Demarest v. Manspeaker
| Citation | 498 U.S. 184,112 L.Ed.2d 608,111 S.Ct. 599 |
| Decision Date | 08 January 1991 |
| Docket Number | No. 89-5916,89-5916 |
| Parties | Richard DEMAREST, Petitioner, v. James MANSPEAKER et al |
| Court | United States Supreme Court |
Petitioner Demarest, an inmate in a state correctional facility, testified as a witness in a federal criminal trial pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum issued by the District Court. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1825(a), he requested that respondent Clerk of the Court certify that he was entitled to fees as a "witness . . . in attendance" under § 1821. After the request was denied, he filed a petition for a writ of mandamus requesting the court to order the Clerk to certify the fees, which was dismissed on the ground that § 1821 does not authorize the payment of witness fees to prisoners. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that while § 1821's language was unqualified, other evidence revealed that Congress did not intend to permit prisoners to receive witness fees.
Held: Section 1821 requires payment of witness fees to a convicted state prisoner who testifies at a federal trial pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum. The statute's terms make virtually inescapable the conclusion that a "witness in attendance at any court of the United States" under § 1821(a)(1) includes prisoners unless they are otherwise excepted in the statute. That Congress was thinking about incarcerated persons when it drafted the statute is shown by the fact that subsection (d)(1) excluded incarcerated witnesses from eligibility for subsistence payments and subsection (e) expressly excepted another class of incarcerated witnesses—detained aliens—from any eligibility for fees. Respondents' argument that the language of § 1825(a)—which requires that fees be paid to defense witnesses "appearing pursuant to subpoenas issued upon approval of the court"—modifies the "in attendance" at court language of § 1821(a)(1) to exclude prisoners because they are "produced" under a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum is rejected. That reading is inconsistent with the respondents' concession that fees are routinely paid to defense witnesses appearing by verbal agreement among the parties and with Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S. 578, 93 S.Ct. 1157, 35 L.Ed.2d 508, which upheld the right to fees of material witnesses who, rather than being subpoenaed, were detained under former Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 46(b). If these are exceptions to respondents' concept of "in attendance," then that concept means no more than "summoned by a means other than a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum." Such a view is not supported by the statutory language and would lead to the anomaly that prisoners summoned to testify for the Government would receive fees—since § 1825(a) does not require them to appear personally by subpoena—while witnesses summoned by the defendant would not. In reaching its decision, the Court of Appeals mistakenly relied on longstanding administrative construction of the statute and other Courts of Appeals' decisions denying attendance fees to prisoners, followed by congressional revision of the statute. Administrative interpretation of a statute contrary to the statute's plain language is not entitled to deference, and, where the law is plain, subsequent reenactment does not constitute adoption of a previous administrative construction. This case does not present a rare and exceptional circumstance where the application of the statute as written will produce a result demonstrably at odds with its drafters' intentions. While there may be good reasons to deny fees to prisoners, who are seldom gainfully employed and therefore do not suffer the loss of income for attendance that many other witnesses do, the same can be said of children and retired persons, who are clearly entitled to fees. This Court declines to consider respondents' argument that defects in Demarest's petition constitute an independent basis for the Clerk's decision to withhold certification, since it was not raised in the courts below. Pp. 601-604.
884 F.2d 1343 (C.A.10 1989), reversed.
James E. Scarboro, Denver, Colo., for petitioner.
Michael R. Lazerwitz, Washington, D.C., for respondents.
The question presented is whether 28 U.S.C. § 1821 requires payment of witness fees to a convicted state prisoner who testifies at a federal trial pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit concluded that it does not. We disagree and conclude that it does.
In March 1988, petitioner Richard Demarest, an inmate in a Colorado state correctional facility, was summoned to appear as a defense witness in a federal criminal trial. He was transported by a United States marshal to the Denver County Jail pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum which had been issued by the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. Demarest testified on the 8th day of the 11-day trial and remained in the custody of federal marshals throughout that period. After completing his testimony, Demarest sought fees as a "witness . . . in attendance," pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1821 for the eight days that he was available to testify and the two days that he spent in transit to and from the Denver County Jail.
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1825(a), petitioner requested that the Clerk of the District Court, respondent James Manspeaker, certify that petitioner was entitled to receive witness fees, and forward that certification to the United States marshal for payment of the fee. Respondent forwarded petitioner's request to the United States attorney, who in turn denied petitioner's request for certification on the ground that § 1821(a) does not entitle prisoners to receive witness fees. Demarest subsequently sought a writ of mandamus requesting the District Court to order Manspeaker to certify his request for fees. The District Court dismissed the petition, agreeing with respondent that § 1821 does not authorize the payment of witness fees to prisoners.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed by a divided vote. 884 F.2d 1343 (1989). The court held that while the language of § 1821 was "unqualified," other evidence revealed that Congress did not intend to permit prisoners to receive witness fees. We granted certiorari, 495 U.S. 903, 110 S.Ct. 1921, 109 L.Ed.2d 285 (1990), in order to determine whether a convicted state prisoner brought to testify at a federal trial by virtue of a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum is entitled to witness fees under § 1821.
In deciding a question of statutory construction, we begin of course with the language of the statute. Section 1821 provides as follows:
"(a)(1) Except as otherwise provided by law, a witness in attendance at any court of the United States . . . shall be paid the fees and allowances provided by this section.
. . . . .
. . . . .
"(d)(1) A subsistence allowance shall be paid to a witness (other than a witness who is incarcerated) when an overnight stay is required at the place of attendance because such place is so far removed from the residence of such witness as to prohibit return thereto from day to day.
. . . . .
"(e) An alien who has been paroled into the United States for prosecution, pursuant to section 212(d)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(5)), or an alien who either has admitted belonging to a class of aliens who are deportable or has been determined pursuant to section 242(b) of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1252(b)) to be deportable, shall be ineligible to receive the fees or allowances provided by this section."
Subsection (a)(1) provides that a "witness in attendance at any court of the United States" shall be paid fees. Subsection (b) provides that "a witness shall be paid an attendance fee of $30." Subsection (d)(1) provides for subsistence fees to witnesses, but excepts those who are incarcerated. Subsection (e) excludes paroled or deportable aliens from eligibil- ity for fees. We think this analysis shows that Congress was thinking about incarcerated individuals when it drafted the statute, since it excluded them from eligibility for subsistence fees. We believe subsection (e) removes all doubt on this question, since Congress expressly excepted another class of incarcerated witnesses—detained aliens—from eligibility for fees. The conclusion is virtually inescapable, therefore, that the general language "witness in attendance at any court of the United States" found in subsection (a)(1) includes prisoners unless they are otherwise excepted in the statute.
Respondents rely on the cognate provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1825 to sustain the decision below. That section provides:
"(a) In any case in which the United States . . . is a party, the United States marshal for the district shall pay all fees of witnesses on the certificate of the United States attorney or assistant United States attorney, . . . except that any fees of defense witnesses, other than experts, appearing pursuant to subpoenas issued upon approval of the court, shall be paid by the United States marshal for the district—
. . . . .
"(2) on the certificate of the clerk of the court upon the affidavit of such witnesses' attendance given by . . . counsel appointed pursuant to section 3006A of title 18, in a criminal case in which a defendant is represented by such . . . counsel."
Respondents first argue that Demarest did not satisfy the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1825 because he failed to allege that he appeared pursuant to...
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