Delorme v. North Dakota Dept. of Human Services, 920062
Decision Date | 24 November 1992 |
Docket Number | No. 920062,920062 |
Citation | 492 N.W.2d 585 |
Parties | Mary Jane DELORME, Appellee, v. NORTH DAKOTA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Appellant, Rolette County Social Service Board, Respondent. Civ. |
Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
Duane Houdek (argued), Legal Assistance of North Dakota, Bismarck, for appellee.
William L. Strate (argued), Asst. Atty. Gen., Bismarck, for appellant.
Steven S. Zaleznick, Patricia DeMichele and Bruce Vignery, Washington, D.C., for amicus curiae American Ass'n of Retired Persons. Submitted on brief.
The North Dakota Department of Human Services ["the Department"] appeals from a district court judgment reversing the Department's order terminating child care reimbursement benefits to Mary Jane Delorme. We reverse the judgment of the district court.
Pursuant to a tribal court order, Mary Jane Delorme has had custody of her 3 year old grandson, Simon, since shortly after his birth. Prior to February 1991 Delorme received Aid to Families with Dependent Children [AFDC] benefits of $108 per month and child care reimbursement of $175 per month on behalf of Simon. Because Delorme works full-time and her income exceeds AFDC eligibility guidelines, her needs are not included in the family's AFDC grant. On February 11, 1991, Delorme was advised that, due to a change in federal regulations, she was no longer eligible for child care reimbursement.
Delorme requested and received a hearing on termination of child care reimbursement. The Department determined that, because Delorme was not an "AFDC eligible family member," she was not eligible for child care benefits. Delorme appealed to the district court, which reversed the Department's order terminating child care benefits. 1 The Department has appealed.
When a decision of an administrative agency is appealed to the district court and thereafter to this court, we review the decision of the agency and not that of the district court. Mullins v. North Dakota Department of Human Services, 483 N.W.2d 160, 166 (N.D.1992); Hakanson v. North Dakota Department of Human Services, 479 N.W.2d 809, 811 (N.D.1992). Our review is governed by Section 28-32-19, N.D.C.C., and the relevant issue in this case is whether the Department's order is in accordance with the law.
We recently summarized the AFDC program in S.N.S. v. North Dakota Department of Human Services, 474 N.W.2d 717, 719 (N.D.1991):
This appeal turns upon the interpretation of federal law. The relevant federal provision on child care benefits is 42 U.S.C. Sec. 602(g)(1)(A)(i):
The federal regulation implementing the statute is 45 C.F.R. Sec. 255.2(a):
Delorme concedes that, because her income exceeds eligibility guidelines and she is not included on the AFDC grant, she is not an "AFDC eligible family member" under the regulation. She asserts, however, that the regulation conflicts with the clear and unambiguous language of the federal statute and consequently is invalid. 2
In general, courts are to give great weight to an agency's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer. Clarke v. Securities Industry Association, 479 U.S. 388, 403, 107 S.Ct. 750, 759, 93 L.Ed.2d 757, 771 (1987); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2782, 81 L.Ed.2d 694, 704 (1984). This principle of deference to administrative interpretations "has been consistently followed ... whenever decision as to the meaning or reach of a statute has involved reconciling conflicting policies, and a full understanding of the force of the statutory policy in the given situation has depended upon more than ordinary knowledge respecting the matters subjected to agency regulations." Chevron, supra, 467 U.S. at 844, 104 S.Ct. at 2782-2783, 81 L.Ed.2d at 704, quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382, 81 S.Ct. 1554, 1560, 6 L.Ed.2d 908, 914 (1961).
In Sullivan v. Everhart, 494 U.S. 83, 88-89, 110 S.Ct. 960, 964, 108 L.Ed.2d 72, 80 (1990), the Supreme Court summarized the scope of judicial review in such cases:
Delorme asserts that we need give no deference to the federal agency's interpretation because the statute is clear and unambiguous on its face. She argues that we should adopt the plain meaning of "family," quoting a dictionary definition describing "family" as a group of individuals living under one roof. She concludes that, under this definition of "family," she is an "individual in the family" and accordingly is entitled to benefits under the statute.
The Supreme Court has cautioned that "there is no errorless test for identifying or recognizing 'plain' or 'unambiguous' language." United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580, 101 S.Ct. 2524, 2527, 69 L.Ed.2d 246, 252-253 (1981). We are reminded, however, that in ascertaining the "plain meaning" of particular statutory language, the court is to look to "the language and design of the statute as a whole." Sullivan v. Everhart, supra, 494 U.S. at 89, 110 S.Ct. at 964, 108 L.Ed.2d at 80.
In reviewing the statute as a whole, we note that 42 U.S.C. Sec. 602 is a lengthy, complex piece of legislation which uses the term "family" numerous times. In many instances, it is clear that Congress has intended a limited scope of the word. For example, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 602(a)(18) provides that "no family shall be eligible for [AFDC] aid under the plan for any month if, for that month, the total income of the family ... exceeds 185 percent of the State's standard of need for a family of the same composition...." Similarly, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 602(a)(7)(B) provides that "the State agency ... shall determine ineligible for [AFDC] aid any family the combined value of whose resources ... exceeds $1000...." If the literal, dictionary definition of family applied to these provisions of the statute, Delorme's grandson would be ineligible for AFDC benefits altogether because the family's resources, including Delorme's income, would exceed the eligibility guidelines. In these sections of the statute, Congress apparently intended to encompass within the "family" only those individuals whose income, assets, and needs were considered in calculating the grant.
A statute is ambiguous if it is susceptible to differing but rational meanings. E.g., Rott v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Co., 478 N.W.2d 570, 573 (N.D.1991). We conclude that the statute, particularly the phrase "individual in the family," is susceptible to differing rational meanings.
Because the statute is not clear and unambiguous on its face, the federal agency's interpretation must be given controlling weight unless it is arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 528, 110 S.Ct. 885, 890, 107 L.Ed.2d 967, 978 (1990); Chevron, supra, 467 U.S. at 844, 104 S.Ct. at 2782, 81 L.Ed.2d at 703. The court "may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency." Chevron, supra, 467 U.S. at 844, 104 S.Ct. at 2782, 81 L.Ed.2d at 703. We are not persuaded that the agency's interpretation is arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. Accordingly, the federal regulation is valid and controlling.
We conclude that the Department's order is in accordance with the applicable law. We reverse the judgment of the district...
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