Delucchi v. County of Santa Cruz

• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: O'FARRELL; BRAUER
• Citation: Delucchi v. County of Santa Cruz, 225 Cal.Rptr. 43, 179 Cal.App.3d 814 (Cal. App. 1986)
• Decision Date: 03 April 1986
• Parties: Andrew DELUCCHI and Dorothy G.S. Delucchi, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. COUNTY OF SANTA CRUZ, et al. Defendants and Appellants. H000161.

Page 43

225 Cal.Rptr. 43

179 Cal.App.3d 814

Andrew DELUCCHI and Dorothy G.S. Delucchi, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. COUNTY OF SANTA CRUZ, et al. Defendants and Appellants.

H000161.

Court of Appeal, Sixth District, California.

April 3, 1986.

Review Denied June 18, 1986.

Certiorari Denied Oct. 6, 1986. See 107 S.Ct. 46.

John K. Van De Kamp, Atty. Gen., N. Gregory Taylor, Asst. Atty. Gen., Joseph Barbieri, Deputy Atty. Gen., San Francisco, for appellant California Coastal Com'n.

Dwight L. Herr, County Counsel, Santa Cruz, for appellant Santa Cruz County.

Thomas F. Olson, Jennifer Mellett von Nosler, California Farm Bureau Federation, Sacramento, for amicus curiae California Farm Bureau Federation.

Dennis J. Kehoe, Adams, Levin, Kehoe, Bosso, Sachs & Bates, Santa Cruz, for respondents.

O'FARRELL, Associate Justice. ^*

Plaintiffs Andrew and Dorothy Delucchi are the owners of approximately 163 acres of land in the coastal zone bordering the residential community of La Selva Beach in Santa Cruz County. On February 23, 1971, plaintiffs and the County of Santa Cruz (County) entered into a contract pursuant to the Land Conservation Act of 1965, also known as the Williamson Act (Gov. Code §§ 51200-51295) wherein it was agreed that the above-noted property would be restricted to agricultural and compatible uses. Thereafter, County placed the subject property into an "agricultural preserve" (A-P) zone. The A-P zone in effect at the time the contract was executed authorized a single-family dwelling for each ten acres of total site area as a permitted, i.e. non-discretionary, use. Except for certain specified conditional uses, all agricultural uses, including "accessory buildings", were similarly designated as permitted uses for which it was not necessary to obtain a discretionary permit from the County. Greenhouses were not specified as conditional uses.

On November 7, 1972, the California Coastal Act (now codified in Pub. Res. Code sections 30000 et seq.) was adopted by voter initiative. ¹ Pursuant to the mandates of the Coastal Act, as revised by the State Legislature, County was required to adopt a Local Coastal Program (LCP) which conformed to the policies of the Coastal Act. (Pub. Res. Code, §§ 30500-30525) In 1982, as part of the implementation of its LCP, County adopted new zoning ordinances, including a revised A-P zone applicable to the subject property. Under this revised A-P zone, a discretionary permit, including coastal permit approval, is required for the construction of dwelling units (one single-family unit per 40 acres), greenhouses and other agricultural structures.

In 1982, plaintiff commenced the underlying actions ² against County and the California Coastal Commission (Commission) alleging, inter alia, that the adoption of the revised A-P zone constituted a breach of their Williamson Act contract and violated a number of their rights under the United States Constitution, including the contract and due process clauses, and also violated the federal Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1983). They sought specific performance, damages and attorney's fees.

At trial, plaintiffs sought to establish the following through extrinsic evidence: that they had been induced to enter the Williamson Act contract by promises of County officials that the text of the A-P zone, including the designation of permitted and conditional uses, would remain the same throughout the term of the contract; that plaintiffs would not have entered into the contract had they thought that the County could unilaterally change the text of the A-P zone ordinance; that the alleged guarantee of land uses, as designated in the original A-P zone, was a part of their contract; and that the primary reason for plaintiffs' execution of the contract was to guarantee these land uses for the life of the contract. Evidence supporting these allegations consisted of plaintiff Andrew Delucchi's testimony concerning oral representations made prior to the execution of the contract by the Tax Assessor and the Planning Director, to the effect that the contract would freeze the zoning.

According to Delucchi, plaintiffs intended to construct family dwellings for themselves and their two adult daughters and to engage in various agricultural land uses. In fact, at time of trial plaintiffs had already completed the construction of two single-family dwellings on the property, one for each of their daughters and their respective families. These homes were built in 1980 and 1982 after plaintiffs applied for and were granted discretionary permits from the Commission.

Following a two-day trial, the court below found the written contract was ambiguous concerning the question of whether or not the original A-P zone was to remain in effect throughout the term of the contract. Resolving this ambiguity against the County, the trial court concluded that the contract did contain a promise not to alter the original A-P zone. Accordingly, the trial court ruled plaintiffs were entitled to specific performance and enjoined the County and the Commission from altering, interfering with, or otherwise modifying the contract at issue, including the A-P district regulations and text in effect on the date of the execution of the contract. Notwithstanding its decision concerning the interpretation of the terms of the contract, the trial court also determined that plaintiffs were still subject to the permit requirements of the Coastal Act and must apply for a discretionary permit from the Coastal Commission for the construction of any additional dwellings on the property. Regarding the construction of greenhouses, however, the trial court held that the Coastal Act does not apply to such structures. Finally, the trial court ruled that the case constituted a private action which did not "rise to the dignity of a Civil Rights Act violation", and therefore ordered each party to bear their own attorney fees.

All parties have appealed. Appellants, the County and Commission, contend that the trial court erred in ruling that greenhouses do not constitute a "development" under the Coastal Act. They further contend that the Williamson Act contract did not freeze the original A-P zone or, if it did, that such a provision would be invalid as an unlawful delegation of its zoning authority pursuant to the police power. Plaintiffs/cross-appellants urge a reversal of that part of the trial court's judgment requiring a discretionary permit for additional dwellings. They also seek a reversal of that portion of the judgment denying their various claims under the Civil Rights Act ³ and contend that they are entitled to attorney's fees on both the trial and appellate levels pursuant to section 1988. ⁴

Discussion

In 1965, our State Legislature enacted the Williamson Act in an endeavor to preserve agricultural land and discourage the premature and unnecessary conversion of such land to urban uses. (Gov. Code § 51200 et seq.) Under the act local governments are authorized to establish agricultural preserves (Gov. Code § 51230) wherein land uses are limited to agricultural and compatible uses. (Gov. Code § 51243) The act further empowers the government entity to enter into annually renewable contracts restricting land use for a minimum term of ten years. (Gov. Code §§ 51240, 51242, 51244) In return for agreeing to restrict the use of his land in accordance with the act, the landowner receives a reduced property tax assessment based on the value of the land for its current use as opposed to its market value. (Cal. Const., art. XIII, § 8, formerly art. XXVIII ⁵; Sierra Club v. City of Hayward (1981) 28 Cal.3d 840, 851, 171 Cal.Rptr. 619, 623 P.2d 180; Honey Springs Homeowners Assn. v. Board of Supervisors (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 1122, 1131, 203 Cal.Rptr. 886; Shellenberger v. Board of Equalization (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 510, 513, 195 Cal.Rptr. 168; Kelsey v. Colwell (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 590, 592, 106 Cal.Rptr. 420.) The landowner may terminate the contract by serving notice upon the local government, but is prescribed from developing the land during the balance of the contract term. (Gov. Code § 51246) Upon notice of non-renewal, taxes on the property gradually return to tax levels for non-restricted property. (Rev. & Tax Code § 426)

I. The Contract Cannot Reasonably Be Interpreted As a Promise By the County That the Existing Zoning Would Not Be Changed.

The applicable principles of appellate review concerning the interpretation of written agreements are well settled. "[I]t is a 'judicial function to interpret a written instrument unless the interpretation turns upon the credibility of extrinsic evidence.' The possibility that conflicting inferences can be drawn from uncontroverted evidence does not relieve the appellate court of its duty independently to interpret the instrument; it is only when the issue turns upon the credibility of extrinsic evidence, or requires a resolution of a conflict in that evidence that the trial court determination is binding. [Citation.]" (Estate of Dodge (1971) 6 Cal.3d 311, 318, 98 Cal.Rptr. 801, 491 P.2d 385; accord Gribaldo, Jacobs, Jones & Associates v. Agrippina Versicherunges A.G. (1970) 3 Cal.3d 434, 445, 91 Cal.Rptr. 6, 476 P.2d 406; Parsons v. Bristol Development Co. (1965) 62 Cal.2d 861, 865, 44 Cal.Rptr. 767, 402 P.2d 839; Blumenfeld v. R.H. Macy & Co. (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 38, 44, 154 Cal.Rptr. 652.)

"The test of admissibility of extrinsic evidence to explain the meaning of a written instrument is not whether it appears to the court to be plain and unambiguous on its face, but whether the offered evidence is relevant to prove a meaning to which the language of the instrument is reasonably susceptible. [Citations.]" (Garcia v. Truck Ins. Exchange (1984) 36 Cal.3d 426, 435, 204 Cal.Rptr. 435, 682 P.2d 1100, quoting Pacific Gas & E. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage Etc. Co. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 33, 37, 69 Cal.Rptr. 561, 442 P.2d 641; accord Blumenfeld v. R.H. Macy &...