Delta Lines, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters

• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: SIMS, Acting P.J., and ELKINGTON
• Citation: Delta Lines, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 136 Cal.Rptr. 345, 66 Cal.App.3d 960 (Cal. App. 1977)
• Decision Date: 09 February 1977
• Parties: , 95 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2498, 82 Lab.Cas. P 55,074 DELTA LINES, INC., a California Corporation, Plaintiff, Cross-defendant and Appellant, v. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, LOCAL 468, an unincorporated association, Defendant, Cross-complainant and Respondent. Civ. 39763.

Page 345

136 Cal.Rptr. 345

66 Cal.App.3d 960, 95 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2498,

82 Lab.Cas. P 55,074

DELTA LINES, INC., a California Corporation, Plaintiff, Cross-defendant and Appellant, v. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, LOCAL 468, an unincorporated association, Defendant, Cross-complainant and Respondent.

Civ. 39763.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 1, California.

Feb. 9, 1977.

Littler, Mendelson, Fastiff & Tichy, Wesley J. Fastiff, Nancy L. Ober, San Francisco, for appellant.

Brundage, Beeson, Tayer & Kovach, Kenneth N. Silbert, San Francisco, for respondent.

LAZARUS, ^* Associate Justice.

This is an appeal by Delta Lines, Inc. (hereinafter 'Company') from a judgment denying its petition to vacate an arbitration award in favor of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 468 (hereinafter 'Union') and granting a petition to confirm the award.

The parties have stipulated that the Sole issue that was to be submitted for arbitration was whether Company had Just cause under a collective bargaining contract to discharge a former employee, John G. Platt. Company contends that in making the disputed award the arbitrator exceeded the scope of his authority by deciding an issue that had not been submitted to him for decision. However, the real question here appears to be whether the arbitrator determined the issue that he was called upon to decide at all.

Company is a trucking firm with its principal offices at Oakland, California. Its drivers are all members of Union. Platt was one of its drivers who had worked for Company from September 22, 1972, until his employment was terminated in February 1975. His regular run was between his home terminal at Emeryville, California and Los Angeles, his layover point.

Article 51, section 2(c) of the collective bargaining contract in effect at the time provided under the heading 'Call Time': 'Employees shall be given at least two (2) hours notice when ordered to report for duty at the home terminal. At the away-from-home terminal, driver shall be given two (2) hours notice to report for duty unless otherwise agreed to.'

On the evening of February 12, 1975, Platt was on layover in Los Angeles. According to his work schedule, he was to return to the Bay Area that night at midnight. Accordingly, Company's Los Angeles dispatcher called Platt's hotel early that evening and left a message for Platt to report for duty at the Los Angeles terminal at midnight. The hotel telephone operator called back and reported that she had been calling Platt's room but could not get an answer. The Los Angeles dispatcher then put in a call to Company's line supervisor in the Bay Area, Mr. Mooney. Mooney followed up by instructing Marvin Armstrong, Company's area safety supervisor in Los Angeles, to go to Platt's hotel to see if he could find out why he had not answered his calls. Armstrong arrived at the hotel at approximately 12:10 a.m. The desk clerk at the hotel told Armstrong that she was sure that Platt was in his room because the lights were on. She gave Armstrong a key so that he could check.

On entering Platt's room Armstrong found Platt lying in bed. He attempted to wake him up by calling his name and shaking him but was unable to arouse him. While he was there Armstrong also observed a pistol protruding from under Platt's pillow. He thereupon left the room and returned to the office of the hotel. After some discussion between Armstrong and the room clerk, she put in a call to the Huntington Park police. The police arrived and Armstrong followed them to Platt's hotel room. After several attempts, the police were finally able to awaken Platt. In the meantime, they had found a quantity of pills in the room. They confiscated the pills and arrested Platt.

Platt's run that was scheduled for departure on February 13th from Los Angeles to the Bay Area was therefore necessarily cancelled. Later, he also was unavailable for work on February 17th and 19th because in the meantime he had been in jail following his arrest until February 19th, when he was released on bail.

Prior to the foregoing incident, Platt had received eight warning letters and two suspensions for being absent from his job and he had an employment record that showed a pattern of consistent failure to report for work. On February 20, 1975, Company discharged Platt. The stated reason was his failure to be available for work on February 13, 17 and 19 and his previous disciplinary record for the same infraction.

Union submitted to the contractual grievance procedure the issue of whether Company had just cause to fire Platt as required by article 46, section 1 of their contract with the employer. After the matter was deadlocked at a hearing before the joint grievance committee, Company and Union both agreed to submit the dispute to arbitration before Homer L. Woxberg, Sr. The submission was made pursuant to article 45 of the collective bargaining contract, containing a grievance and arbitration procedure which provides that Company and Union are to submit 'any controversy which may arise' to a prescribed grievance procedure. Section 1(e) of article 45 also provides that any cases deadlocked in the grievance committee 'which pertain to discharge' be submitted 'to umpire handling.' It also includes the following clause: 'The decision of the umpire shall be specifically limited to the matter submitted to him and he shall have no authority in any manner to amend, alter or change any provision of this Agreement.' (Emphasis added.)

At the arbitration hearing on September 11, 1975, the parties entered into the stipulation referred to above that the sole issue for decision by the arbitrator was whether Company had just cause within the meaning of article 46, section 1 of the Union contract to discharge Platt.

On October 10, 1975, the arbitrator issued his findings and award sustaining the grievance, reinstating Platt in his former job at Company and ordering payment of back pay.

In arriving at the award, the arbitrator stated: 'It is the opinion of the Arbitrator Mr. Armstrong's actions made it impossible for Grievant Platt to report for work. ( ) The Arbitrator has serious doubts that Grievant Platt could have made an on-time departure on the 13th even if he had not been arrested. ¹ The Arbitrator was not impressed with the attitude and testimony of the Grievant. This award is based only on the fact that Management erred on February 13th by participating in a police action, resulting in an invasion of privacy.' (Emphasis added.)

Elsewhere, his findings opined: 'The Arbitrator recognizes that such a practice of checking on drivers when they do not respond to a call at their layover point, is not unusual. ( ) The Arbitrator finds no objection to the actions of Area Supervisor Marvin Armstrong up to the time he left Grievant Platt's room after being unable to awaken him. Mr. Armstrong erred in returning to the hotel office and participating in a discussion with the hotel clerk, resulting in a call to the police and accompanying them to Mr. Platt's room. ( ) When Mr. Armstrong failed to awaken Grievant Platt, Delta's interest in the welfare of an employee should have ceased. Mr. Armstrong's only responsibility was to report to his superiors what transpired in Grievant Platt's room. ² No one else (sic).' (Emphasis added.)

At the outset, we are, of course, mindful of the very limited functions of a reviewing court on appeal from the decision of an arbitrator. It has long been the policy of this state to recognize and give the utmost effect to arbitration agreements. The merits of the controversy are not a proper subject for judicial scrutiny. (Meat Cutters Local No. 439 v. Olson Bros. (1960) 186 Cal.App.2d 200, 203--204, 8 Cal.Rptr. 789.) 'The policy of the law in recognizing arbitration agreements and in providing by statute for their enforcement is to encourage persons who wish to avoid delays incident to a civil action to obtain an adjustment of their differences by a tribunal of their own choosing. . . . 'Therefore every reasonable intendment will be indulged to give effect to such proceedings. '' (Utah Constr. Co. v. Western Pac. Ry. Co. (1916) 174 Cal. 156, 159, 162 P. 631, 632.) 'This policy is especially applicable to collective bargaining agreements since arbitration under such agreements has been a potent factor in establishing and maintaining peaceful relations between labor and industry.' (Myers v. Richfield Oil Corp. (1950) 98 Cal.App.2d 667, 671, 220 P.2d 973, 976; see Levy v. Superior Court (1940) 15 Cal.2d 692, 704, 104 P.2d 770.) But the corollary to the rule is that the award must be coextensive with the submission. In fact, the only grounds for setting aside an arbitration award are as set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 1286.2. (State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Guleserian (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 397, 402, 104 Cal.Rptr. 683.) Subdivision (d) of that section provides that the court shall vacate the order if it determines that 'The arbitrators exceeded their powers and the award cannot be corrected without affecting the merits of the decision upon the controversy submitted.' And, as heretofore noted, the collective bargaining agreement between the parties likewise unequivocally provided that 'The decision of the umpire shall be specifically limited to the matter submitted to him.'

,7] An arbitrator thus derives his power solely from the arbitration agreement and he cannot exceed his derived powers. 'There is indeed a strong policy in favor of enforcing agreements to arbitrate, but there is no policy compelling persons to accept arbitration of controversies which they have not agreed to arbitrate and which no statute has made arbitrable.' (Freeman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1975) 14 Cal.3d 473, 481, 121 Cal.Rptr. 477, 482, 535 P.2d 341, 346.)

',9] The powers of an arbitrator are limited and circumscribed by the agreement or ...