Dellmuth v. Muth

• Decision Date: 15 June 1989
• Docket Number: No. 87-1855,87-1855
• Citation: 109 S.Ct. 2397,491 U.S. 22,105 L.Ed.2d 181
• Parties: Carl S. DELLMUTH, Acting Secretary of Education of Pennsylvania, Petitioner v. Russell A. MUTH, Jr., et al
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

491 U.S. 22

109 S.Ct. 2397

105 L.Ed.2d 181

Carl S. DELLMUTH, Acting Secretary of Education of Pennsylvania, Petitioner

v Russell A. MUTH, Jr., et al.

No. 87-1855.

Argued Feb. 28, 1989.

Decided June 15, 1989.

Syllabus

The Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA)—which enacts a comprehensive scheme to assure that handicapped children may achieve a free public education appropriate for their needs provides, inter alia, that parents may challenge the appropriateness of their child's "individualized education program" (IEP) in an administrative hearing with subsequent judicial review. Respondent Muth (hereinafter respondent) requested a hearing to contest the local school district's IEP for his son Alex, who is handicapped within the meaning of the EHA. Before the hearing was convened, respondent enrolled Alex in a private school. Alex's IEP then was revised and declared appropriate by the hearing examiner, and that decision was affirmed by Pennsylvania's secretary of education more than one year after the original hearing. While the administrative proceedings were under way, respondent brought suit in the Federal District Court against the school district and the secretary challenging the appropriateness of the IEP and the validity of the administrative proceedings and seeking, among other things, reimbursement for Alex's private-school tuition and attorney's fees. The court found that, while the revised IEP was appropriate, procedural flaws had delayed the administrative process and that, since the EHA had abrogated the Commonwealth's Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit, the school district and the Commonwealth were jointly and severally liable for reimbursement of Alex's tuition and attorney's fees. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Held: The EHA does not abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit, and, thus, the Amendment bars respondent's attempt to collect tuition reimbursement from Pennsylvania. Pp. 227-232.

(a) Congress may abrogate the States' immunity only by making its intention "unmistakably clear in the language of the statute." Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242, 105 S.Ct. 3142, 3147, 87 L.Ed.2d 171. Pp. 227-228.

(b) Respondent's nontextual arguments—that abrogation is necessary to meet the EHA's goals and that amendments to the Rehabilitation Act, though not retroactively applicable to respondent's suit, evince a previous intention to abrogate immunity from EHA suits—have no bearing on the abrogation analysis since congressional intent must be unmistakably

Page 224

clear in the statute's language. Although nontextual evidence might have some weight under a normal exercise in statutory construction, it is generally irrelevant to a judicial inquiry into whether Congress intended to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment. The argument that application of the Atascadero standard is unfair in this case because Congress could not have foreseen that application is premised on an unrealistic view of the legislative process. It is unlikely that the 94th Congress, taking careful stock of the state of Eleventh Amendment law, would drop coy hints but stop short of making its intention manifest. Pp. 228-230.

(c) The EHA provisions relied on by the Court of Appeals—the preamble's statement of purpose, the 1986 amendments dealing with attorney's fees, and the authorization for judicial review—do not address abrogation even in oblique terms. The statutory structure which, unlike the Atascadero statute, makes frequent references to States—lends force only to a permissible inference that States are logical defendants and is not an unequivocal declaration of congressional intent to abrogate. Pp. 231-232.

83 F.2d 113, (CA3 1988) reversed and remanded.

KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and WHITE, O'CONNOR, and SCALIA, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 233. BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ., joined, post, p. 233. BLACKMUN, J., post, p. 243, and STEVENS, J., filed dissenting opinions, post, p. 243.

Maria Parisi-Vickers, Philadelphia, Pa., for petitioner.

Martha A. Field for respondents.

Page 225

Justice KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question before us is whether the Education of the Handicapped Act abrogates the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in the federal courts.

I

The Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA), 84 Stat. 175, as amended, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. V.), enacts a comprehensive scheme to assure that handicapped children may receive a free public education appropriate to their needs. To achieve these ends, the Act mandates certain procedural requirements for participating state and local educational agencies. In particular, the Act guarantees to parents the right to participate in the development of an "individualized education program" (IEP) for their handicapped child, and to challenge the appropriateness of their child's IEP in an administrative hearing with subsequent judicial review. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1982 ed. and Supp. V); School Committee of Burlington v. Department of Education of Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 359, 361, 105 S.Ct. 1996, 1998, 85 L.Ed.2d 385 (1985).

Alex Muth, the son of respondent Russell Muth (hereinafter respondent), is a bright child, but one handicapped within the meaning of the EHA by a language learning disability and associated emotional problems. Alex was enrolled in public school in the Central Bucks School District of Pennsylvania from 1980 to 1983. In the summer of 1983, respondent requested a statutory administrative hearing to challenge the district's IEP for Alex. In September, shortly before the hearing convened, respondent enrolled Alex in a private school for learning disabled children for the coming school year.

The hearing examiner found that Alex's original IEP was inappropriate and made a number of recommendations. Both respondent and the school district then appealed the decision to the secretary of education, as provided under Pennsylvania law, see 22 Pa.Code § 13.32(24) (1988). The secretary remanded the case to the hearing examiner with in-

Page 226

structions to the school district to revise Alex's IEP (1988). After the district did so, the hearing examiner issued a decision declaring the revised IEP appropriate, and the secretary affirmed that decision on October 24, 1984, more than a year after the original due process hearing.

While the administrative proceedings were underway, respondent brought this suit in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against the school district and the state secretary of education, whose successor is petitioner here. As amended, respondent's complaint alleged that the district's IEP for Alex was inappropriate and that the Commonwealth's administrative proceedings had violated the procedural requirements of the EHA in two respects: the assignment of review to the secretary, an allegedly partial officer; and the delays occasioned by the secretary's remand to the hearing examiner. Respondent requested declaratory and injunctive relief, reimbursement for Alex's private-school tuition in 1983-1984, and attorney's fees.

The District Court found various procedural infirmities in Pennsylvania's administrative scheme and entered summary judgment on respondent's procedural claims. The court held a hearing to resolve the remaining issues in the case and to determine the proper remedy for the procedural violations. The court concluded that, while the district's proposed IEP for 1983-1984 had been appropriate within the meaning of the EHA, respondent was entitle to reimbursement for Alex's tuition that year because the procedural flaws had delayed the administrative process. The District Court further determined that the school district and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania were jointly and severally liable, agreeing with respondent that the EHA abrogated Pennsylvania's Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit. The court also awarded attorney's fees, assessed jointly and severally against the school district and the Commonwealth.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed. Muth v. Central Bucks School Dist., 839 F.2d

Page 227

113 (1988). Most pertinent for this case, the Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar the reimbursement award against the Commonwealth. The court concluded that "the text of EHA and its legislative history leave no doubt that Congress intended to abrogate the 11th amendment immunity of the states." Id., at 128.

To resolve a conflict among the Circuits, we granted certiorari, sub nom. Gilhool v. Muth, 488 U.S. 815, 109 S.Ct. 52, 102 L.Ed.2d 30 (1988), on the question whether the EHA abrogates the States' sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. Compare David D. v. Dartmouth School Committee, 775 F.2d 411 (CA1 1985) (finding abrogation), with Gary A. v. New Trier High School Dist. No. 203, 796 F.2d 940 (CA7 1986); Doe v. Maher, 793 F.2d 1470 (CA9 1986); and Miener v. Missouri, 673 F.2d 969 (CA8 1982) (finding no abrogation). We now reverse.

II

We have recognized that Congress, acting in the exercise of its enforcement authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,¹ may abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456, 96 S.Ct. 2666, 2671, 49 L.Ed.2d 614 (1976). We have stressed, however, that abrogation of sovereign immunity upsets "the fundamental constitutional balance between the Federal Government and the States," Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238, 105 S.Ct. 3142, 3145, 87 L.Ed.2d 171 (1985), placing a considerable strain on " '[t]he principles of federalism that inform Eleventh Amendment doctrine,' " Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100, 104 S.Ct. 900, 907-908, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984), quoting Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 691, 98...