Dement v. Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R. Co., 87-2069

• Decision Date: 26 April 1988
• Docket Number: No. 87-2069,87-2069
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit
• Parties: 128 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2235, 108 Lab.Cas. P 10,462 R. DEMENT; J.H. Hines; V.N. Meekins; L.A. Koenig, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. RICHMOND, FREDERICKSBURG & POTOMAC RAILROAD COMPANY; United Transportation Union, Defendants-Appellees.

Page 451

845 F.2d 451

128 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2235, 108 Lab.Cas. P 10,462

R. DEMENT; J.H. Hines; V.N. Meekins; L.A. Koenig, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. RICHMOND, FREDERICKSBURG & POTOMAC RAILROAD COMPANY; United

Transportation Union, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 87-2069.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued Nov. 2, 1987.

Decided April 26, 1988.

Robert Patrick Geary, Richmond, Va., for plaintiffs-appellants.

William Francis Sheehan (Shea & Gardner, Washington, D.C., James V. Meath, Williams, Mullin, Christian & Dobbins, on brief), Jay J. Levit (Levit & Mann, Richmond, Va., Clinton J. Miller, III, Asst. Gen. Counsel United Transp. Union, Washington, D.C., on brief), for defendants-appellees.

Before WINTER, Chief Judge, HALL, Circuit Judge, and KAUFMAN, Senior United States District Judge for the District of Maryland, sitting by designation.

FRANK A. KAUFMAN, Senior District Judge, sitting by designation:

Appellants, four railroad workers, appeal from the district court's dismissal of their so-called "hybrid" action against their union, the United Transportation Union (UTU), and their employer, the Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac Railroad Company (RF & P). We affirm the dismissal of two of appellants' three claims against the UTU, but remand the third claim for further proceedings. We also affirm the dismissal of the appellants' action against the RF & P, but for reasons different from those stated by the district court.

I.

Appellants R. Dement, J.H. Hines, Jr., V.N. Meekins and L.A. Koenig (hereinafter collectively "appellants") are employees of the former Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company (Seaboard). ¹ On November 12, 1986, they filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia against their union, the UTU, for breach of the latter's statutory duty of fair representation imposed upon it by the Railway Labor Act (RLA), 45 U.S.C. Secs. 151-188 (1982). Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 96 S.Ct. 1048, 47 L.Ed.2d 231 (1976); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 87 S.Ct. 903, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967). Also joined as a defendant in the suit is the RF & P, which, appellants allege, violated its collective bargaining agreement with the UTU. If appellants are given the benefit of all reasonable inferences, the facts as alleged are as follows: ²

In 1970, in connection with Seaboard's merger with another railroad, ³ Seaboard and the RF & P agreed to consolidate railroad yard operations which, up until that time, were performed in both Seaboard's Hermitage Yard in Richmond and the RF & P's Acca Yard, also in Richmond. Under the terms of the 1970 agreement (Consolidation Agreement), Seaboard discontinued its operations then performed at the Hermitage Yard and transferred them to the Acca Yard. The Consolidation Agreement gave to Seaboard employees, who had previously worked at the Hermitage Yard, the right to bid on and fill similar positions at the Acca Yard. Whenever the Seaboard employees worked at the Acca Yard under that arrangement, their employment was governed by whatever collective bargaining agreements the RF & P had negotiated with its UTU local, and that same UTU local also represented the Seaboard employees with respect to grievances arising out of their work at the Acca Yard. The Consolidation Agreement also permitted these Seaboard employees to retain the right to bid on jobs at Seaboard facilities other than the defunct Hermitage Yard. When Seaboard employees worked at Seaboard's other facilities, they were subject to the applicable bargaining agreement between Seaboard and its UTU local, and that local represented the employees with respect to grievances against Seaboard.

In 1979, the RF & P and RF & P's UTU local negotiated a new agreement, the "Crew Consist Agreement," the terms of which, appellants charge, violated the protections afforded appellants under the Consolidation Agreement. Essentially, the Crew Consist Agreement allowed the RF & P to reduce the size of the train crews which worked in the Acca Yard. In exchange for that reduction, the RF & P agreed to pay those employees who worked as members of the smaller train crews additional pay to serve "as compensation for the additional services and responsibilities consistent with the operation of a reduced crew." Crew Consist Agreement, p 3. The Crew Consist Agreement, however, limited the class of employees who were entitled to the extra pay to two groups. The first group consisted of so-called "protected employees," i.e., "all employees initially hired by RF & P and holding seniority on the combined road/yard roster as of [April 1, 1979]." Crew Consist Agreement, p 2. The second group was comprised of all workers employed after April 1, 1979. Crew Consist Agreement, p 3. Because appellants were not initially hired by the RF & P, they were not treated as "protected employees." Furthermore, because appellants were hired prior to April 1, 1979, they also failed to come within the second group of employees covered by the Crew Consist Agreement.

According to appellants, they did not become aware of the terms of the Crew Consist Agreement until February 1982. At that time, appellant Koenig, who was then working on a reduced crew at the Acca Yard, sought, but was denied, the additional payments made to "protected employees" under the Crew Consist Agreement. The denial of Koenig's payments precipitated a four-year struggle between the UTU, the RF & P, and the Seaboard employees excluded from coverage of the Crew Consist Agreement. The battle was waged on two fronts, between the Seaboard employees and the RF & P, and also between the Seaboard employees and their own union. In March 1983 appellant Dement, the Chairman of Seaboard's UTU local, requested that the RF & P's management rescind the Crew Consist Agreement. The RF & P, however, refused to deal with Dement, claiming that only members of the RF & P's UTU local were authorized to handle the RF & P employee grievances in question.

Most of appellants' attempts to resolve their contractual differences, however, occurred within the UTU hierarchy itself. From January 1983 until the spring of 1984, appellant Dement was in touch with various UTU officials, including UTU President Fred Hardin, seeking their help in amending the Crew Consist Agreement so as to include the Seaboard employees. Although the UTU allegedly promised to investigate the matter and certain meetings were held, ⁴ Dement's efforts were apparently unsuccessful. The existing record suggests that the union officials may have been less than solicitous of the concerns of the Seaboard employees. ⁵

Finally, on June 1, 1984, an arbitration board known as the "Public Law Board" (Board) constituted pursuant to the RLA, see 45 U.S.C. Sec. 153, ⁶ adjudicated appellant Koenig's claim that the denial of payments to him in 1982 was incorrect. In a two-to-one decision, ⁷ the Board rejected Koenig's claim, reasoning in relevant part as follows:

The [UTU] bases its claim on the fact that the [Seaboard] Employees working on the RF & P are performing additional services for the latter Carrier but are not receiving payment.

The Claimant [Koenig] is not a "protected Employee" because he was not initially hired by RF & P, which is a requirement of the Agreement in question. Nor was he hired subsequent to April 1, 1979. This Claimant was, of course, initially hired by [Seaboard].

This Board has no authority or jurisdiction to extend the terms of Agreements between the two parties to individuals who were clearly not covered by the terms of the Agreement. Accordingly, we have no alternative but to deny the claim.

The Board's ruling was limited to an interpretation of the Crew Consist Agreement. Koenig did not raise, nor did the Board address, the question of whether the terms of that agreement violated the 1970 Consolidation Agreement.

A little over one month after the Board's determination, appellant Dement, acting on behalf of the Seaboard employees, wrote to UTU President Hardin. Dement informed Hardin that he intended to retain an attorney and sue both the UTU and the RF & P over the Crew Consist Agreement. In that letter, in discussing why he would bring suit at that time, Dement stated his interpretation of the UTU Constitution:

According to Article 28 of the U.T.U. [sic] Constitution, I am not allowed to seek self help in the form of a civil law suit until all avenues of appeals have been exhausted. It is my understanding that the ruling [of the Board on Koenig's claim] ... constitutes the end of all appeals. ⁸

About a week later, President Hardin replied to Dement's letter, declining to take any action in connection with the contractual dispute until he received appropriate comments from the UTU General Chairman, R.E. Thompson. Commenting with regard to Dement's understanding of the UTU Constitution, Hardin rather cryptically wrote: "The decisions by Public Law Boards are final and binding on both parties."

On August 1, 1984, Dement answered both Hardin's letter and one received from R.E. Thompson as well. ⁹ Dement's August 1st letter stated his understanding that the Board's denial of Koenig's claim was the end of the UTU's internal grievance procedures, and that Dement was entitled to bring a civil suit with respect to claims arising under the Crew Consist Agreement. Dement's letter also reflected that as of August 1, 1984, the Seaboard employees were extremely dissatisfied with the union's handling of the Crew Consist Agreement grievance:

I have not talked with an attorney yet, since I feel I must await your decision. However, my [union] local ..., in anticipation, passed a motion over a year ago that I should do so, since this ruling was expected. I cannot accurately express the feelings that I and the other members hold other than that of exasperation.

From late August 1984 until June 1986, appellants allege that the UTU attempted to dissuade them from filing the...