Delon v. Eli Lilly & Co.

• Decision Date: 31 December 2013
• Docket Number: No. 1:12–cv–00556–JMS–MJD.,1:12–cv–00556–JMS–MJD.
• Citation: 990 F.Supp.2d 865
• Parties: Staci L. DeLON, Plaintiff, v. ELI LILLY & CO., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana

990 F.Supp.2d 865

Staci L. DeLON, Plaintiff,

v.ELI LILLY & CO., Defendant.

No. 1:12–cv–00556–JMS–MJD.

United States District Court,

S.D. Indiana,

Indianapolis Division.

Dec. 31, 2013.

Barry A. Macey, Quincy Erica Sauer, Macey Swanson and Allman, Indianapolis, IN, for Plaintiff.

Ellen E. Boshkoff, Ryann E. Ricchio, Faegre Baker Daniels LLP, John W. Purcell, Baker & Daniels, Indianapolis, IN, for Defendant.

ORDER

JANE MAGNUS–STINSON, District Judge.

Plaintiff Staci DeLon, a former employee of Defendant Eli Lilly and Company ( “Lilly” ), brings this suit against Lilly, asserting claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act ( “ADA” ) and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ( “ERISA” ). Presently pending before the Court is Lilly's Motion for Summary Judgment. [Dkt. 68.] For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS Lilly's Motion for Summary Judgment.

I.Standard of Review

A motion for summary judgment asks the Court to find that a trial is unnecessary because there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and, instead, the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. SeeFed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). As the current version of Rule 56 makes clear, whether a party asserts that a fact is undisputed or genuinely disputed, the party must support the asserted fact by citing to particular parts of the record, including depositions, documents, or affidavits. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A). A party can also support a fact by showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute or that the adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(B). Affidavits or declarations must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant is competent to testify on matters stated. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(4). Failure to properly support a fact in opposition to a movant's factual assertion can result in the movant's fact being considered undisputed, and potentially in the grant of summary judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e).

On summary judgment, a party must show the Court what evidence it has that would convince a trier of fact to accept its version of the events. Johnson v. Cambridge Indus., 325 F.3d 892, 901 (7th Cir.2003). The moving party is entitled to summary judgment if no reasonable fact-finder could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Nelson v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868, 875 (7th Cir.2009). The Court views the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draws all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Darst v. Interstate Brands Corp., 512 F.3d 903, 907 (7th Cir.2008). It cannot weigh evidence or make credibility determinations on summary judgment because those tasks are left to the fact-finder. O'Leary v. Accretive Health, Inc., 657 F.3d 625, 630 (7th Cir.2011). The Court need only consider the cited materials, Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(3), and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has “repeatedly assured the district courts that they are not required to scour every inch of the record for evidence that is potentially relevant to the summary judgment motion before them,” Johnson, 325 F.3d at 898. Any doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue for trial is resolved against the moving party. Ponsetti v. GE Pension Plan, 614 F.3d 684, 691 (7th Cir.2010).

II.Background

The following factual background is drawn from the admissible evidence presented by the parties. The facts presented are those that are undisputed or, if disputed, are set forth in the light most favorable to the non-movant, Ms. DeLon.

Ms. DeLon was hired by Lilly in 2001 as a pharmocakinetics operations associate. [Dkt. 76–1 at 1.] In 2004, she transferred to the position of scientific communications associate, and by 2006, was promoted to senior scientific communications associate. [ Id.] She remained in that position until June 2010, when Lilly terminated her employment. [ Id. at 10.]

In 2007, Ms. DeLon was diagnosed with Cushing's Syndrome. [ Id. at 2.] This and other medical issues led Ms. DeLon to suffer from, among other things, severe chronic nausea, major depressive disorder, and chronic fatigue. [ Id. at 3.] Ms. DeLon's medical problems made it difficult for her to continue her ninety-minute commute to Lilly's Indianapolis office. [ Id.] Beginning in 2006 or 2007, Ms. DeLon received approval to work from home, instead of from Lilly's Indianapolis office, all but three days every two weeks. [ Id. at 4.] She performed her work successfully under this arrangement through 2009. [ Id. at 4–5.] Between 2006 until her termination in 2010, Lilly approved several medical leaves of absence for Ms. DeLon, which ranged from a few days off per month to extended multi-month periods of full-time leave. [Dkt. 68–2 at 3.]

Lilly employee Charlene Jones was Ms. DeLon's immediate supervisor in 2009. [Dkt. 76–1 at 5.] Ms. Jones supported Ms. DeLon working from home and gave her positive performance reviews. [ Id. at 5, 13.] In September 2009, Ms. DeLon became aware that Lilly intended to eliminate its flex policy effective January 1, 2010, which affected Ms. DeLon's ability to work remotely as often as she did. [ Id. at 5.] In light of this change, Ms. Jones recommended that Ms. DeLon consider Lilly's telecommute policy and secure the necessary approval to continue working from home under that policy. [ Id. at 5–6.]

Ms. DeLon consulted her primary physician, Dr. Timothy Gatewood, that September. He recommended that, due to her various health issues, she work from home “at least four days per week for the next six months.” [ Id. at 6.] Although Ms. Jones was supportive of this arrangement, Ms. Jones' supervisor, Cathy Drook, “was resistant to the idea ... but ... did not provide a firm denial.” [ Id.] Ms. Jones informed Ms. DeLon that the ultimate decision would be made by Ms. Drook, with input from Lilly's Employee Health Services ( “EHS” ), thus Ms. DeLon should communicate the bases for her request to EHS. [ Id.] Ms. Jones did so, and her work performance during this period did not suffer, despite the additional stress the situation caused. [ Id. at 6–7.] But in November 2009, Ms. Drook denied Ms. DeLon's request to continue working from home. [ Id. at 7.]

Because Ms. DeLon was going to have to report five days a week to Lilly's Indianapolis office beginning January 1, 2010, she applied for leave under Lilly's Illness Pay Plan ( “IPP” ). [ Id.] The IPP provides, in relevant part, that “[i]f a regular employee ... is absent because of his or her own qualifying illness or injury, he or she may ... receive full or partial pay.” [Dkt. 68–4 at 8.] For employees such as Ms. DeLon who had worked at Lilly for over a year, the IPP provides them three months of full pay followed by three to twelve months of sixty-five percent pay, depending on their years of service. [ Id.] Lilly granted Ms. DeLon's request and she began receiving IPP benefit payments. Lilly extended Ms. DeLon's IPP leave on several occasions—ultimately through mid-May of that year—based on medical information she provided. [Dkts. 76–1 at 7–8; 76–6 at 8.] Ms. DeLon contacted Ms. Jones in mid-May to see if she could begin working from home several days each week. [Dkt. 76–1 at 8.] Although Ms. Jones continued to support the idea, Lilly would not permit Ms. DeLon to work from home. [ Id.]

Ms. DeLon continued to have her treating physicians update Lilly regarding her ability to return to work. On May 27, 2010, Dr. Gatewood sent a letter to Lilly explaining his view of Ms. DeLon's ongoing medical difficulties and concluded that she “will be unable to work through September of 2010.” [Dkt. 76–2 at 12.] Dr. Michelle Haendiges, another of Ms. DeLon's treating physicians, sent Lilly a letter on June 14, 2010, stating, “Due to the ongoing issues, treatment and adjustments to her medication [Ms. DeLon] will be unable to work through August 16, 2010.” [ Id. at 15.] Despite the views of Ms. DeLon's physicians, Lilly determined that Ms. DeLon could return to work by June 17, 2010 because she no longer qualified for the IPP. [Dkt. 76–1 at 9.] That day she met with one of Lilly's in-house physicians, who reviewed the list of medications Ms. DeLon was prescribed and confirmed that she could return to work. [Dkts. 68–1 at 14; 76–1 at 9.]

Lilly informed Ms. DeLon that if she did not report to work by noon on June 22, 2010, Lilly would consider her to have voluntarily resigned. [Dkts. 68–1 at 10; 76–1 at 10.] Ms. DeLon responded that, due to her medical conditions, she was “unable to return to work at this time,” but declined to resign her position. [Dkt. 76–3 at 18.] After Ms. DeLon did not report to work as ordered, Lilly terminated her employment effective June 22, 2010. [Dkt. 76–1 at 10.]

Ms. DeLon neither applied for nor received any benefits pursuant to Lilly's Extended Disability Plan ( “EDP” ). The EDP deems eligible any employee “whose active employment terminates because of Disability.” [Dkt. 68–6 at 28.] The EDP explains, “An Employee who intends to file a claim for [EDP benefits] must notify the Employee Benefits Committee ... in writing within 30 days from the date on which the Disability commences.” [ Id. at 39.] Should an employee qualify for EDP payments, the payment “shall commence as of the first day of the month immediately following the month in which such Employee's Disability Date occurs. [ Id. at 31.] And an employee's “Disability Date” is the later occurring of (1) “the last day for which an Employee who is Disabled received pay under [the IPP],” or (2) “the date as of which the Employee Benefits Committee makes a final determination that the Employee is Disabled.” [ Id. at 19.] Thus, an employee cannot begin receiving EDP payments until after they have received full benefits under the IPP. [ Id.]

On March 31, 2011, Ms. DeLon filed a charge of discrimination against Lilly with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ( “EEOC” ), alleging that...