Delozier v. S2 Energy Operating, LLC
| Citation | 498 F.Supp.3d 884 |
| Decision Date | 30 October 2020 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 18-14094 |
| Parties | Correy DELOZIER, et al., Plaintiffs v. S2 ENERGY OPERATING, LLC, et al., Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana |
Mark G. Tauzier, Michael Kevin Melucci, Yeager LaNasa Tauzier LLC, Metairie, LA, Patrick Hillary Hufft, Hufft & Hufft, APLC, New Orleans, LA, for Plaintiffs Correy Delozier, Valerie Delozier.
Derek Mikel Mercer, Taylor C. Lombardo, Mercer Law Firm, LLC, New Orleans, LA, for Plaintiff Manufacturers Alliance Insurance Company.
Jefferson Randolph Tillery, Catherine Barrett Rice, Jennifer A. David, Jones Walker, New Orleans, LA, for Plaintiff Pioneer Production Services, Inc.
Jennifer E. Michel, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, Lafayette, LA, Joseph Patrick Tynan, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, New Orleans, LA, for Defendant S2 Energy Operating, LLC.
Charles Rowand Talley, Amanda Howard Lowe, Daniel B. Stanton, Kean Miller LLP, New Orleans, LA, for Defendants Wood Group PSN, Inc., Stephen Dauzat.
Jefferson Randolph Tillery, Catherine Barrett Rice, Jennifer A. David, Jones Walker, New Orleans, LA, for Defendant Pioneer Production Services, Inc.
SECTION: "E" (2)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is Defendant Wood Group PSN, Inc.’s ("Wood Group") motion for summary judgment on the two negligence claims filed against it by Plaintiffs.1
Plaintiff Correy Delozier alleges he was working as an offshore operator, doing work on S2 Energy Operating, LLC's ("S2") fixed platforms and wells in the Timbalier Bay Field, when he sustained significant injuries by being "crushed" as he transferred from a crew boat to a fixed drilling platform.2 Delozier and his wife, Valerie Delozier, filed suit against S2, Pioneer Production Services, Inc. ("Pioneer"), Wood Group, and Stephen Dauzat seeking damages for his injuries and her loss of consortium.
Summary judgment is appropriate only "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."3 "An issue is material if its resolution could affect the outcome of the action."4 When assessing whether a material factual dispute exists, the Court considers "all of the evidence in the record but refrain[s] from making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence."5 All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the nonmoving party.6 There is no genuine issue of material fact if, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, no reasonable trier of fact could find for the nonmoving party, thus entitling the moving party to judgment as a matter of law.7
If the dispositive issue is one on which the moving party will bear the burden of persuasion at trial, the moving party "must come forward with evidence which would ‘entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial.’ "8 If the moving party fails to carry this burden, the motion must be denied. If the moving party successfully carries this burden, the burden of production then shifts to the nonmoving party to direct the Court's attention to something in the pleadings or other evidence in the record setting forth specific facts sufficient to establish that a genuine issue of material fact does indeed exist.9
If the dispositive issue is one on which the nonmoving party will bear the burden of persuasion at trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden of production by either (1) submitting affirmative evidence that negates an essential element of the nonmovant's claim, or (2) demonstrating there is no evidence in the record to establish an essential element of the nonmovant's claim.10 When proceeding under the first option, if the nonmoving party cannot muster sufficient evidence to dispute the movant's contention that there are no disputed facts, a trial would be useless, and the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.11 When, however, the movant is proceeding under the second option and is seeking summary judgment on the ground that the nonmovant has no evidence to establish an essential element of the claim, the nonmoving party may defeat a motion for summary judgment by "calling the Court's attention to supporting evidence already in the record that was overlooked or ignored by the moving party."12 Under either scenario, the burden then shifts back to the movant to demonstrate the inadequacy of the evidence relied upon by the nonmovant.13 If the movant meets this burden, "the burden of production shifts [back again] to the nonmoving party, who must either (1) rehabilitate the evidence attacked in the moving party's papers, (2) produce additional evidence showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial as provided in Rule 56(e), or (3) submit an affidavit explaining why further discovery is necessary as provided in Rule 56(f)."14 "Summary judgment should be granted if the nonmoving party fails to respond in one or more of these ways, or if, after the nonmoving party responds, the court determines that the moving party has met its ultimate burden of persuading the court that there is no genuine issue of material fact for trial."15
16
Plaintiff Correy Delozier's Third Amended Complaint asserts causes of action against Wood Group based on (1) respondeat superior liability for negligence on the part of its employee Stephen Dauzat,17 and (2) failure to "properly train employees and/or hiring and/or retaining careless and/or unskilled employees."18 Wood Group seeks summary judgment in its favor on both negligence claims.19
The Plaintiffs allege Wood Group is liable for Dauzat's failure to properly operate, maintain and/or control the M/V Miss Michelle and his failure to properly navigate the vessel.20 The parties dispute which law applies to this negligence claim. Plaintiffs argue general maritime law and Louisiana state law jointly apply.21 Wood Group argues this claim is governed by general maritime law.22 S2 Energy argues Louisiana state law applies.23
The analysis for determining whether general maritime law applies to the Plaintiffs’ tort claim based on respondeat superior liability for Dauzat's alleged negligence is identical to the analysis for determining whether federal admiralty jurisdiction exists over the claim.24 The Plaintiffs allege in their Third Amended Complaint the Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332,25 but also assert the action is brought "pursuant to the laws of the State of Louisiana, the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. Sections 30104 - 30106, and the General Maritime Laws of the United States."26 Generally, injured plaintiffs like the Deloziers may assert either diversity jurisdiction or admiralty jurisdiction for their maritime tort claims.27 Regardless of the jurisdiction invoked in the Plaintiffs’ pleadings, substantive federal maritime law will govern if the claim is within constitutional and statutory grants of admiralty jurisdiction.28 If admiralty jurisdiction is established, "then all of the substantive rules and precepts peculiar to the law of the sea become applicable."29
In Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. , the Supreme Court set forth the test for establishing admiral jurisdiction over tort claims and, thus, the test for determining whether general maritime law applies to a cause of action in tort.30 The Supreme Court adopted a two-pronged analysis focusing first on location and then on connection with maritime activity:
[A] party seeking to invoke federal admiralty jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) over a tort claim must satisfy conditions both of location and of connection with maritime activity. A court applying the location test must determine whether the tort occurred on navigable water or whether injury suffered on land was caused by a vessel on navigable water. The connection test raises two issues. A court, first, must assess the general features of the type of incident involved, to determine whether the incident has a potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce. Second, a court must determine whether the general character of the activity giving rise to the incident shows a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity.31
The location prong is satisfied by either (1) a tort occurring wholly on navigable water32 or (2) an injury suffered on land that was caused by a vessel on navigable water.33 The Fifth Circuit in Egorov, Puchinsky, Afanasiev, & Juring v. Terriberry, Carroll &Yancey , held that to determine whether a tort occurred on navigable water the court must look to where the harm "took effect" rather than the "locus of the allegedly tortious conduct."34 In this case, the parties agree Delozier was injured after he stepped off the crew boat and was scrambling onto the SF4 fixed platform.35 Delozier testified he was hanging onto a piling supporting the fixed platform when the crew boat hit his right ankle and leg, pinning him between the crew boat and the piling.36 Although the alleged tortious conduct—Dauzat's negligent driving of the crew boat and his alleged instruction to Delozier "to climb upon the well,"37 occurred on navigable water—the harm took effect on the fixed platform where Delozier was located when his ankle and leg were crushed by the...
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