Deltona Corp. v. Bailey

• Decision Date: 25 August 1976
• Docket Number: No. 49053,49053
• Citation: 336 So.2d 1163
• Parties: The DELTONA CORPORATION, Appellant, v. James BAILEY, Tax Assessor and Director of Tax Assessments, et al., Appellees.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 1163

336 So.2d 1163

The DELTONA CORPORATION, Appellant, v. James BAILEY, Tax Assessor and Director of Tax Assessments, et al., Appellees.

No. 49053.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Aug. 25, 1976.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 7, 1976.

William L. Earl, of Peeples, Earl & Blank, Miami, for appellant.

William M. Barr, of Raymond, Wilson, Conway, Barr & Burrows, Daytona Beach, Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Larry Levy, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellees.

SUNDBERG, Justice.

This is an appeal from the dismissal for failure to state a cause of action of an amended complaint seeking ad valorem real property tax relief and, also, from earlier orders relating to discovery. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b)(1), Constitution of Florida, in that the trial court initially and directly passed upon the validity of Section 195.062, Florida Statutes (1973) (the 'Rose law'). The trial court found the designated statute to be violative of both the 1968 Florida Constitution and the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Appellant Deltona filed its original complaint on December 5, 1974. Deltona alleged that the tax assessor failed to apply the Rose law and thereby violated its rights under that law, and that the company was denied due process and equal protection in its 1974 tax assessments and subsequent administrative reviews. The circuit court dismissed all counts of the original complaint with leave to amend.

Count I of the amended complaint was predicated on the Rose law. The lower court dismissed Count I because the Rose law violated the 1968 Florida Constitution and both the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The trial court held that the language in Interlachen Lake Estates, Inc. v. Snyder, 304 So.2d 433 (Fla.1973), which stated that the decision would be applied prospectively meant that past transactions in justified reliance on the law would not be disturbed if the result would be an unreasonable hardship on a party acting in good faith. The lower court held that no such justified reliance exists in the instant case.

Count II of the amended complaint was dismissed with further leave to amend; absent such amendment, dismissal was to be with prejudice. The lower court noted that a cause of action for denial of equal protection could be alleged pursuant to Dade County v. Salter, 194 So.2d 587 (Fla.1957), and Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. County of Dade, 275 So.2d 4 (Fla.1973), but held that Deltona had failed to frame its pleadings in conformity with those cases.

Count III of the amended complaint was dismissed in the same manner as Count II. The court held that the pleadings were insufficient in that Deltona failed to allege ultimate facts showing the manner in which it notices from the Assessor were 'faulty, incomplete and inaccurate.' The court noted that although Deltona alleged that it was 'unable to present evidence, confront witnesses or be heard,' Deltona did not allege that those rights were actually denied by the Board and, in fact, from the allegations of the amended complaint it appears that not only did Deltona petition the Board of Tax Adjustment for an administrative review and hearing on its assessment, but that such a hearing and review took place, after which the Board denied relief.

Concerning the discovery issue, Deltona propounded twenty interrogatories to the appellee Tax Assessor in January, 1975. On March 24, 1975, the trial court granted the Tax Assessor's motion for a protective order against answering such interrogatories on the premise that it would be oppressive and burdensome for the Tax Assessor to respond prior to determination of pending motions to dismiss the complaint. After the original complaint was dismissed in an order dated June 18, 1975, Deltona moved on July 30, 1975, to compel answers to its initial interrogatories. This motion was denied by the trial court's order dated October 30, 1975.

Deltona declined to further amend Counts II and III of its complaint within the time limited by the trial court and filed a notice of appeal to the First District Court of Appeal. On appellees' motion the appeal was transferred to this Court pursuant to Rule 2.1a(5)(d), Florida Appellate Rules.

On this appeal Deltona raises five issues, which are: (i) whether the Rose law is applicable for the 1974 tax year; (ii) whether the amended complaint stated a cause of action under the Rose law; (iii) whether the amended complaint stated a cause of action for denial of equal protection; (iv) whether the amended complaint stated a cause of action for denial of due process; and (v) whether the lower court improperly prohibited discovery against the defendants/appellees.

Determination of the first issue turns on an interpretation of the last paragraph of this Court's original decision in Interlachen Lake Estates, Inc. v. Snyder, supra, which reads:

'This decision operates prospectively from the date the opinion becomes final because persons relying on the state statute did so assuming it to be valid despite the new provisions of the 1968 State Constitution. Compare Gulesian v. Dade County School Board, Fla., 281 So.2d 325, opinion filed July 31, 1973, and City of Naples v. Conboy (Fla.), 182 So.2d 412 at 417 et seq.' (emphasis supplied)

In its decision filed September 12, 1973, the Court, in responding to questions certified from the circuit court, held that Section 195.062(1), Florida Statutes (1971), ^* violated the constitutional provision requiring just valuation of all property for ad valorem taxation. After considering a petition for rehearing filed by plaintiffs and hearing oral argument on the petition, this Court adhered to the opinion filed on September 12, 1973. In the instant case the trial court concluded that this Court was without power to give its decision in Interlachen prospective effect, for to do so would be an unauthorized attempt to breathe retroactive life into an organically dead law. The court bottomed its ruling upon the decision of this Court in State ex rel. Nuveen v. Greer, 88 Fla. 249, 102 So. 739 (Fla.1924), wherein it was stated at page 745:

'The courts have no power to make a statute inoperative only from the date of an adjudicated invalidity, because the courts merely adjudge that a statute conflicts with organic law, and the Constitution then operates to make the statute void from its enactment, the courts having no power to control the operation of the Constitution.'

The trial court dismissed as distinguishable the authorities asserted by Deltona to authorize prospective invalidity by concluding that they dealt with equitable considerations of hardship where the parties had relied to their detriments on putatively valid legislation. The trial court reached its conclusion by reference to the two cases cited by Justice Ervin to support the prospective application of invalidity of the Rose law. It construed the implication of the prospective language of the Interlachen Lake Estates decision to mean only that past transactions were not to be disturbed when to do so would create an unreasonable hardship on a party acting in good faith. The court further found no such reliance on the part of Deltona in the instant case. Appellees in this Court similarly maintain that the Gulesian and Conboy cases cited by Justice Ervin make clear that the prospective language in Interlachen Lake Estates precludes only the necessity of undoing past completed transactions and was only to be applicable to instances of extreme hardship. They assert that these cases are bottomed on a doctrine in the nature of equitable estoppel.

There are two problems with the trial court's ruling and the position asserted by the appellees. First, an act of the Legislature is presumed constitutional until invalidated by a final appellate decision. In re Estate of Caldwell, 247 So.2d 1 (Fla.1971); State ex rel. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Board of Equalizers, 84 Fla. 592, 94 So. 681 (1922). Likewise, courts have on various occasions, contrary to the doctrine expressed in Nuveen, supra, applied the principle of prospective constitutional invalidity. See, e.g., City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204, 90 S.Ct. 1990, 26 L.Ed.2d 523 (1970) (state statutory and constitutional provisions restricting franchise in general obligation bond elections to property holders); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 89 S.Ct. 1897, 23 L.Ed.2d 647 (1969) (state statute limiting franchise to 'property taxpayers' in elections called to approve issuance of revenue bonds by municipal utility); State v. Barquet, 262 So.2d 431 (Fla.1972) (abortion statute); Franklin v. State, 257 So.2d 21 (Fla.1971) ('abominable and detestable crime against nature' statute). Second, the Interlachen Lake Estates decision stated in unequivocal language that it was to operate prospectively 'from the date the opinion becomes final.' Clearly the opinion ws not final until the order on petition for rehearing was filed on December 9, 1974. See Kippy Corp. v. Colburn, 177 So.2d 193, 195 (Fla.1965); State ex rel. Owens v. Pearson,156 So.2d 4, 7 (Fla.1963). To the argument, based on Gulesian and Conboy, supra, that the Interlachen Lake Estates decision was limited to the facts and particular hardship involved in that case only, we respond that such an argument is refuted by a plain reading of the decision. The case came to the Court on certified questions pursuant to Florida Appellate Rule 4.6 without any discussion in the opinion of any peculiar factual situations. In addition, Justice Ervin stated that the decision was to operate prospectively 'because Persons relying on the state statute did so assuming it to be valid despite the new provisions of the 1968 State Constitution.' (emphasis supplied) Use of the word 'persons' makes clear that the decision was not limited to the taxpayers...