DeLong Equipment Co. v. Washington Mills Electro Minerals Corp.
| Decision Date | 29 July 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 92-8049,92-8049 |
| Citation | 997 F.2d 1340 |
| Parties | 1993-2 Trade Cases P 70,335, 26 Fed.R.Serv.3d 383 DeLONG EQUIPMENT COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, Cross-Appellee, v. WASHINGTON MILLS ELECTRO MINERALS CORP., f/k/a Washington Mills Abrasive Co., Washington Mills Ceramic Corp., John T. Williams and Peter Williams, Defendants- Appellees, Cross-Appellants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
William E. Sumner, Sumner & Hewes, David A. Webster, Atlanta, GA, for appellant.
Paul Webb, Jr., Philip S. Coe, Webb & Daniel, Atlanta, GA, for appellees.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.
Before KRAVITCH, Circuit Judge, GODBOLD and OAKES *, Senior Circuit Judges.
On May 17, 1993, we issued an opinion in this case reversing the district court's grant of a new trial on Sherman Act antitrust and common law fraud claims, 990 F.2d 1186. That decision will result in the reinstatement of jury verdicts in favor of the plaintiff, DeLong Equipment Co. ("DeLong"), for $6,099,885 (after trebling) on the Sherman Act claim and for $117,824 on the common law claims.
Our original opinion contained no instructions to the district court concerning the award of postjudgment interest. Consequently, DeLong has moved that we amend the mandate to indicate that interest should be awarded from the date of the original judgment. We agree with DeLong that interest should accrue from September 20, 1990, the date of the original judgment, and amend our mandate accordingly.
Our ruling is guided by 28 U.S.C. § 1961 (1988), which states that postjudgment interest is mandatory, and by Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, which states in relevant part that
[i]f a judgment is modified or reversed with a direction that a judgment for money be entered in the district court, the mandate shall contain instructions with respect to allowance of interest.
Awarding interest from the date of the district court judgment is the usual rule when that judgment is affirmed. Fed.R.App.P. 37. However, the default rule when an appellate court reinstates a vacated judgment is that interest accrues from the date of the judgment on remand. Briggs v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 334 U.S. 304, 68 S.Ct. 1039, 92 L.Ed. 1403 (1948). The Briggs Court reasoned that the district court had no power to award money not mentioned in the mandate, and so if instructed to reinstate a verdict it could award only the amount named in that verdict. Rule 37 codifies Briggs; the advisory committee stated that the rule "is a reminder to the court, the clerk and counsel of the Briggs rule". See also 16 Wright & Miller, Fed. Pract. & Proc. § 3983 at 462-63 (1977).
While the default rule of Briggs and Rule 37 defines the limits of district court authority, it does not aid an appellate court in determining how to instruct a district court on the award of postjudgment interest.
Much of the case law indicates that an appeals court has discretion to select an appropriate date from which interest should run. See, e.g., Affiliated Capital Corp. v. City of Houston, 793 F.2d 706, 709-10 (5th Cir.1986) (en banc) (awarding interest only from date of judgment on remand in antitrust case because case was weak, plaintiff's right to money not established until appeal final, and trebling eliminates concern that plaintiff is not fully compensated for loss if does not receive interest for the time between verdict and judgment)
In cases such as this one, which reinstate a jury verdict for the plaintiff, we think that equity ordinarily, and perhaps always, commands that interest be awarded from the date of the original judgment. There are several reasons for this. First, and most important, it is necessary to protect the integrity of the jury verdict. The jury in this case awarded DeLong approximately $6 million as of September, 1990, not $6 million as of May, July or August, 1993. The value of six million September, 1990 dollars is not $6 million today, but what $6 million would have grown to in the interim. Since we have not held that the jury awarded DeLong more than it should have, we should not undermine the jury verdict by refusing to grant the interest necessary to maintain its value. We think DeLong might have a serious Seventh Amendment claim if we were to rule otherwise.
Secondly, we note that Washington Mills has been able to put the $6 million to use, presumably earning some sort of interest, for nearly three years since a jury found that it had violated the antitrust laws. It would receive a windfall if it were not to pay DeLong for use of the funds for this time--apparently a benefit worth roughly $1.5 million. That the district court erroneously set aside the earlier judgment should not result in a transfer of wealth from Washington Mills to its victim, DeLong. In short, the flip side of the potential windfall to Washington Mills would be a penalty to DeLong: as the First Circuit stated in a similar case, "[c]alculating interest from the date of the second judgment would penalize [the plaintiff] for the trial judge's error." Cordero v. De Jesus-Mendez, 922 F.2d 11, 18 (1st Cir.1990).
Our reasoning is entirely consistent with Briggs and Rule 37. The only basis for the Briggs default rule was to establish the limits of district court authority: when faced with a mandate to award $x, a district court may not award $x plus interest from an earlier date. We eliminate this concern by instructing the district court to do exactly what logic, equity and perhaps the Seventh Amendment require: to award $x plus interest from the date of the earlier judgment. This reasoning is also consistent with prior precedent of the Fifth Circuit, still binding on this court. Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 509 F.2d 784 (5th Cir.1975) (), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 833, 96 S.Ct. 59, 46 L.Ed.2d 52 (1975). 1
Washington Mills, citing the Affiliated Capital case, argues that equity instead supports an award of interest from the date of the judgment on remand. The company notes that (1) in a treble damages case, a plaintiff still is more than compensated for its losses; and (2) that, because the case was difficult and DeLong's...
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