Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Woods, 51213

Decision Date29 January 1976
Docket NumberNo. 51213,Nos. 1,3,2,51213,s. 1
Citation137 Ga.App. 693,224 S.E.2d 763
PartiesDELTA AIRLINES, INC., et al. v. L. P. WOODS
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

Rehearing Denied Frb. 18, 1976. Powell, Goldstein, Frazer & Murphy, Edward, E. Dorsey, Daryll Love, Robert Travis, Atlanta, for appellants.

William R. Parker, Tucker, for appellee.

PANNELL, Presiding Judge.

This is an appeal from the grant of a partial summary judgment in favor of complainant-appellee suing upon a Family Care Disability & Service plan of Delta Air Lines, Inc., claiming total disability since January 31, 1973, when payments under the plan were terminated. The motion was made and based upon the contention that the finding of the Georgia State Workmen's Compensation Board that the plaintiff was 'totally disabled,' unappealed from, operated as res judicata or estoppel by judgment as to such fact and was binding on the defendant as to 'total disability' under its contract with the complainant. The board's finding on February 20, 1974, was as follows: 'Form 16 Agreement approved September 13, 1971, shows that claimant injured his back while lifting a box at work on September 1, 1970, and returned to work for periods thereafter until May 31, 1971, when compensation recommenced, that by Supplemental Agreement, approved April 24, 1972, parties stipulated claimant was able to return to work on January 3, 1972, at no loss in wages, and liability for temporary total disability ceased on that date.

'From all the evidence, the Full Board finds as a matter of fact that claimant has not worked since May 31, 1971; that his economic disability ceased on January 3, 1972, by reason of satisfactory arrangements being made with financial benefits provided by employer, satisfactory to claimant by which he received $116.00 per week not working; that by November of 1972, he was seeking to return to light work with employer and had medical clearance from Dr. Tutsch to do limited work, but none was available; that on or about January 10, 1973, his back condition worsened and he was no longer, in the opinion of Dr. Tutsch, eligible for even limited work, and the Board finds that as of that date his economic disability changed to total disability, employer having terminated financial benefits also about that date.

'The Board notes the contention of employer that claimant's back strain caused only a few weeks temporary disability and that any disability from his back thereafter is the result of a congenital akylose spondylitis, but notes that in claimant's sworn testimony that he had never experienced back trouble prior to his compensable injury and notes that Dr. Tutsch concedes that traumatic aggravation may contribute to it although he indicates he feels that it was a coincidence.

'From consideration of all of the evidence, the Board finds that his physical disability of his back was contributed to by his compensable injury and that he has been totally disabled thereby since January 10, 1973, and is entitled to compensation at the rate of $50 per week since that date.'

The hearing was had on December 20, 1973, and the award of the full Board was on February 11, 1974.

1. Appellee contends that the factual finding by the Workmen's Compensation Board constitutes an estoppel by judgment under the ruling of this court in Hayes v. Layton, 125 Ga.App. 433, 188 S.E.2d 149.

"A judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction shall be conclusive between the same parties and their privies as to all matters put in issue, or which under the rules of law might have been put in issue in the cause wherein the judgment was rendered, until such judgment shall be reversed or set aside.' Code, § 110-501.

'(a) The rule just quoted states the doctrine of res judicata, and relates only to cases involving the same cause of action. A somewhat different rule applies in regard to the doctrine of estoppel by judgment since the latter doctrine has reference to previous litigation between the same parties based upon a different cause of action. Worth v. Carmichael, 114 Ga. 699, 40 S.E. 797; Draper v. Medlock, 122 Ga. 234, 50 S.E. 113, 69 L.R.A. 483, 2 Ann.Cas. 650. In the latter case, there is an estoppel by the judgment only as to such matters as were necessarily, or as are shown to have been actually adjudicated in the former litigation. Scarborough v. Edgar, 176 Ga. 574, 581, 168 S.E. 592; Sumner v. Sumner, 186 Ga. 390(2), 197 S.E. 833.' Spence v. Erwin, 200 Ga. 672(1), 38 S.E.2d 394.

Estoppel by judgment occurs only when the issue determined in the prior proceeding is the same as that in the subsequent proceeding. Smith v. Wood, 115 Ga.App. 265, 266-267, 154 S.E.2d 646; Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Webb, 112 Ga.App. 344, 348, 145 S.E.2d 63, 67; King Sales Co. v. McKey, 105 Ga.App. 787, 125 S.E.2d 684.

The determination of total disability as found by the Board under the workmen's compensation laws is a finding of total economic disability, which is the same as defined in the contract sued upon.

2. The cause of action not being the same, the question then remaining is whether the finding of fact in a workmen's compensation case is binding on the parties and their privies in a common law action on a contract in a court of law under the doctrine of estoppel by judgment.

The Board 'is not a court authorized to render judgments on contracts . . . since it merely determines the amount of compensation and the time of payment in accordance with the Act. City of Hapeville v. Preston, 67 Ga.App. 350(2), 20 S.E.2d 202; Maryland Cas. Co. v. Stephens, 76 Ga.App. 723, 47 S.E.2d 108; Tillman v. Moody, 181 Ga. 530, 531, 182 S.E. 906; Lloyd Adams, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 190 Ga. 633, 10 S.E.2d 46.' Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Crowder, 123 Ga.App. 469, 471, 181 S.E.2d 530, 532.

The doctrine of res judicata or estoppel by judgment is usually applied to a court proceeding, or quasi judicial proceeding, and not to administrative bodies (50 C.J.S. Judgments § 603, p. 27) except in the administrative proceeding itself, or in appeals therefrom, or in securing judgments in the superior courts upon an award of the workmen's compensation board. South v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America, 39 Ga.App. 47, 146 S.E. 45; City of Hapeville v. Preston, 67 Ga.App. 350, 357, 20 S.E.2d 202, supra; Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Camp, 69 Ga.App. 758, 26 S.E.2d 679; Maryland Casualty Co. v. England, 160 Ga. 810, 812, 129 S.E. 75; Home Accident Ins. Co. v. McNair, 173 Ga. 566, 161 S.E. 131.

It has been held generally that the finding of a fact by a court not having jurisdiction of the subject matter litigated in a subsequent action between the parties is not conclusive in the subsequent action. See Sanderson v. Niemann, 17 Cal.2d 563, 110 P.2d 1025, 1030-31 (1941); Hickman v. Hickman, 10 Terry 568, 49 Del. 568, 121 A.2d 689 (1956); Weller, 14 Ariz.App. 42, 480 P.2d 379, 483, 484 (1971); Loomis v. Loomis, 288 N.Y. 222, 42 N.E.2d 495 (1942); Brownell v. Union & New Haven Trust Co., 143 Conn. 662, 124 A.2d 901 (1956); Gollner v. Cram, 258 Minn. 8, 102 N.W.2d 521. However, pretermitting any decision as to whether the fact finding of the workmen's compensation board is administrative or judicial, or whether the rules stated in the above out-of-state cases do or do not apply here, we prefer to place our decision upon another ground, and in so doing we must necessarily overrule the decision of this court in Hayes v. Layton, 125 Ga.App. 433, 188 S.E.2d 149, supra.

The basis of our determination is on constitutional grounds.

3. 'The right of trial by jury, except where it is otherwise provided in this Constitution, shall remain inviolate, but the General Assembly may prescribe any...

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