five beneficiaries thereafter petitioned the court to terminate the trust, seeking immediate equal distribution of the accumulated income and farm property to all of the beneficiaries. The trial court granted this petition.
Trustees assert on appeal that their responsibility and authority do not terminate simultaneously with termination of the trust. They argue that in terminating the trust the trial court effectively stripped the trustees of the authority and responsibility for winding up the affairs of the trust. More specifically, they contend that the trial court's order prevents them from settling pending claims, contracts, bills, taxes, court costs, and other related matters in an orderly disposition of the trust property.
This Court will not disturb a trial court order unless it is apparent that there has been an abuse of discretion. Loeb v. Loeb (1969), 252 Ind. 96, 100, 245 N.E.2d 831, 833. An abuse of discretion will be found where "the trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or if the trial court has misinterpreted the law." McCullough v. Archbold Ladder Co. (1993), Ind., 605 N.E.2d 175, 180.
In reversing the trial court in the present case, the Court of Appeals relied in part upon McNew v. Vert (1908), 43 Ind.App. 83, 86 N.E. 969, which held that when power vested in cotrustees to sell real estate for the purpose of the trust is coupled with absolute title to the premises, such power is not destroyed by the death of the settlor. Matter of Nathan Trust, 618 N.E.2d at 1345. Since McNew, however, our legislature has enacted Indiana's Trust Code, Ind.Code 30-4-1-1, et seq., which is applicable to this action.
The Trust Code declares that "[t]he rules of law contained in this article shall be interpreted and applied to the terms of the trust so as to implement the intent of the settlor and the purposes of the trust." Ind.Code § 30-4-1-3.
Moreover, Ind.Code § 30-4-3-24 provides in relevant part:
(a) On petition by a trustee or beneficiary, the court may, in its discretion, terminate the trust:
(1) If the purpose of the trust has been fulfilled or has become illegal or impossible of fulfillment ...
(b) The court shall include in its order under subsection (a) of this section a provision making such a distribution of the trust estate as the court deems most nearly in conformance with the settlor's intent.
In the present case, the trust indenture plainly evinces the intent of the settlor and the purpose of the trust:
Said Co-Trustees are hereby authorized, empowered and directed to pay the income from said trust to the Settlor, Della Lustgarten Nathan,...
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Malachowski v. Bank One, Indianapolis, N.A.
...intended by the settlor. Matter of Nathan Trust, 618 N.E.2d 1343, 1346 (Ind.Ct.App.1993), reh'g denied, vacated on other grounds by 638 N.E.2d 789 (Ind.1994) (citing Robison v. Elston Bank & Trust Co., 113 Ind.App. 633, 658, 48 N.E.2d 181, 190 (1943)). As our supreme court pointed out in it......
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...or if the trial court has misinterpreted the law.'" Rhoades v. State, 675 N.E.2d 698, 702 (Ind.1996) (quoting In re Della Lustgarten Nathan Trust, 638 N.E.2d 789, 790 (Ind.1994)). Before beginning our analysis, we take note of the reasons behind the secret nature of grand jury proceedings. ......
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In re Armstrong, CASE NO. 12-30175 HCD
...Supreme Court of Indiana, reviewing a similar trust, has provided helpful guidance in resolving this issue. In In re Della Lustgarten Nathan Trust, 638 N.E.2d 789 (Ind. 1994), the trust document established that, upon the settlor's death, the trust was to be terminated and the corpus of the......
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Rhoades v. State
...effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or if the trial court has misinterpreted the law.' " In re Della Lustgarten Nathan Trust, 638 N.E.2d 789, 790 (Ind.1994) (quoting McCullough v. Archbold Ladder Co., 605 N.E.2d 175, 180 (Ind.1993)). The trial court here was presented wi......